Mass media communications
and mass reactions to emergencies and disasters
Dr John Drury, University
of Sussex
Dr Chris Cocking, London
Metropolitan University
RUSI Conference on the
role of the media in emergencies,
London, September 2008
Some of the research referred
to in this presentation was made possible by a grant from the Economic
and Social Research Council Ref. no: RES-000-23-0446
Overview
Introduction: Mass reactions to
emergencies and disasters – issues and implications
1. The problem of information
2. The question of trust
3. Source and target relationships
4. The discourse of mass emergencies
Conclusions: Facilitating collective
resilience
through mass communication
The
‘pathology’ model
of crowd behaviour in emergencies
‘Mass panic’, i.e.
in the face of threat:
- ‘Instinct’ overwhelms
socialization
- Emotions outweigh reasoning
- Rumours and sentiments spread
uncritically through ‘contagion’
- Reactions are disproportionate
to the danger
- Competitive and selfish behaviours
predominate
- Lack of co-ordination and
disorder results
But!
- Panic is rare in crowds
- Co-operation, altruism and
order are common
- The ‘pathology’ model
of crowd behaviour is now widely rejected
Current models conceptualize crowd behaviour
as:
- Meaningful
- Cognitive
- Social
The different models of mass behaviour
each have different implications for mass media communication in emergencies
1. Information
If crowd behaviour is understood
as pathological (i.e., irrational, over-emotional and prone to panic
etc.) then:
- Withhold information about
danger
- Restrict information about
danger
1. Information
BUT
The assumption of crowd pathology is
part of the problem!
In general, collective behaviour is
adaptive the more information available
‘When
people die in fires, it’s not because of panic, it’s more likely
to be the lack of panic.’
(Neil Townsend, Divisional
Officer, London Fire Rescue Service, 2003)
1. Information
Examples:
- Lack of response to alarms
and the danger of delayed action
- Study of Newcastle Metro found
more effective evacuation with more information (Proulx & Sime,
1991)
- Use of radio code-words (e.g.
‘Mr Sands’) good for keeping professional composure and reducing
public anxiety. BUT no evidence people stampede if they hear ‘FIRE’!
- Practical information (e.g.
about location of danger) is key
Hurricane Gustav
‘You need to be scared, you need to
be concerned, you need to get your butts moving out of New Orleans now!
… We are ordering a mandatory evacuation of the city of New Orleans
starting in the morning at 8am on the West Bank… we give you four
hours to evacuate’
(Ray Negin, Mayor of New Orleans. 31st
August 2008)
2. Trust
- The presumption of ‘mass
panic’ implies a lack of trust in the crowd and the public.
- This informs the practice
of withholding information from ‘the masses’.
2. Trust
BUT
- There is already a contemporary
public distrust of the authorities and cynicism towards the mass media
- Withholding information risks
creating further distrust!
- Reverse
‘crying wolf’ syndrome: The public won’t trust and act upon
genuine information!
- Examples: Controversies
around 7/7, 9-11, Katrina
2. Trust
- quarantine (not dispersal)
and
- decontamination
needs to be communicated, trusted
and complied with for the safety of the wider population!
3. Source
Interrelation of information,
trust and source
- Example: MPS post 7/7 use
of media: one spokesperson (reassuring, confident, authoritative,
articulate)
Problems:
- Assumes a homogenous ‘public’
(e.g. in attitude, culture and language)
- Assumes a shared mass media
source
- Assumes the police are always
the appropriate face of authority in an emergency
3. Source
Example of managing
CBRN
- CBRN: Issues of novelty, information,
trust and compliance
- Having the police as the ‘public
face’ of CBRN emergency services risks ‘public safety’ becoming
‘public disorder’ (i.e. issues of legitimacy, rights, power, confrontation)
3. Source
Managing CBRN: A new
paradigm
- CBRN is a medical / health
issue
- Hence medics should
be the public face of authority and information
- This will enhance trust and
compliance, and encourage the public to organize their own safety and
protection (‘self-policing’).
4. Discourse
- Talk is performative
(functional) not just representational
- Discourse has consequences
- Hence we need to consider
the language of the message in mass media communications
in emergencies
4. Discourse
The discourse of
‘mass panic’
- Coupled with mistrust, the
advice ‘don’t panic’ makes us believe there is something
to ‘panic’ about! (Wessely, 2005)
- References to ‘panic
buying’ in the media construct those around us as acting over-emotionally
and selfishly
- Reports of such ‘panic buying’
therefore encourage us to act simply in our own personal interest
and against the collective good
- Instead, ‘the problem of
the commons’ needs to be reported factually, without clichés and
in terms of public (i.e. collective) interests.
4. Discourse
Talking about Katrina 2005
- The media construction of
the Katrina survivors as ‘barbarians’ may have shaped the perceptions
of rescuers, who treated them as less than human
- The outraged, violent response
of survivors to rescuers becomes a self-fulfilling prophesy
4. Discourse
Pathologizing the ‘masses’ through
discourse feeds into practice in the authorities and the public themselves.
Such discourse is therefore counter-productive,
producing the very lack of co-operation and anxiety that the authorities
are afraid of.
Conclusions
How might we use mass
media communications to facilitate
collective resilience in the crowd and the wider public?
A definition:
Collective resilience
refers to the way shared identification allows groups of survivors to
express and expect solidarity and cohesion, and thereby to coordinate
and draw upon collective sources of support and other practical resources,
to deal with adversity (Drury, Cocking, & Reicher, in press)
Collective resilience is therefore the
social-psychological basis of both
- individual resilience/recovery
and
- organizational/structural
resilience
- Collective resilience is
largely endogenous (i.e. arises ‘naturally’ from shared experience)
- The key to collective resilience
is shared identification
- BUT certain media (and other)
practices can facilitate (or undermine) this shared identification and
hence resilience
Undermining shared identification
and resilience?
- Excluding the public (authorities
versus public)
- Distrusting the mass
- Restricting information
- Prioritizing ‘public order’
over ‘public safety’, health and civil liberties
- Pathologizing the mass and
the ‘other’ in our midst
Facilitating shared identification
and resilience?
- Including the public (catering
for the public desire to help)
- Trusting the crowd and the
public to self-organize
- Providing information
- Prioritizing ‘public health’
resources over social control
- Promoting unity: ‘we’
(the authorities, public etc.) are ‘all in the same boat’
Mass media communications
and mass reactions to emergencies and disasters
Take-home message:
Mass media information
and sources are trusted by the masses when the sources themselves trust
the masses.
