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U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL STRATEGY REPORT
MARCH 1995
BUREAU FOR INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS AND LAW ENFORCEMENT AFFAIRS

AFRICA AND THE MIDDLE EAST 413
Cote d'Ivoire 415
Egypt 417
Ethiopia 419
Ghana 421
Israel 424
Kenya 427
Lebanon 429
Morocco 433
Nigeria 435
Senegal 439
Syria 441
Tunisia 445

Other Africa 446
Algeria 446
Botswana
Cameroon
Cape Verde
Jordan
Lesotho
Mauritius
Mozambique
Namibia
Niger
Seychelles
Sierra Leone
Sudan
Swaziland
Togo
Uganda
Zambia
Zimbabwe

COTE D'IVOIRE

I. Summary

Cote d'Ivoire is a transit point for heroin from Asia and cocaine from South Am
erica destined for North American and European markets. There is some producti
on of low grade cannabis, primarily for domestic consumption. Domestic use of
other illegal drugs, especially heroin and cocaine, are rising. The vast major
ity of those arrested for drug related offenses are of Ivoirian nationality. T
he National Drug Police (NDP), while recognizing the problem of narcotics traff
icking, is hampered by a lack of resources. In 1994, a project letter of agree
ment was signed between the Government of Cote d'Ivoire (GOCI) and the USG rela
tive to the fight against narcotics trafficking. Cote d'Ivoire is a party to t
he 1988 UN Convention.

II. Status of Country

The production of narcotics in Cote d'Ivoire is limited to the cultivation of l
ow-grade cannabis, primarily for domestic consumption. While there is no wide-
spread drug use in the country, the influx of both heroin and cocaine concerns
authorities. Abidjan serves as a regional hub for both international airline t
ravel and financial activity, and thus is an attractive site for the transshipm
ent of narcotics, and for money laundering. There is no evidence of any narcot
ics processing in Cote d'Ivoire.

III. Country Action Against Drugs in 1994

Policy Initiatives. The GOCI took a number of small steps in meeting the 1988
UN Convention objectives. In July, the Minister of Security chaired a cabinet-
level meeting to ensure that all GOCI counternarcotics programs are properly co
ordinated.

Accomplishments. There were no significant counternarcotics accomplishments dur
ing the year. Despite an apparent willingness to combat trafficking, the GOCI
lacks resources to devote to meaningful drug control actions.

Law Enforcement Efforts. The effectiveness of the GOCI's law enforcement activ
ities is limited by the lack of training and resources.

Corruption. There were no significant arrests and/or prosecutions for corrupti
on in 1994, nor is there any evidence to implicate public officials in corrupt
practices.

Agreements and Treaties. The GOCI is a party to the 1961 UN Single Convention,
the 1972 Protocol thereto, and the 1971 Convention on Psychotropic Substances.
In 1991, it ratified the 1988 UN Convention. In 1992, 1993 and 1994, it sign
ed letters of Agreement with the USG seeking to enhance GOCI capabilities to su
ppress the cultivation, processing, trafficking, consumption and transshipment
of illicit narcotics.

Drug Flow/Transit. Abidjan's Houphouet-Boigny International Airport is used a
s the primary transit point in the country for the flow of Asian heroin and coc
aine. It is difficult to gauge the amount of drugs transiting the country, sin
ce the GOCI's data base is unreliable.

Demand Reduction. The GOCI's modest demand reduction program is limited to the
publication of news articles on drug abuse and on the penalties associated wi
th illicit narcotics use and trafficking.

IV. US Policy Initiatives and Programs.

Policy Initiatives. The USG focuses on ways to limiting the use of Abidjan as
a transit point for narcotics trafficking.

Bilateral Cooperation. The bilateral agreements of 1992, 1993 and 1994 helped
to relieve some of the GOCI's logistical problems in combatting narcotics. USG
and GOCI law enforcement officials cooperate will and share information.

Road Ahead. The USG will continue to seek a decrease the use of Abidjan's Houp
houet-Boigny International Airport for the transshipment of narcotics.


EGYPT

I. Summary

Egypt's role as transit point for opium and cannabis destined for other countri
es in the Middle East, Europe and the United States continued in 1994. Egyptia
n authorities eradicated an area in the Sinai region capable of producing ten t
imes as much opium as was eradicated in the 1993 campaign. The GOE believes th
at the increased cultivation was intended for domestic markets. Cannabis culti
vation and eradication also increased significantly with over seven million pla
nts destroyed in the Sinai region this year. Domestic demand for opium remaine
d low but increasing. Widespread hashish consumption continued. There is incr
eased abuse of pharmaceutical drugs though the scope is difficult to gauge beca
use prescriptions are not required to purchase pharmaceuticals in Egypt.

Egypt has ratified the 1988 UN Convention, but competition for resources from h
igher GOE priorities such as counter terrorism hamper efforts to fully comply.
There were some indications of low-level narcotics-related public corruption i
n 1994.

II. Status of Country

Egypt continues to serve as a significant transit point for heroin from Southea
st and Southwest Asia to Europe and the United States. Cultivation of cannabis
and opium is a small, but growing problem, and the GOE has been aggressive in
eradicating suspected cultivation. The GOE has begun to address the transit pr
oblem in the Suez Canal.

III. Country Against Drugs

Accomplishments. The GOE's aggressive eradication campaign in the Sinai region
resulted in the destruction of over 10.3 million poppy plants and 7 million ca
nnabis plants. In November the GOE formally adopted a comprehensive drug contr
ol strategy that coordinates the use of ANGA, Customs, police and some military
resources in law enforcement, particularly interdiction at entry points. In a
ddition, the strategy involves non-governmental organizations in planning drug
awareness programs. The strategy also addresses the need to establish drug tre
atment programs.

Law Enforcement Efforts. The GOE strictly enforced its strong anti-narcotics l
aws and began work on bolstering money laundering and controlled delivery legis
lation. Bilateral efforts focussed on coordination of law enforcement activity
through the implementation of a narcotics task force approach.

The GOE's Anti-Narcotics General Administration (ANGA) continues to conduct eff
ective airport interdiction programs. ANGA coordinates its activities with the
frontier police, customs, and police narcotic units in the provinces. ANGA's
successful eradication campaign in the Sinai region was conducted with material
s and technical support provided by the Ministry of Agriculture.

Corruption. There were no reports of any senior GOS officials engaged in narco
tics trafficking. There were indications of limited low-level corruption as lo
w salaries make law enforcement agencies vulnerable to corruption.

Agreements and Treaties. Egypt has a bilateral counternarcotics agreement with
the United States signed in 1991. The existing extradition treaty with the US
G dates from the Ottoman Empire. The USG has not made any narcotics-related ex
tradition requests since 1989.

Egypt has bilateral agreements with Tunisia, Syria, Pakistan, India, Germany, J
ordan, Italy, the United Kingdom, and the United States. All agreements featur
e cooperation with police agencies in joint investigation, timely exchange of i
ntelligence information, extradition, law enforcement assistance (equipment/tra
ining), judicial assistance (role of the judiciary, training of prosecutors, ju
dges, and formulation of laws).

Cultivation/Production. Egyptian authorities destroyed over 10.3 million opium
plants and 7 million cannabis plants in 1994. Cultivation is concentrated in
remote areas of the Sinai region and along the Nile River in southern Egypt.

US Programs. The United States will continue to make regional training opportu
nities available to the GOE. The USG will continue to seek the full implementa
tion of its 1991 bilateral counternarcotics agreement and its amendments with t
he GOE. Major USG policy objectives are:

- To exchange information with the GOE regarding the trafficking of illegal dru
gs through Egypt and on to the United States and Europe.

- To detect and interdict heroin shipments through Egypt to the United States t
hrough a wire intercept program and other efforts.

- To provide training, equipment, and advice to Egyptian law enforcement person
nel so that they may function independently, efficiently, and professionally to
counter narcotics trafficking.

Road Ahead. The USG will continue to seek full implementation of the 1991 bila
teral agreement with Egypt and its 1992 and 1993 amendments, to include the arr
ival, installation, and use of USG provided equipment, and the implementation o
f an effective Suez Canal interdiction program. The USG will continue its coop
eration with the GOE in both bilateral and regional counternarcotics efforts.


ETHIOPIA

I. Summary

The only illicit (but licit in Ethiopia) drug produced and consumed in Ethiopia
is qat, some of which is also exported to neighboring countries. Addis Ababa'
s international airport, a regional air hub, increasingly is being used as a na
rcotics transshipment point primarily for heroin originating in India and Thail
and destined for Europe and North America. Modest efforts have been made by th
e transitional Government of Ethiopia (TGE) to overhaul law enforcement and jud
icial efforts to combat narcotics trafficking and, although in 1994 Ethiopia be
came a party to the 1988 UN Convention, much remains to be done.

II. Status of Country

Ethiopia serves as a regional air hub which connects South Asia with the Middle
East and West Africa, and evidence indicates a significant increase in the num
ber of narcotics shipments transiting Addis Ababa. Criminal sentences in Ethio
pia for trafficking offenses are not severe and offer little deterrent to drug
couriers. Statistics kept on drug arrests and qat production are not accurate
and are therefore suspect.

III. Country Actions Against Drugs in 1994

Policy initiatives. In 1994 Ethiopia became a party to the 1988 UN Convention
and to the 1971 Protocol to the 1961 Single Convention, to which it is also a p
arty. In addition, Ethiopia is a party to the 1971 Convention. Under pressure
from the US and other countries, the TGE has shown greater concern in addressi
ng all aspects of drug trafficking and consumption, and has begun the process t
o improve its counternarcotics capability.

Law Enforcement Efforts. A large seizure of heroin at Addis' Bole Internationa
l Airport (10 kgs.) was made during 1994 resulting in the arrest of several Nig
erians and one Ethiopian. As part of the general move to overhaul the antinarc
otics apparatus, Ethiopian judges have begun to impose sentences for drug convi
ctions which exceed current statutory limits.

Corruption. Corruption of TGE officials is not a problem in Ethiopia. The TGE
does not as a matter of government policy encourage or facilitate illicit prod
uction or distribution of illicit drugs or the laundering of drug money.

Agreements and Treaties. During 1994 the TGE signed a Regional Counternarcot
ics Cooperation Agreement with Eritrea whereby the two countries agreed to exch
ange information. The Ethiopians have agreed in principle to expand this agree
ment to neighboring countries.

Cultivation and Production. Ethiopia is a leading producer of qat, a stimulant
used most commonly by Yemenis and the ethnic Somalis in Ethiopia, Djibouti and
Somalia. Several tons of qat is flown daily into these neighboring countries
via commercial and charter flights. The production, exportation and consumptio
n of qat is entirely legal both in Ethiopia as well as in the importing neighbo
ring countries.

Drug Flow/Transit. There is no doubt that significant amounts of heroin are tr
ansiting Addis Ababa, originating in Bombay, Karachi and Bangkok, and destined
for Lagos and other West African countries for further transit to Europe and No
rth America.

Demand Reduction. Ethiopia does not have a significant narcotics consumption p
roblem (other than qat, which is legal). However, the TGE no longer ignores th
e heroin transshipments and recognizes that a domestic consumption problem is o
ften a byproduct of a narcotics transit operation. Consequently, efforts were
made in 1994 to develop a public awareness program to highlight the dangers pos
ed by narcotics, particularly heroin.

IV. US Policy Initiatives and Programs.

Policy initiatives. US counternarcotics goals within Ethiopia focus entirely
on eliminating, or at least limiting, the use of Addis Ababa as a transit point
for international heroin smugglers. The USG will also press the post-transiti
onal government to sign the 1988 UN Convention.

Bilateral cooperation. In April 1994, the USG funded two Ethiopian counternarc
otics officers' attendance at a regional counternarcotics conference in Harare,
Zimbabwe, and again, in July, a senior Ethiopian counternarcotics officer atte
nded a one-month DEA management conference in Washington, funded by the USG. I
n September 1994, the Department of State provided two drug sniffer dogs and a
transportation vehicle for use at Addis' Bole International Airport.

Road Ahead. The TGE appears to be committed to limiting the flow of heroin thr
ough Addis Ababa and to this end looks to the USG for providing continued assis
tance and expertise.


GHANA

I. Summary

Ghana's role increased as a transit route for cocaine from Latin America and he
roin from Asia, both ultimately destined for the US and Europe, despite the gov
ernment's intensive law enforcement and public awareness efforts. The Governme
nt of Ghana (GOG) also acknowledged the on-going cultivation of marijuana and a
rise in drug consumption across the nation. Narcotics authorities implemented
US-sponsored training program to improve interdiction efforts at airports and
at the borders, resulting in increased arrests and seizures. The Government of
Ghana energetically pursued the goals and objectives of the 1988 UN Convention
to which it is a party.

II. Status of the Country

Illicit drug trafficking is increasing in Ghana, despite the country's stringen
t narcotics laws and active law enforcement efforts. The GOG believes that, in
addition to the long established Nigerian-Ghanaian organizations based in Accr
a, international groups headquartered elsewhere are now operating in Ghana. Du
ring 1994, there was a dramatic increase in the number of Ghanaians arrested wo
rldwide on narcotics charges, primarily for cocaine trafficking.

III. Country Actions Against Drugs in 1994

Policy Initiatives. The GOC made progress in advancing elements of its counter
narcotics master plan by developing effective interdiction capabilities along b
orders with Togo and the Ivory Coast. Ghana's customs service placed a narcoti
cs squad at the Ghana/Ivory Coast border to interdict cocaine trafficking. Add
itionally, the police narcotics unit assigned personnel to the seaport at Tema
and the regional capitals of Ho, Kumasi and Koforidua to interdict heroin comin
g from Nigeria. The Narcotics Control Board (NCB) increased its education awar
eness program in secondary schools and supported the formation of drug preventi
on clubs.

To meet 1988 UN Convention objectives, the GOG restructured the NCB to include
representatives from the Pharmacy Board, the Education Service, trade unions, t
he public prosecutor's office, psychiatric care givers, and prisons officials.
The NCB hopes the public prosecutor will become a major force in getting propo
sed counternarcotics legislation approved by the parliamentary draft committee.

Law Enforcement Efforts. The NCB routinely investigates local businesses for d
rug trafficking activity. The NCB is constantly upgrading techniques and metho
ds to counter the sophisticated operations of drug dealers. However, the curre
nt budget and manpower levels of law enforcement agencies are insufficient for
Ghana's enormous narcotics problem.

The GOG has asset seizure legislation which is routinely enforced. There have
been unsuccessful attempts to amend the law so that 50 percent of drug dealer's
seized assets would be given to the NCB to fund counternarcotics activities.

The GOG continued its close cooperation with international organizations on cou
nternarcotics issues. In October, chiefs of all three Ghanaian narcotics contr
ol agencies (NCB, police, Customs) readily agreed to support a DEA undercover o
peration in Ghana.

There were no reports of money laundering in Ghana in 1994, nor did the GOG rep
ort any diversions of precursor chemicals to manufacture illicit drugs.

Corruption. No Ghanaian government official was implicated in 1994 in facilit
ating the production, processing, or shipment of narcotic and psychotropic drug
s and other controlled substances, or was involved in discouraging the investig
ation or prosecution of such acts. The GOG opposes all corruption, as evidence
d by the dismissal of four senior customs officials this year on corruption cha
rges.

Agreements and Treaties. Ghana and the USG signed a Letter of Agreement (LOA)
in 1993 providing for counternarcotics cooperation. Ghana is a signatory to th
e 1988 UN Convention. In October, the GOG honored its treaty with the US by ar
resting and extraditing a Ghanaian national. In July and August, the GOG assis
ted the DEA in a successful drug investigation which led to arrests.

Cultivation/Production. Cannabis grows naturally in most parts of the country.
Despite eradication efforts, the number of fields under cultivation is increa
sing and spreading into new areas closer to urban centers. Ghanaian counternar
cotics authorities estimate that their annual seizures of marijuana represent o
nly a small fraction of total production. The GOG lacks detailed information o
n drug distribution, but acknowledges that marijuana is readily available throu
ghout the country, particularly in the larger urban centers.

The GOG lacks sufficient regional narcotics personnel to monitor closely and in
vestigate cannabis production in rural areas. There is no evidence that other
drugs are produced in Ghana.

Drug Flow and Transit. The inauguration of Ghana Airways' direct flights to th
e US in October enhanced Accra's appeal as a drug transit point. Counternarcot
ics agencies also uncovered growing use of the international mail to smuggle he
roin from Thailand into Ghana, although use of express mail decreased. Cocaine
seizures decreased markedly from 1993 levels. Ghanaian counternarcotics offic
ials believe cocaine couriers now primarily use swallowing methods rather than
external concealment, making detection more difficult. Cocaine couriers are no
rmally Ghanaian nationals who obtain the drugs in Rio de Janeiro and travel to
the Ivory Coast or Nigeria, then return to Ghana overland or by air. Both hero
in and cocaine are transshipped to the US or to the UK and other parts of Europ
e. The majority of drug trafficking organizations appear to be headed by Niger
ians who have formed small syndicates with Ghanaians serving as couriers.

Demand Reduction. Under its demand reduction program, the NCB conducted two se
minars, distributed information and educational literature, and produced docume
ntary videos to loan to antidrug abuse clubs in schools and local communities.
The GOG conducted a seminar to enhance media awareness of the dangers of drug
abuse.

IV. US Policy Initiatives and Programs

The Road Ahead.

The USG will support the creation of self-sufficient GOG counternarcotics organ
izations by assisting the GOG to improve interdiction efforts; by providing com
modity assistance and training; and by coordinating intelligence and extraditio
n proceedings.


ISRAEL

I. Summary

Israel is a transit route for heroin and hashish. The Israel National Police r
egards the war on drugs as its highest priority after internal security. While
Israeli antidrug policy emphasizes demand reduction, the GOI plans to augment
its drug interdiction capabilities with a newly formed, 200-person drug unit re
cruited from within Israel's Customs Service. The GOI is working to ensure tha
t drug trafficking will not increase with Israel's enhanced regional ties.

There were promising initial steps toward increased regional counternarcotics c
ooperation. In June, Israeli and Egyptian antidrug agencies established formal
lines of communication, and the Israel/Jordan Peace Treaty signed in October c
alls for cooperation in combatting crime and drugs. At present, Israel lacks t
he legal means to combat effectively money laundering. The National Police coo
perates closely with foreign counterparts and has stationed drug liaison office
rs in the US and Europe. Israel has signed, but not ratified, the 1988 UN Conv
ention.

II. Status of Country

The GOI is concerned that open borders and improving regional trade relations r
esulting from the Middle East Peace Process will increase drug trafficking acti
vities through Israel. Drug cultivation and production are a problem in surrou
nding countries. This makes Israel a potential trafficking route, particularly
from Lebanon, a major transit country for hashish and heroin, to Egypt. Israe
l is not a major drug producer, but the Antidrug Authority (ADA) estimates that
there are 200,000 casual drug users and about 30,000 addicts in Israel. Surve
ys in 1989 and 1993 indicate a slight decline in drug abuse rates as a percenta
ge of the population. However, they show a troubling shift among young people
from hashish and marijuana, to synthetic drugs, opiates, heroin, and cocaine.

Israel's banking secrecy laws and liberal immigration policies might allow Isra
el to become a significant regional money laundering center. Money laundering
is illegal and may be prosecuted in conjunction with a criminal conviction. Ho
wever, there have been few prosecuted cases of money laundering. It appears th
at Israel's sophisticated financial infrastructure is being used increasingly b
y money launderers.

III: Country Actions Against Drugs in 1994

Policy Initiatives. The ADA, under the direct authority of the Prime Minister,
continues to expand programs of drug education and awareness, treatment, and r
ehabilitation. At $9.5 million, the ADA's 1994 budget was some 20 percent high
er than in 1993: much of the money went for drug treatment. The ADA establishe
d additional rehabilitation centers in the southern and central districts, and
planned to open two more for the Haifa and Jaffa districts by year end.

Law Enforcement Efforts. Over the next year and a half, Israel hopes to introd
uce technologically advanced customs checks at all Israeli points of entry, inc
luding the Jordan River bridges. The National Police initiated a drug detectio
n canine program at Ben Gurion airport.

International Cooperation. The National Police cooperates closely with its for
eign counterparts and has stationed drug liaison officers in the US, Turkey, Ho
lland, France, Germany, Russia, and Ukraine. The Customs Service has posted li
aisons officials in Belgium, Italy, Hong Kong, and the US The GOI has called f
or a comprehensive regional conference to discuss cooperation in the antidrug f
ight, and is exploring the possibility of establishing a regional training cent
er in Israel.

Agreements and Treaties. In June, Israeli and Egyptian drug agencies establish
ed formal lines of communication. The Israel/Jordan Peace Treaty concluded in
October calls for cooperation in combatting crime and drugs.

The US and Israel signed a counternarcotics memorandum of understanding (MOU) i
n 1991. In 1993, the two governments signed a customs cooperation agreement.
The recently ratified bilateral tax treaty grants US tax authorities limited ac
cess to bank account information. In November, Israel hosted negotiations on a
mutual legal assistance treaty with the USG which would cover narcotics matter
s. Those negotiations are continuing.

Israel acceded to the European Convention on Mutual Legal Assistance in Crimina
l Matters, and ratified the 1961 UN Single Convention and its 1972 Protocol. I
n addition, Israeli law permits legal assistance in the absence of a treaty. I
srael has signed, but not ratified, the 1988 UN Convention.

Israel has extradition treaties with the US, UK, France, and Italy. It does no
t extradite its own citizens.

Corruption. Drug-related corruption by government officials does not appear to
be a problem in Israel.

Cultivation/Production. Israel neither cultivates nor produces illicit drugs.

Drug Flow/Transit. Israel lies on a drug transit route. Heroin from southwest
Asia via Turkey, and from southeast Asia via Europe, enters at airports and se
aports and transits Israel to Egypt. According to the ADA, hashish going to Eg
ypt, and heroin to the US pass through Israel.

Demand Reduction. ADA now has a drug awareness program in more than one-third
of all primary and secondary schools in Israel. Special programs to combat inc
reasing drug abuse among the Israeli Arab minority are conducted jointly by gov
ernment ministries, Arab local authorities, the Red Crescent, and the ADA.

IV. US Policy Initiatives and Programs

Policy Initiatives. US-Israel cooperation focuses on helping Israel build a se
lf-sustaining, professional, drug interdiction force, and on fostering regional
cooperation between Israel and neighboring countries on antidrug issues.

Bilateral Cooperation. In 1994 the INP established with USG assistance a detec
tor dog program at Ben Gurion airport. The team proved very effective, and mad
e 17 drug seizures in the last quarter of the year. The GOI now plans to expan
d the program to cover all points of entry into Israel.

Road Ahead. Israeli law enforcement agencies and US Customs will co-sponsor a
drug interdiction training program in Israel, with possible additional regional
participation from Egypt and Jordan. A USG multi-disciplinary enforcement te
am also plans to host a money laundering seminar in Israel.


KENYA

I. Summary

Kenya enacted in 1994 the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Control Ac
t. It implemented the terms and conditions of the 1988 UN Convention, to which
Kenya is a party. The legislation established severe prison sentences for the
possession of or trafficking in illicit drugs. The Government of Kenya (GOK)
also appointed a former recipient of USG-funded training as the new director of
Kenya's Anti-Narcotics Unit (ANU). Despite the tough new legislation, and th
e GOK's ambitious counternarcotics strategies, the government's lack of insuffi
cient resources and inefficiency prevented enforcement agencies from stemming t
he flow of drugs through the country.

II. Status of Country

For reasons of geography and infrastructure, Kenya is an important transit poin
t for heroin originating in India, Pakistan, and Thailand, and destined for Eur
ope and the US The country is also an increasingly popular transshipment point
for methaqualone (Maandrax) bound for South Africa. A November agreement call
ing for the creation of a single travel document for Kenya, Tanzania, and Ugand
a could complicate attempts by Kenyan drug enforcement agencies to identify the
large number of non-Kenyan African couriers operating out of Kenya's two major
international airports and its principal seaport.

III. Country Actions Against Drugs in 1994

Policy Initiatives. In August, the GOK implemented the provisions of the 1988
UN Convention by enacting the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Contro
l Act. The comprehensive legislation covers drug cultivation, possession, tra
fficking, forfeiture of assets and proceeds, money laundering, rehabilitation,
international assistance, and conspiracy.

The GOK also organized a counternarcotics seminar in conjunction with the UNDCP
, and recommended the creation of an inter-ministerial coordinating committee t
o formulate a national drug policy.

In regional cooperation, ANU officers attended a November workshop in South Afr
ica on the legal aspects of drug enforcement. Kenya agreed to host a meeting o
f chief narcotics investigators and public prosecutors from Tanzania, Uganda, a
nd Kenya in 1995. In October Kenya sent delegates to Addis Ababa for a confere
nce of the Heads of Drug Law Enforcement Agencies of Africa (HONLEA-Africa).

Accomplishments and Law Enforcement Efforts. Kenyan drug enforcement agencies
seized roughly 1,000 kgs of cannabis, 22 kgs of heroin, and 23,000 tablets of m
ethaqualone through October. In a noteworthy sting operation, ANU officers arr
ested a Pakistani national at Kenyatta Airport carrying 4 kgs of heroin, and us
ed the courier to trace, arrest, and convict a Nairobi-based Nigerian trafficke
r. This case underscores a recent trend by African traffickers to rely on Indi
an or Pakistani nationals, rather than on other Africans, to smuggle heroin int
o Kenya from the subcontinent and East Asia.

ANU officials assert that the primary obstacle to more effective law enforcemen
t efforts is neither corruption nor lack of political will, but insufficient fi
nances and equipment. For instance, there are currently no funds budgeted for
street informants. Despite this inadequacy of resources, the ANU plans to form
a 10-person investigation section in 1995 to focus on trafficking operations i
n Nairobi.

Agreements and Treaties. Kenya acceded to the 1988 UN Convention in 1992. It
is a party to the 1961 UN Single Convention and the 1972 Protocol thereto, but
does not have any formal counternarcotics or extradition agreements with the U
SG or with any other government.

Cultivation/Production. Cannabis (bhang) is cultivated illegally throughout Ke
nya, with commercial-scale production near the coast, but there is no data on t
he extent of cultivation are not available. The GOK is considering the use of
aerially-applied herbicides against cannabis crops, but this strategy might pro
mpt opposition, given Kenya's sensitivity to environmental concerns.

Drug Flow/Transit. Kenya remains a popular transit point for traffic in Southw
est Asian brown heroin and Southeast Asian white heroin. The drugs typically e
nter the country from India, Pakistan, and Thailand, are picked up by non-Kenya
n African couriers, and transported through Nigeria and other west African coun
tries to Europe and the US. Kenyan drug enforcement agencies also report that
cocaine from South American source countries is bartered for heroin in Kenya.
The cocaine is then exported to Europe, while the heroin in shipped to the US.

Domestic Programs. Kenya does not have a national public education program on
narcotics, nor are there any drug rehabilitation centers in the country. UNDCP
officials, working in conjunction with the GOK, are currently conducting resea
rch to determine the extent of drug abuse in the country. The UNDCP's findings
are to be published in 1995, enabling the GOK to formulate a demand reduction
strategy.

IV. US Policy Initiatives and Programs

Policy Initiatives. The USG encourages the GOK to interdict illicit drugs and
is prepared to assist the government improve its capabilities to do so.

US Department of Defense officials met with Kenya's Attorney General, the head
of the Criminal Investigation Department (CID), and the ANU director in April t
o discuss possible forms of US assistance for Kenya's antidrug efforts. The GO
K submitted a request to DEA headquarters for training assistance. DOD represe
ntatives held further talks with the CID and ANU in October about assessment te
ams (PAT's) that may go to Kenya. A US Customs official met with ANU officers
in December to arrange a two-week training seminar for Kenya's drug enforcement
agencies in 1995.

The Road Ahead. The USG will assist the GOK in realizing the initiatives plann
ed for 1995 by the new ANU Director. With the implementing legislation for the
1988 UN Convention in place, the USG will focus on law enforcement training an
d on developing information exchange mechanisms with the GOK.


LEBANON

I. Summary

Lebanon remained a major nexus for narcotics production and trafficking in 1994
. Lebanese success in dramatically reducing the cultivation of both opium and
cannabis in 1994 was offset by the continued processing of imported narcotics.
Lebanese production facilities maintained pre-eradication levels of output. T
he Syrians have been cooperative in facilitating some advances in the Lebanese
counternarcotics effort. However, no processing laboratories in Lebanon were
dismantled, and the number of heroin and cocaine laboratories increased signifi
cantly during 1994. The volume of raw opium and cocaine flowing into Lebanon f
or processing and reexport offset the decreased volume of opium and cannabis cu
ltivated in the Biqa' Valley.

In addition to significant successful eradication efforts, positive development
s in Lebanon during 1994 include the lifting of immunity to permit prosecution
of a legislator alleged to be corrupt, and the initiation of investigations of
other public figures. There was also a marked increase in the number of small
seizures and arrests reported in Lebanon, a major seizure of cocaine base in th
e port of Beirut was recorded, and a major importer of pharmaceuticals was also
arrested on suspicion of diverting chemicals to illicit laboratories.

Although Lebanon has signalled its intent to accede, it is not yet a party to t
he 1988 UN Convention and has not met some of the goals and objectives of the C
onvention. Lebanon does not have a bilateral narcotics agreement with the Unit
ed States.

II. Status of Country

The Bekaa Valley remains a center of international drug production and distribu
tion. Shipments of illicit narcotics from the Bekaa Valley find their way to E
urope and the United States.

Lebanese and Syrian scrutiny in and around the Bekaa Valley has contributed to
significant decreases in the cultivation of drugs, but credible reports of the
participation of Lebanese and Syrian officials in the drug trade persisted. A
recent visit by the UNDCP senior legal advisor addressed Lebanon's need to focu
s on money laundering and precursor chemical legislation, and prosecutorial gui
delines. The Lebanese have not reconciled bank secrecy laws with the need to d
evelop safeguards against money laundering. There have been repeated high leve
l statements that Lebanon will maintain its traditional banking secrecy laws.

III. Country Action Against Drugs in 1994

The joint Lebanese/Syrian eradication program initiated in 1992 attained its gr
eatest success in 1994. USG agencies estimate that as a result of the 1994 era
dication campaign less than 90 hectares of opium poppy were available for harve
st with the potential to produce less than one metric ton of opium, an 80 perce
nt decrease from 1993 totals. USG agencies also estimate that 1994 hashish cul
tivation dropped some 50 percent from 15,700 hectares in 1993 to 8,100 this yea
r with a similar production decrease from 565 metric tons in 1993 to 275 tons i
n 1994.

It was recently reported that the GOL has tentatively agreed to accept the 1988
UN Convention on Narcotics. UNDCP officials are engaged in an extensive effor
t to establish sentencing guidelines for narcotics offenses and announced that
the GOL has identified a prosecutor for these offenses. At present there is a
draft law residing with the parliamentary committee for administration and judi
cial matters targeting money laundering in connection with narcotics violations
. The recent assignment of a UNDCP official in Beirut further echoes the gover
nment's willingness to address illicit drug matters in the international arena.

Lebanon's coordinated efforts with the UNDCP crop substitution program have con
vinced some farmers to cultivate staple crops, but the amount of future remuner
ation for the substitution of crops will determine the continued success of the
program.

Extradition. There were no known extraditions during 1994 as all narcotics off
enses committed in Lebanon are prosecuted locally.

Law Enforcement Efforts. Cooperation between Lebanon and Syria resulted in a m
arked increase in the number of seizures during 1994. The numbers of arrests a
nd seizures in 1994 rose from 250 in 1993 to approximately 1,100 in 1994. Alth
ough the majority of seizures were small, in November this cooperation, along w
ith efforts with other governments and organizations, resulted in the seizure o
f 100 kg of cocaine aboard a Colombian vessel. Three individuals were arrested
locally as a result of the seizure and the investigation continues. Lebanese
authorities have begun to work closely with European narcotics officials and ha
ve made numerous visits to the Bekaa with their European counterparts.

Agreements and Treaties. Lebanon and the US have no existing agreements on nar
cotics or extradition. Lebanese authorities have stated that the Chamber of Mi
nisters has adopted the 1988 Convention on Narcotics but there has been no offi
cial announcement.

Drug Flow/Transit. This year witnessed the first seizures at airports and seap
orts and the creation of a narcotics unit assigned to the ports and airport.

Domestic Programs. It is difficult to determine the extent of drug addiction i
n Lebanese society, but anecdotal and media-derived evidence suggest a signific
ant, growing problem. At present the extent of the GOL anti-drug campaign is l
imited to education and posters in the schools.

IV. US Policy Initiatives and Programs.

Embassy and DEA officals continue to stress the necessity of interdicting shipm
ents of narcotics base chemicals and precursor chemicals in visits with Lebanes
e narcotics authorities.

Bilateral Cooperation. The US and Lebanon do not have a bilateral narcotics ag
reement. DEA and embassy officials maintain close liaison with Lebanese counte
rparts and have worked in concert with them on numerous controlled deliveries i
n the region. Embassy and Lebanese counterparts have also worked closely toget
her on matters of mutual concern involving transit of drugs to the United State
s. The GOL has repeatedly stressed its willingness to combat narcotics and to
work closely with USG and third country narcotics efforts.

Road Ahead. The progress that the Government of Lebanon is making in counterna
rcotics through the steps being taken toward acceding to the 1988 Convention on
Narcotics and the drafting of laws addressing money laundering schemes, consti
tute grounds for cautious optimism. The willingness of the Government of Leban
on to pursue the prosecution of a member of Parliament is another indicator of
its increased seriousness in its counternarcotics efforts. The posting of a UN
DCP official will assist the Lebanese authorities in crafting narcotics statute
s consistent with international standards.

[CHART: LEBANON STATISTICAL TABLES]


MOROCCO

I. Summary

Morocco is one of the world's largest producers of cannabis. Most Moroccan pro
duction is processed into hashish resin or oil, and exported to Europe, Tunisia
, and Algeria for consumption or for re-export. Cannabis cultivation and sale
is the economic base of a large portion of northern Morocco. Latin American co
caine and Asian heroin enter the country, both to service a small, but growing
domestic market, and for transshipment to Europe; the drugs are trafficked thro
ugh routes historically used for the cannabis trade. The Government of Morocco
(GOM) devoted significant resources in 1994 to interdiction efforts, targeting
small and medium-scale hashish traffickers. However, producers and large-scal
e traffickers operated with virtual impunity, due to GOM budgetary constraints,
corruption, and nearly exclusive focus of the authorities on lower-level couri
ers.

Morocco is a signatory to the 1988 UN Convention. However, the Moroccan Parlia
ment has not passed the implementing legislation proposed by the Ministry of Ju
stice.

II. Status of Country

Estimates of the portion of the cannabis crop consumed domestically range from
15 to 40 percent. Moroccan officials and health care workers increasing cocain
e and heroin addiction in urban areas, although there were only small seizures
of these drugs in 1994. Drug money contributed to a construction boom througho
ut the country; as an increasing number of office and apartment buildings sit u
noccupied, traffickers are seeking new investment opportunities.

III. Country Action Against Drugs in 1994

Policy Initiatives. In December, the Moroccan Minister of the Interior present
ed to international donors a white paper on combatting drugs which calls for th
e GOM to invest $100 million annually in agricultural infrastructure, social be
nefits, and crop substitution for the Rif region, Morocco's main cannabis culti
vation area. The initiative also envisions a contribution from the European Un
ion (EU) of more than $2 billion over a five-year period. However, the EU only
acknowledges a commitment to provide $30 million for development programs in t
he Rif region over a two-year period.

Cultivation and Production. Moroccan officials estimate that 55,000-60,000 hec
tares were under cultivation in the Rif region in 1994, compared to the 50,000
hectare estimate given by the King in a 1993 speech. Vast new resources would
be required to implement the crop substitution programs the GOM proposes to r
eplace income lost through crop eradication.

Law Enforcement. The GOM claims 10,000 law enforcement personnel are now assig
ned to counternarcotics duty in northern Morocco, as opposed to the 3,000 perso
n-force reported in 1993. While drug arrests increased to 8,256 in 1993 from 3
,928 in 1987, this increase is more likely due to increased drug production, th
an improved law enforcement.

Arrest data for 1994 have not been released.

Moroccan law has not been amended to permit asset seizure or undercover operati
ons involving the controlled delivery of illegal drugs. Cooperation between Mo
roccan and foreign law enforcement agencies in drug matters is limited to train
ing and liaison. The GOM accomplished no drug-related extraditions, joint oper
ations, or joint investigations during the year.

Agreements and Treaties. Morocco ratified a mutual legal assistance treaty wit
h the US in 1993. Morocco and the US concluded a narcotics cooperation agreeme
nt in 1989. Morocco also has antinarcotics or mutual legal assistance agreemen
ts with the EU, France, Spain, Germany, Italy, Portugal, and the UK.

Corruption. There are credible reports that GOM officials, including high-leve
l officials, have been involved in the drug trade. However, in 1994 only one m
id-grade police official was sentenced to prison for drug trafficking. The GOM
normally targets low-level traffickers, permitting major traffickers and corru
pt officials to act with impunity.

Drug Flow/Transit. Cocaine from South America is transshipped across Morocco b
y air to Europe primarily by Latin American and West African couriers, or by s
ea from ports in Casablanca and Tangier. Some cocaine enters Morocco from Euro
pe, as payment in kind for exported cannabis, and is sold domestically. Small
amounts of heroin from Asia arrive in Morocco for transshipment to Europe and,
to a lesser extent, for domestic distribution.

Demand Reduction. The GOM does not acknowledge a significant hard drug addicti
on problem in the country, nor does it promote a reduction in the domestic dema
nd for cannabis.

IV. US Policy Initiatives.

The USG encourages Moroccan anti-narcotics efforts by cooperating with law enfo
rcement officials to curtail the production and transshipment of drugs; providi
ng training in law enforcement techniques; promoting GOM adherence to bilateral
and international agreement requirements; providing support, as appropriate, f
or Moroccan-European drug control cooperation; and encouraging greater internat
ional cooperation to control Moroccan production and exportation of drugs.

Bilateral Cooperation. The US and Morocco maintain a dialogue on drug issues u
nder their 1989 narcotics agreement. The USG provides training and narcotics
intelligence where possible. The US also participates in the Dublin Group, bot
h at the ministerial level and at the working-group level in Rabat.

The Road Ahead. The USG will monitor the narcotics situation in Morocco, coope
rate with the GOM in its drug control efforts, support the Dublin Group process
, and offer law enforcement training, intelligence, and other support where app
ropriate.


NIGERIA

I. Summary.

A major transit country for Asian heroin and Latin American cocaine destined fo
r the international market, Nigeria is the focal point for most West African tr
afficking organizations. The government of Nigeria (GON) has not addressed ade
quately corruption among law enforcement agencies, thereby hindering counternar
cotics efforts. The export of Nigerian drug trafficking to Liberia and other W
est Africa countries is of particular concern. The focus of the Nigerian Drug
Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA) remained almost exclusively on drug couriers, ra
ther than on leaders of drug trafficking groups.

The GON did begin to show concern about international and domestic drug abuse d
uring 1994. The GON prepared a draft national drug policy plan designed to cur
b trafficking and substance abuse. The GON formed a ministerial level task for
ce on drug abuse which will develop a drug control strategy by mid-1995. In De
cember, the GON appointed a special advisor on drugs, money laundering, and fra
ud whose task is to coordinate the antidrug efforts of the NDLEA, the police, a
nd the customs agency. The GON returned to the United States three major heroi
n traffickers.

II. Status of Country.

Nigerian trafficking organizations control courier networks that move heroin fr
om Asia to the US and Europe; they also run sophisticated money laundering ope
rations. In response to increasingly vigorous international law enforcement, N
igerian drug organizations quickly adapt, find new means to evade detection, an
d alter and expand their heroin smuggling routes and markets. Traffickers imp
ort South American cocaine for reexport to the US and Europe and, to a lesser d
egree, for consumption in Nigeria. They also ship cannabis -- the only illicit
drug grown in Nigeria -- to Europe and other countries in West Africa.

III. Country Action Against Drugs in 1994.

Policy Initiatives. Responding to USG extradition requests, the GON returned t
hree major Nigerian traffickers to the US to face drug charges. The GON develo
ped a national drug control policy to curb trafficking and substance abuse, but
did not sign the plan into law; it was referred to an inter-ministerial task f
orce on national drug control strategy created by Head of State Abacha to overs
ee and coordinate nationwide antidrug efforts. On December 27, the GON appoint
ed a special advisor on drugs, money laundering, and advance fee fraud. The go
vernment did not introduce legislation providing for the seizure and forfeiture
of narcotics traffickers' assets and took no enforcement actions in this area.

Accomplishments. The NDLEA and other law enforcement agencies conducted small
drug raids and seizures, primarily at airports, seaports, and border checkpoint
s. The GON increased its cannabis seizures and arrests of minor drug offenders
. The GON also engaged a team of American legal and drug enforcement experts t
o examine the money laundering statutes with a view to strengthening them. Th
e NDLEA seized two air cargo shipments containing $2 million in gold believed t
o be drug trafficking proceeds, acting on USG-provided information. Although i
t failed to apprehend two major traffickers whose extradition the US has sough
t since 1992, the NDLEA arrested and turned over to US law enforcement authorit
ies three other Nigerian drug dealers wanted in the US.

Law Enforcement Efforts. The effectiveness of Nigerian counter narcotics effor
ts remained inadequate. Operations were hindered by the lack of cooperation be
tween the NDLEA, police, and customs. Rampant corruption in every law enforceme
nt body continued unabated. The military general appointed in late 1993 to hea
d the NDLEA pledged to rid the agency of corrupt officials and downsize it from
its estimated staff of 2,000. The new administrator initially relieved as man
y as 350 NDLEA agents, but later hired an estimated 700 new agents. NDLEA scre
ening and training procedures continued to be inadequate: some current and newl
y appointed agents have known drug ties. NDLEA cooperated only minimally with
foreign missions. Although in late 1994 the NDLEA began to cooperate more clos
ely with the USG, the narcotics task force created in 1993 to locate trafficker
s sought by the USG was inactive throughout the year. The NDLEA was unable or
unwilling to use USG-provided assistance effectively, and the agency focused on
apprehending couriers, rather than those controlling trafficking networks.

The authorities made no money laundering arrests or prosecutions. The GON took
no steps to reduce cannabis production in the country.

Corruption. The GON replaced the discredited former leader of the NDLEA and ex
pressed concerns about corruption in antinarcotics
agencies. However, it did not investigate or punish any senior official for al
leged involvement in the drug trade. While encouraging narcotics trafficking a
nd money laundering do not appear to be objectives of official government polic
y, there appears to be rampant corruption that facilitates trafficking and mone
y laundering.

The GON did not foster or protect an independent judiciary for drug cases, nor
encourage prosecution of money laundering cases. It permitted the circumventio
n and/or intimidation of honest officials who sought to fight drug trafficking.
Drug suspects often were released without proper court authorization, and the
fts of drug evidence prevented prosecution of drug cases or resulted in the rel
ease of drug suspects.

Agreements and Treaties. Nigeria is a party to the 1988 UN Convention, the 196
1 UN Single Convention, and its 1972 Protocol, as well as the 1971 Convention o
n Psychotropic Substances. The 1931 US-UK extradition treaty, extended to incl
ude Nigeria in 1935, is the legal basis for USG extradition requests. The US a
nd Nigeria signed a mutual legal assistance treaty in 1989, but it has not been
ratified. The Nigerian government and Nigeria Airways signed an air carrier a
greement with US Customs in 1993. The Nigerian government has not entered into
an asset sharing agreement with the USG, or any other country.

Demand Reduction Programs. There has been a rise in domestic drug abuse in Nig
eria, along with the growth of drug trafficking. The Nigerian government began
to show some interest in the problem of increased domestic consumption in 1994
. A credible demand reduction program should be established in 1995.

IV. US Policy Initiatives and Programs.

US Policy Initiatives. Reduction of trafficking in illicit drugs by Nigerian c
itizens, particularly of heroin destined to the US, is the goal of US policy.
Its realization depends on the willingness of the GON to arrest or extradite ma
jor traffickers, and to enforce anti-conspiracy laws that will allow the prosec
ution of the drug barons behind the couriers. The USG has offered to assist th
e GON with training and information sharing. The GON must improve operational
cooperation and make a realistic effort to stamp out corruption in Nigerian cou
nternarcotics agencies.

Bilateral Cooperation. Cooperation between the US and Nigeria was far below US
G expectations; Nigeria did not fulfill the conditions of its bilateral narcoti
cs agreement with the US The USG will continue to seek the extradition of two
major traffickers sought since 1992, as well as other drug offenders remaining
at large. The US-Nigerian Joint Narcotics Task Force (JNTF), a cooperative eff
ort between the NDLEA and the DEA, was inactive in 1994 and should be reactivat
ed in 1995. The NDLEA did not make effective use of previously provided USG as
sistance.

Road Ahead. The USG will stress to the GON the importance the USG attaches to
narcotics control. Specifically it will:

-- Press for the extradition of prominent traffickers and other Nigerians wante
d in the US on drug charges;

-- Call for the investigation, arrest and prosecution of major traffickers, as
opposed to confining efforts to apprehending to couriers;

-- Press for aggressive investigative and other enforcement efforts aimed at di
smantling trafficking organizations;

-- Monitor the GON's willingness to share intelligence on the operations of tra
fficking organizations within Nigeria with the international community;

-- Advocate effective GON attacks on corruption and on the lack of coordination
among its drug law enforcement agencies, especially the NDLEA;

-- Seek the enforcement and strengthening of money laundering and asset seizure
and forfeiture laws through the development and effective enforcement of a mon
ey laundering bill based on the UNDCP model; and

-- Encourage the reform of banking regulations to increase the integrity of fin
ancial transactions.

[CHART: NIGERIA STATISTICAL TABLES]
[GRAPHIC: NIGERIA COCAINE SEIZURES 1988-1994]


SENEGAL

I. Summary

Senegal an important transit point for heroin and cocaine, given its good air a
nd sea connections to Europe and North America, as well as its worsening econom
ic climate The suspension of direct commercial flights between Lagos and New Y
ork in 1993 increased the importance of Dakar as a direct transit point for Nig
erians smuggling Asian heroin to the US Drug abuse is increasing among Senegal
ese youth. Senegal is a party to all the major international treaties dealing
with drug production and trafficking, including the 1988 UN Convention. Howeve
r, the Government of Senegal (GOS) is not in full compliance with the Conventio
n because of inadequate resources, weak border controls, and as well as competi
ng national priorities. The GOS has devoted little effort to controlling the p
roduction of cannabis. Law enforcement also is hampered by inefficient coordin
ation among various GOS agencies.

II. Status of Country

However, Senegal has grown in importance as a transit point for drugs bound for
the North American and European drug markets. Nigerian nationals lead the lis
t of couriers arrested in Senegal. The suspension of the direct air link betwe
en Lagos and the US has made Dakar more attractive to Nigerian, with direct biw
eekly flights from Dakar to New York.

Senegal is not a major drug-producing country. The only drug crop cultivated i
s cannabis, sold mostly for local consumption. There is no evidence that Senega
l is a major money laundering center.

III. Country Actions Against Drugs in 1994

Accomplishments. The Government of Senegal (GOS) made no significant progress
in the effort to end the illicit cultivation and distribution of cannabis. Sen
egal does not have the resources to conduct an effective eradication program.

Law Enforcement Efforts. Authorities make most drug-related arrests as a resul
t of search and seizures at Dakar Yoff airport. Although statistics for the 19
94 are not yet available, there were 20-30 drug arrests annually in years past.
There are continuing problems with coordinating among the various GOS agencie
s dealing with drug trafficking. The National Commission on Narcotics has not
proven to be effective in coordinating drug enforcement activities.

Corruption. Although it is difficult to document, it is likely that corruption
in the lower civil service levels plays a role in the illicit narcotics trade
in Senegal.

Agreements and Treaties. Senegal is a party to all three major UN Conventions,
including the 1988 Convention. Senegal has extradition treaties with Cape Ver
de, the Gambia, Guinea Bissau, Mali, Morocco, Tunisia and France. Senegal is a
member of INTERPOL and relies heavily on drug information obtained through its
channels.

Cultivation/production. Senegal's narcotics production is limited to cannabis,
none of which is exported.

Drug Flow/Transit. Drug trafficking through Dakar appears to be rising, althou
gh its rate of growth is difficult to chart because the GOS publishes statisti
cs on drug arrests and seizures infrequently.

Demand Reduction. During 1994, a local group associated with the Ministry of
Interior formed the first Sub-Sahara Africa chapter of PRIDE which promotes a
parent-teaching approach to drug education, and introduced the PRIDE methodolog
y into local schools and youth groups. The group also has proposed opening a d
rug treatment center.

IV. US Policy Initiatives and Programs

US Policy Initiatives. The USG seeks to assist the GOS in curbing the transit
of narcotics through Dakar.

Bilateral Cooperation and Accomplishments. In March, US Customs presented a dr
ug course in Dakar for 24 students from the Senegalese police, Customs and Gend
armerie.

The Road Ahead. Although receptive to counternarcotics training and materials,
it is unlikely in the current climate of economic decline that the GOS will in
crease its resources targeted against illicit narcotics. National priorities a
re dominated by other more pressing social and economic problems, despite the i
ncrease in local drug use.


SYRIA

I. Summary

Syria is an important transit point for narcotics flowing through the Middle Ea
st to Europe and, to a lesser extent, the US In addition, Syria has a responsi
bility for assisting Lebanese authorities to end drug production and traffickin
g through Lebanon because of the presence of some 30,000 Syrian troops in the B
ekaa Valley of Lebanon. In 1994, Syria continued and expanded its cooperation
with Lebanese authorities to eradicate opium poppy and cannabis cultivation in
the Bekaa, significantly reducing opium and cannabis cultivation. Syrian force
s increased seizures of cocaine, heroin, and hashish and raised the number of a
rrests of drug traffickers in Syria and Lebanon. Syrian military authorities i
n Lebanon assisted in a significant seizure of cocaine base delivered to Beirut
's port. Despite these efforts, however, the flow of narcotics did not diminis
h in 1994.

The Syrian government has reiterated its willingness to pursue all information
regarding the possible production of narcotics in Lebanon and Syria. Neverthel
ess, neither the Syrian nor the Lebanese authorities moved successfully against
cocaine or heroin laboratories operating in either country. There were a sign
ificant number of arrests in Syria for drug-related offenses, but despite repor
ts of individual Syrian military personnel profiting from the drug trade in Leb
anon, the government initiated no corruption investigations nor brought charges
against any Syrian security or military personnel during the year.

The USG does not provide Syria with bilateral assistance and does not support l
oans for Syria in multilateral institutions.

Syria is a party to the 1988 UN Convention. Syria does not have a bilateral na
rcotics agreement with the US.

II. Status of Country

There were continuing reports that Syrian military and security personnel perso
nally profited from the drug trade in 1994. Syria remained a transit site for
drugs processed within Lebanon or imported from third countries. Lebanese hash
ish transits Syria in route Egypt and the Gulf region. Syria did not collabora
te sufficiently with the Lebanese to stop the transit of raw drugs base moving
to cocaine and heroin production laboratories in Lebanon.

III. Country Actions Against Drugs in 1994

Policy Initiatives. There were no new policy initiatives, but the Syrian gover
nment continued to implement its stiff 1993 drug law. The Syrian antinarcotics
police arrested over 1,500 suspects on drug charges, and sentences ranged from
two to twenty years. There were also at least four ongoing cases in which the
defendants faced the death penalty for trafficking.

The Syrian government hosted the 30th session of the UNDCP's Subcommission on I
llicit Drug Traffic in the Near and Middle East in February 1994.

Accomplishments. Joint Syrian and Lebanese eradication efforts in the Bekaa Va
lley drastically reduced potential annual opium production to less than one mt.
In addition, USG estimates indicate Syrian and Lebanese officials destroyed n
early 50 percent of the cannabis crop between 1993 and 1994.

Syrian and Lebanese authorities jailed and fined some farmers still engaged in
illicit cultivation. Lebanese officials working with the UNDCP crop substituti
on program in Lebanon claimed that farmers might return to drug crops if the Sy
rian forces lessened their efforts against illicit cultivation. The UNDCP main
tains a small program in Syria to train antinarcotics officials and enhance int
erdiction capabilities.

Extradition. There were no known instances of narcotics-related extradition fr
om Syria. Syrians detained in Lebanon for drug-related offenses are turned ove
r to Syrian military officials by the Lebanese for detention and prosecution in
Syria.

Law Enforcement Efforts. While the reported number of seizures and the percent
age of drug crops destroyed in Lebanon both rose in 1994, the Syrians and Leban
ese did not make progress against cocaine and heroin laboratories operating in
the Bekaa Valley and elsewhere in Lebanon and Syria. Syrian officials deny the
existence of drug production facilities in Syria. Successful joint operations
with the Lebanese netted a Bekaa Valley pharmaceuticals importer suspected of
diverting chemicals needed to manufacture cocaine. In November, authorities se
ized 100 kgs of cocaine base in Beirut's port found aboard a Colombian ship.

Corruption. Credible reports of Syrian military protection for drug trafficker
s persisted in 1994, despite official claims to the contrary. The Syrian gover
nment asserted that there was no evidence on which to base the investigation of
any Syrian military personnel for involvement in drug trafficking. Syria does
not as a matter of government policy encourage the production or distribution
of drugs.

Agreements and Treaties. Syria is a party to the 1988 UN Convention and the 19
61 UN Single Convention on narcotics and its 1972 Protocol, as well as the 1971
Convention on Psychotropic Substances. Syria maintains antinarcotics traffick
ing agreements with Germany, Iran, Jordan, Lebanon, the Netherlands, Cyprus, Sa
udi Arabia, and Turkey. Syria and the US do not have a narcotics agreement, no
r is there an extradition treaty between the two countries. Syria is a member
of Interpol.

Drug Flow/Transit. Raw materials for the production of heroin and cocaine are
reported to transit Syria on their way from Turkey to Lebanon for processing.
Syrian authorities maintained that no such transit occurs, but promised to foll
ow up on the reports. The Government of Syria believes raw opium may enter Leb
anon by sea directly through Lebanese ports. Cocaine does not appear to transi
t Syria to the same degree as opium; Syrian authorities said they seized only 2
kgs of cocaine during the first six months of 1994. Overland routes through S
yria provide a means for smuggling Capaton (fenethyline) to Saudi Arabia and ot
her countries in the Middle East.

The quantities of narcotics seized by Syrian authorities failed to reflect the
full scope of the smuggling, transit, and distribution of drugs and precursor c
hemicals in and through Syria and Lebanon. The magnitude of the transit proble
m is illustrated by Turkey's seizure in December of a 16.5 mt shipment of aceti
c anhydride aboard a Honduran vessel coming from Lebanon.

Domestic Programs. Continuing publicity about the new drug law is considered t
o have been sufficient to discourage demand for drugs, and there are no additio
nal programs being designed to reduce demand. There is anecdotal evidence of i
ncreased drug use among well-to-do young people, but social stigma and strong f
amily traditions combine with strict laws to limit drug abuse. The government
maintains two short-term treatment centers, and is planning a third. Private d
octors also provide treatment, although there does not appear to be any coordin
ation between private and public centers.

Law Enforcement and Transit Cooperation. In addition to cooperation with Leban
on, the Syrians also engaged in "controlled deliveries" with Jordan and Lebanon
of 2,050 kgs of hashish moving from Lebanon through Syria into Jordan, presuma
bly destined for the Gulf region.

IV. US Policy Initiatives and Programs

Policy Initiatives. The USG stresses to the Syrian government the need to cont
inue its efforts to end drug crop cultivation in those areas of Lebanon in whic
h it maintains a presence; of expanding its joint efforts with the Lebanese to
dismantle drug laboratories and interdict shipments of narcotic base materials
and precursor chemicals; and of ending any involvement, active or passive, of i
ndividual Syrian officials in the drug trade.

Bilateral Cooperation. The US and Syria do not have a bilateral narcotics agre
ement. However, DEA officials based in Nicosia and US Embassy officials in Dam
ascus maintain liaison with the Syrian National Police antinarcotics unit. In
addition, US officials periodically shares their views and recommendations with
the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Interior. The Syrian government exchange
d information concerning ongoing investigations to interdict narcotics coming f
rom Lebanon.

The Road Ahead. The USG will encourage high-ranking officials of the Syrian go
vernment to close drug processing facilities in areas of Lebanon where Syrian f
orces are present, and to end the involvement of Syrian officials in all facets
of drug trafficking. It also will encourage the Syrian government to sustain
the positive efforts on eradication it has made to date, and to expand its coll
aboration with the Lebanese government to attack drug production and transit in
the region.

[CHART: SYRIA STATISTICAL TABLES]


TUNISIA

I. SUMMARY

Tunisia's role as a drug transshipment point is limited, and the government wor
ks closely with neighboring states and with international bodies to interdict s
hipments. Tunisia has only a minor domestic demand problem. The use of drugs
such as heroin and cocaine is virtually non-existent, but there is some cannabi
s cultivated and consumed in rural areas. The Government of Tunisia (GOT) is c
oncerned about the abuse of prescription drugs, and has an active antidrug educ
ation program with a special focus on youth. There is no counternarcotics agre
ement between the US and Tunisia. Tunisia was an early ratifier of the 1988 UN
Convention, and the GOT makes a sincere effort to comply with its provisions.

II. Status of the Country

There is some scattered production of cannabis in northern Tunisia, but it rare
ly enters commercial channels. Consumers generally are older farmers; the use
of cannabis and cannabis resin was legal in pre-independence Tunisia.

III. Country Action Against Drugs in 1994

The most visible government effort was its active antidrug education program, f
ocusing on youth. The government also sought to curb the abuse of prescription
drugs by Tunisia's growing middle class.

Tunisia has an active narcotics interdiction effort. The Police, National Guar
d, and Customs Service have drug enforcement units. Tunisia has tough security
/anti-terrorist procedures which include thorough customs checks and arbitrary
vehicle and pedestrian inspections. However, such efforts are hindered by Tuni
sia's relatively long borders, lack of personnel and equipment, and its interes
t in attracting foreign tourists. No government officials were implicated in d
rug-related corruption during 1994.

IV. US Policy Initiatives and Programs.

The USG supports Tunisian efforts to comply fully with the 1988 UN Convention,
and seeks Tunisian support for US international antinarcotics initiatives. The
re is no US-Tunisia bilateral narcotics agreement, but the USG in the past prov
ided narcotics-related training assistance in maritime security for Tunisian cu
stoms officials. The USG will use all appropriate means to enhance Tunisian cap
abilities in its narcotics control efforts.


OTHER AFRICA AND MIDDLE EAST

ALGERIA. Algeria faces relatively modest problems of drug consumption and traf
ficking, although domestic consumption and the transit trade in cannabis and ph
armaceuticals appeared to be increasing until the border with Morocco was close
d in September. Cannabis appears to be the only narcotic cultivated or produce
d in Algeria, and is grown for the domestic market. The Algerian government es
timates that 95 percent of the narcotics brought into Algeria, primarily hashis
h from Morocco, are reexported to Europe or the Middle East.

Narcotics-related corruption does not appear to be a problem in Algeria; compet
ing priorities are the major obstacles to effective law enforcement. Algeria h
as signed the 1988 UN Convention and attempts to meet its goals and objectives,
but it is hamppered by a lack of resources and political unrest.

Algeria averages more than 2,500 seizures annually. The majority take place in
the Western regions of the country near the Moroccan border and involve hashis
h or cannabis from Morocco. In April, customs in Oran seized 132 kgs of hashis
h destined for Europe; in June, police intercepted 80 kgs arriving from Morocco
. Algerian government demand reduction effortd focussed on encouraging youth a
ssociations to work in poorer neighborhoods to discourage drug consumption.

Algeria is a member of the Customs Cooperation Council, in which European and M
aghreb countries exchange information on drug trafficking. Authorities coopera
te with enforcement officials in other countries on narcotics-related issues; A
lgerian police also cooperate closely with Interpol.

BENIN. Benin is not a significant narcotics producer or consumer country, but
there has been a growing trafficking problem. Because of Benin's rather porous
land and sea borders with Nigeria, Nigerian traffickers smuggle heroin from As
ia and cocaine from South America through Benin, destined for US and European m
arkets. Given Benin's dismally low GNP, it is not difficult to find willing ca
ndidates to assist with facilitating the transit of drugs. Benin is not a part
y to the 1988 UN Convention, although it is a party to the 1961 Single Conventi
on, the 1971 Protocol and the 1971 Convention.

The Government of Benin's (GOB) anti-narcotics programs are somewhat diluted be
cause Benin's legal basis for prosecuting drug offenses rests on an obsolete 19
76 law which in effect reduces drug trafficking to a misdemeanor status. The m
ajor consequence of this anomaly is that little incentive is provided for Benin
ese prosecutors to pursue narcotics cases. Notwithstanding these deficiencies,
the GOB has shown a marked increase in its concern for narcotics transshipment
s and has worked closely with the US and other countries to interdict the traff
ickers and seize the contraband. There were no instances of drug-related publi
c corruption reported by the GOB in 1994. An eight-day seminar on overseas enf
orcement training, conducted by the US Customs Service, is scheduled to be held
in Cotonou in April, 1995. During 1994 the USG provided two patrol boats for
the small Beninese navy to assist its efforts to interdict traffickers.

BOTSWANA. Botswana is a transit country primarily for Mandrax (methaqualone) s
hipped through east and central Africa from India, and destined for South Afric
a. Botswana is not a major producer or consumer of illegal drugs. There is so
me local production and use of marijuana, and Mandrax is consumed in limited qu
antities. Botswana is an active participant in regional and international effo
rts to combat drug smuggling, although its efforts are limited by the size of i
ts sixty-person narcotics squad. There does not appear to be corruption proble
m among counternarcotics enforcement agencies. Botswana is not a signatory to
the 1988 UN Convention, although it is a party to the 1961 Single Convention, i
ts 1972 Protocol, as well as the 1971 Convention on Psychotropic Substances.

CAMEROON. Cameroon is not a significant narcotics producing or consuming count
ry, but there has been an increase in Asian heroin smuggled to Nigeria via Came
roon. The increase in drug trafficking activity in 1994 also reflected worseni
ng economic conditions, the devaluation of the CFA, and a stronger effort by tr
affickers in neighboring Nigeria to take advantage of relatively weak controls
at Cameroon's border posts and airports.

Cameroon is a party to the 1988 UN Convention, and to the other major UN Conven
tions, but has addressed only some of the Conventions' objectives; it has met t
hose with limited success. Most of the government's counternarcotics resources
are devoted to airport interdiction and to roadblocks, and seizures during 199
4 increased significantly. The Government of Cameroon did not report any insta
nces of drug-related corruption on the part of public officials in 1994.

The USG withheld narcotics assistance in 1992 as part of the overall suspension
of assistance because of Cameroon's inadequate record in democratization, huma
n rights, and economic reform. The narcotics aid was not released in 1993 or i
n 1994 because of the unwillingness of the police to furnish drug data to the U
SG. However, during 1994 some senior police officials indicated a greater will
ingness to cooperate with the USG on counternarcotic efforts.

CAPE VERDE. Cape Verde is not a significant narcotics producer or consumer cou
ntry, but it is a transit route for narcotics, particularly cocaine, shipped by
sea and air from Asia and South America to Europe and North America. The Gove
rnment of Cape Verde (GOCV) showed greater concern over narcotics during 1994,
and undertook some concrete actions. To improve its ability to patrol its ter
ritorial waters, it signed an agreement with Mauritania for the use of a 100-fo
ot ocean-going naval vessels. The GOCV also launched a National Coordinating C
ommission to Combat Drugs, which is to develop a two-track approach to narcotic
s control by improving law enforcement and establishing rehabilitation programs
. The GOCV sent its Director of Judicial Policy to the Naples Conference on Or
ganized Transnational Crime. Corruption of public officials is not a problem.
Although it is a party to the 1961 UN Single Convention, its 1972 Protocol, an
d the 1971 UN Convention on Psychotropic Substances, Cape Verde is not a party
to the 1988 UN Convention, nor is there any bilateral agreement regarding narco
tics between the US and Cape Verde.

JORDAN. Illegal transit of narcotics is still a small problem in Jordan, altho
ugh there is some trafficking of drugs from Lebanon to Egypt and Saudi Arabia.
However, authorities are concerned that the opening of new border crossing poi
nts with Israel could increase the country's attractiveness to international tr
afficking organizations. Jordan has comparatively few problems with drug use;
cultural norms limit the use of drugs primarily to hashish. There are no major
problems of narcotics cultivation, money laundering, or precursor chemical div
ersion. Jordan cooperates with its neighbors on the illegal transit of drugs.

The GOJ is committed to combatting increasing domestic consumption. Programs f
or rehabilitation and drug education also expanded, and a hospital for the trea
tment of drug-related problems was opened.

Jordanian authorities maintain liaison with the USG and several other governmen
ts on international narcotics matters. Jordanian police and security services
have excellent professional relationships with Interpol and appropriate USG law
enforcement agencies. The government's budgetary and personnel constraints li
mit efforts to enhance counternarcotics performance.

The US and Jordan currently are negotiating an extradition treaty. It is expec
ted that cooperation with the United States will be maintained, and that the GO
J will continue to rigorously enforce its strong anti-narcotics measures and as
set seizure laws.

Corruption does not appear to be a problem. Jordan has signed the 1988 UN Conv
ention and is working to comply with its goals and objectives.

LESOTHO. Lesotho is neither a significant producer nor a major consumer of ill
egal drugs. Cannabis is cultivated as a cash crop; it is exported to South Afr
ica or consumed locally. Lesotho is a transit route for smugglers moving Mandr
ax from India to South Africa, but the extent of this traffic is unknown. Leso
tho's tiny Drugs and Diamond Smuggling Unit cooperates with the South African p
olice in interdiction, but is ill-equipped to undertake major actions on its ow
n. An officer from the unit attended a DEA-sponsored regional workshop in Hara
re, Zimbabwe, in 1994. The Government of Lesotho reported no instances of drug
-related public corruption in 1994. Lesotho is not a party to the 1988 UN Conv
ention, although it is a party to the 1961 Single Convention, its 1972 Protocol
, and the 1971 UN Convention on Psychotropic Substances.

MAURITIUS. The principal narcotics problem for Mauritius continues to be traff
icking of heroin brought into the country from Bombay by couriers via commercia
l airlines. The volume suggests that a significant part of the shipments is fo
r onward shipment but there is no hard evidence yet developed to confirm this.
Good air and sea connections to Europe and South Africa, the establishment of
a free port, a growing offshore banking industry, and the large cash-turnover o
f its successful tourist industry all indicate that Mauritius may develop into
a major narcotics transshipment point and money laundering center.

During 1994, narcotics-related problems made headlines with increasing regulari
ty, leading to the establishment of a Parliamentary committee to address the is
sue of drugs in Mauritius and the adoption of a constitutional amendment which
improves law enforcement officials' ability to pursue drug traffickers. The GO
M also recognized that it needed to extend its fight against drugs beyond its b
orders and assigned police officers to Bombay and Singapore where they worked e
ffectively and have assisted with several arrests. Internally, in August 1994
the Prime Minister appointed a new Commissioner of Police who instituted a syst
em designed to get all police units involved in the fight against drugs and to
improve information sharing with the GOM. The GOM reported no instances of dru
g-related corruption by public officials in 1994. Mauritius has signed but not
ratified the 1988 UN Convention. It is a party to the 1961 Single Convention
and the 1971 Convention, and increasingly is pursuing bilateral agreements to c
ombat narcotics. USG goals are to assist Mauritius in limiting its very real p
otential for growth in narcotics transshipment and money laundering.

MOZAMBIQUE. Mozambique is not a significant drug producer or exporter, nor is
it a important center for money laundering. Concern is growing, however, about
the increasing use of Mozambique as a transit point for mandrax (which is a le
gal substance in Mozambique), South American cocaine, and heroin from Asia. Lo
cal interdiction efforts are extremely weak due to an undermanned counternarcot
ics unit. Marijuana use is common among rural Mozambicans and is often cultiva
ted for traditional medicinal purposes and not for exportation.

Mozambique is not a party to the 1988 UN Convention or any of the other UN Conv
entions on narcotics. There are currently no bilateral agreements between the
USG and the GOM on narcotics matters. Mozambique, one of the world's most aid-
dependent economies, is receiving no foreign financial assistance in counternar
cotics. Drug-related public corruption appears not to be a problem and no inst
ances were reported by the GOM in 1994.

NAMIBIA. Namibia is neither a producer nor consumer of illicit narcotics, but
its role as a transit point for Mandrax (European trade name for methaqualone c
ombined with an antihistamine) from India destined for South Africa and South A
merican cocaine, smuggled via Angola to South Africa and Europe, is growing. I
n 1992 the Government of Namibia (GON) created the Drug Enforcement Bureau as p
art of the police department. This Bureau has grown from 15 to 70 members in t
he past two years. Nevertheless, counternarcotics measures are, at best, barel
y adequate for the job, and more equipment, training, and personnel are needed,
particularly in the field of interdiction and seizure. To this end, in 1994 D
EA provided drug enforcement training to Namibian counterparts. There has been
no report of any drug-related corruption of public officials. Namibia is not
a party to the 1988 UN Convention, but it will adhere to many of the Convention
's goals and objectives if, as anticipated, it promulgates in 1995 the Drug an
d Drug Trafficking Act. One of the USG's goals will be to have Namibia become
a party to the Convention in 1995 as well.

NIGER. Niger is neither a significant producer nor a consumer of illicit drugs
, nor is it considered an important transit point. The Government of Niger (GO
N) has no bilateral counternarcotics treaties or agreements with the US, althou
gh it does have several agreements with France and Nigeria. There is no eviden
ce that GON officials are involved in drug-related corrupt activities. Niger i
s a party to all the major UN narcotics Conventions, including the 1988 Convent
ion.

The GON appears to be willing to do what is necessary to prevent drugs from bec
oming a problem for Niger. New legislation will be brought before the 1995 Nat
ional Assembly and is expected to pass easily, which would largely bring Niger
into conformity with the 1988 UN Convention. Niger is on schedule in its effor
ts to complete the goals of its 1993 Five-Year Plan on counter-narcotics. Thes
e goals are increasing attention to domestic demand reduction, improving traini
ng and research facilities, creating regional commissions to better coordinate
counternarcotics law enforcement, and developing the National Center for the Re
pression of Illicit Drug Trafficking.

In 1994, the USG donated a computer with appropriate software to be used by the
GON to track data and generate reports. Given Niger's relatively modest probl
ems with illicit drugs, the GON's efforts in this field are not given top prior
ity. US goals will continue to focus on border control issues.

SEYCHELLES. The Republic of Seychelles is neither a producer nor a major consu
mer of illicit drugs, and its involvement in drug transshipment appears to be q
uite minimal. Given its size, isolation, and strong governmental internal cont
rol, it is unlikely that it will become a major player in the world of narcotic
s will develop. The Republic of Seychelles is a party to the 1988 UN Conventio
n, as well as the 1961 Single Convention and its 1972 Protocol, and the 1971 Co
nvention.

The Government of Seychelles' (GOS) police department and its modest coast guar
d facilities are, along with other functions, charged with providing law enforc
ement to counter drug trafficking . However, neither agency has a defined, str
ong, and dedicated role to play in counter-narcotics activities, so combatting
drugs is a distant, secondary responsibility. In 1994 the US Coast Guard Mobil
e Training Team (MTT) provided some training on seizure and interdiction techni
ques.

In 1994, the USG funded the attendance of a Seychelles police officer to a DEA-
sponsored regional conference and also funded a small education program on anti
-drug and alcohol abuse. There were no instances of drug-related public corrup
tion reported by the GOS in 1994. USG goals are focused primarily on improving
GOS' law enforcement techniques.

SIERRA LEONE. Sierra Leone's civil unrest, combined with the deterioration of
law enforcement capability, resulted in 1994 in an increased number of transshi
pments of heroin from Asia and cocaine from South America destined to Europe an
d North America. Little effort is being paid by the Government of Sierra Leone
(GOSL) to counternarcotics measures during this difficult period for the coun
try. While there are some demand reduction programs, there has been no detecta
ble diminishment of the indigenous cannabis production, the overwhelming majori
ty of which is consumed locally. Sierra Leone ratified the 1988 UN Convention
in June 1994, but no effort has been made to implement the Convention. Also in
1994, Sierre Leone became a party to the 1961 UN Single Convention on Narcotic
Drugs and the 1971 Convention.

Drug-related corruption of public officials, particularly along Sierra Leone's
borders, is relatively commonplace, and the GOSL has made no genuine effort to
root it out and prosecute. There is no USG program of assistance to the GOSL a
nd, until domestic difficulties are resolved, there is little likelihood that a
ny assistance will be forthcoming.

SUDAN. Sudan is neither a significant producer nor consumer of illicit drugs,
but it is becoming increasingly important as a transshipment point in the inter
national drug trade. Sudan's strategic location at the crossroads of Africa, a
long with its 500 km of largely unpatrolled coast on the Red Sea, offers easy e
ntry and exit for drug shipments. Domestic drug use is not well-documented, bu
t it is estimated that between one and five percent of the population is uses d
rugs. While cannabis is considered a drug of the poorer population, Asian hero
in, South American cocaine, and synthetic drugs are used by the wealthier popul
ace, or by students who have travelled abroad.

The Government of Sudan (GOS) made important progress in combatting illicit dru
g cultivation, in prosecuting drug users and dealers, and in treating addicts.
In 1994, the government enacted a new law on narcotics and psychotropic substa
nces, replacing Sudan's 1924 law. Under this law, the government strengthened
penalties, included synthetic drugs, and established its first drug treatment c
linic. The primary agency for narcotics control is the Drug Combat Administrat
ion (DCA). Its staff expanded in 1994, but its total budget decreased in dolla
r terms due to the devaluation of the Sudanese pound. The GOS reported no inst
ances of drug-related corruption on the part of government officials in 1994.

The DCA, in conjunction with the Ministries of Education and Health, stepped up
its demand reduction programs. These included antidrug campaigns on televisi
on, radio, and in secondary schools and universities. Treatment at the DCA's s
mall drug rehabilitation center is free and patients are exempt from criminal p
rosecution.

Sudan signed the 1988 UN Convention in 1989, but has not ratified it. Sudan is
a party to the 1961 UN Single Convention and in 1994 became a party to the 197
2 Protocol thereto. It also is a party to the 1971 Convention.

SWAZILAND. Swaziland is not an important producer or consumer of illegal drugs
. Local production is limited to cannabis, a small portion of which is smuggle
d across borders to neighboring countries. Swaziland does, however, serve as a
transit point for Mandrax from India to South Africa and heroin from Asia to E
urope. Swaziland's law enforcement efforts are hampered by a lack of proper eq
uipment and poor training of its 15-person narcotics unit. The Government of S
waziland (GOS) recognizes that drug-related corruption of its officials exists,
but the problem is not extensive. Swaziland is not a signatory to the 1988 UN
Convention, nor are there any drug-related bilateral agreements with the US.

TOGO. Given its proximity to Nigeria and largely ineffective border controls,
Togo is a transit point for narcotics shipments, particularly Asian heroin, fro
m Nigeria to the US and Europe. Drug shipments are likely to increase as a res
ult of the opening in 1994 of the Togo-Ghana border. Cannabis, grown in small
amounts, is Togo's only drug crop and it is not exported. Due to civil disturb
ances and diminishing resources, counternarcotics efforts by the Government of
Togo (GOT) received a low priority in 1994. Togo is a party to the 1961 UN Sin
gle Convention on Narcotic Drugs, its 1972 Protocol, and the 1971 Convention on
Psychotropic Substances. Togo also is a party to the 1988 UN Convention, but
is not yet in full compliance. Hopefully, efforts toward this end will be made
once the civil unrest is quelled. There are no drug-related bilateral agreeme
nts between Togo and the US The GOT reported no instances of drug-related corr
uption of public officials during 1994. The USG will assist the GOT by providi
ng a limited amount of equipment for drug interdiction and by helping the GOI i
mprove the quantity and quality of narcotics intelligence.

UGANDA. Uganda is neither a significant producer nor transit point for illicit
drugs. As its trade and tourism expand it is expected that Uganda's role as a
transshipment point will grow in importance. In 1994 Uganda drafted new narco
tics legislation to replace its outdated laws. The draft legislation was sent
to the UNDCP for review to align it with international standards. With financi
al assistance from the UNDCP, Uganda is completing a two-year project to train
police, customs and immigration officers. Uganda is a party to all the major U
N narcotics treaties, including the 1988 UN Convention, but has no narcotics or
extradition bilateral treaties.

Uganda's anti-narcotics efforts are severely limited by lack of funding, person
nel and training. Although the Ugandan Government (GOU) increased security mea
sures at all airports, the police have not yet placed trained anti-narcotics pe
rsonnel at all land border crossing points. Uganda has no legislation against
money laundering nor any provisions for seizure of assets or extradition in cri
minal narcotics cases. The GOU has not reported any instances of drug-related
corruption by public officials in 1994.

The GOU began a public awareness campaign to increase reporting of illegal cult
ivation and to decrease local usage of marijuana. However, funding shortages p
reclude the implementation of any effective narcotics awareness program in the
near future. USG goals focus primarily on encouraging Uganda's counternarcotic
s efforts and in 1994 the USG funded a DEA-sponsored training program for Ugand
an anti-narcotics enforcement officers.

ZAMBIA. Zambia is a transit point for illicit narcotics shipments, principally
Mandrax (methaqualone), from the Asian subcontinent to South Africa. Transshi
pment of Southwest Asian heroin and South American cocaine, although still mino
r, is growing. With direct and indirect air routes to and from South America,
Asia, and Europe, Zambia is strategically situated along established and develo
ping narcotics trafficking routes. Heroin and cocaine trafficking are of incre
asing concern to Zambian narcotics officials. West African heroin traffickers
use Zambian documentation and couriers to ferry drugs to Europe and North Ameri
ca. Cannabis is the only drug cultivated in Zambia. Money laundering by regio
nal traffickers, made easier by economic liberalization, is increasing as well.

Narcotics-related corruption is a problem within the Customs and Immigration se
rvices, and the police force. During 1993 there were persistent credible repor
ts of drug trafficking by high-level government officials. Following strong in
tervention by the donor community, Zambian officials began to take steps to dea
l with the problem as the year ended.

A strengthened narcotics law entered into force in 1993. The new law provides
for harsher penalties and streamlines forfeiture procedures. Zambia ratified t
he 1988 UN Convention in 1993, but failed to meet many of its goal and objectiv
es.

ZIMBABWE. Zimbabwe is transit point for illicit narcotics shipments, particula
rly for Mandrax from India in route to South Africa. Aside from small amounts
of cannabis, which are domestically consumed, no illicit drugs are produced in
Zimbabwe. Demand reduction programs, therefore, are modest. There is no concr
ete evidence of drug-related corruption among members of the Zimbabwe Republic
Police (ZRP), although there are reports that there is widespread corruption am
ong customs officials staffing Zimbabwe's land borders.

The ZRP has a small and dedicated narcotics control force; however, it would be
nefit from further training. Several high-ranking officers attended a DEA-spon
sored management course in the US, which included observation of drug interdict
ion operations on the US-Mexico border and at Denver's Stapleton Airport. The
USG also funded the training of drug detector dogs for use at Harare's airport.
The Government of Zimbabwe wants to improve its counternarcotics capabilities
across the board and will participate in as many international training progra
ms as possible. Zimbabwe became a party to the 1988 UN Convention in 1993; it
also is a party to the 1971 UN Convention on Psychotropic Substances.

(###)


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