Regulation of Agricultural GMOs in China

 

Regulation of Agricultural GMOs in China

Regulation of Agricultural GMOs in China

 

SONG Ying

 

   The purpose of this paper is to survey on the regulation of agricultural GMO technologies in China, particularly GM crops and GM food. China is one of the top five principal producers of GM crops, after the United States, Argentina, Canada and Brazil.¹ The potentials of and expectations for such technologies are high but at the same time also mixed. Relevant issues concerning the biosafety and regulation of agricultural GMOs have been brought into light only in the past couple of years. A comparatively more comprehensive administrative framework for regulating GM crops and food was established in 2001. The following survey hopefully serves as an integral part of the whole project of “International Conflict in GMO Regulation – Improving Global Governance of Risk”.

 

I. Overview of the Development of Agricultural GMOs in China

 

   The research and development of agricultural GMOs in China started from the mid of 1980s. Due to the nature of China’s central-planned economy, especially the centralized financial system, the research and development of agricultural GMOs in China, unlike that in the developed states where private companies perform most of the agricultural biotechnology research, heavily relied on public funding from the government. From the early 1980s, biotechnology, in general, has been promoted and incorporated into several national research and development programs for science and technology, mainly for the purpose of achieving more rapid economic growth. The most important ones include the “Key Breakthrough Science and& Technology Projects” (1982), the establishment of 30 “National Key Laboratories (NKLs) on Biotechnology” (from 1985), the “High Technology Research and Development Plan”(1986, in short term the “863 Program)”², the establishment of “Natural Science Foundation” (1986), the “Special Foundation for Transgenic Plant Research and Commercialization” (1995) and the “Foundation for High-Tech Commercialization” (1998), etc.³ For those projects approved by these projects, programs and plans, the government provided research funding and relevant policies favorable to the research and development activities. For example, the “863 Program” funded 12 major biotechnology programs that consisted of over 100 projects.⁴ According to one survey, the public sector made about 45% of plant biotechnology research expenditures in the world. China currently accountsed for more than 10% of this amount. It was estimated that in 1999 China invested US$ 112 million in plant biotechnology in 1999. In early 2001, the government announced plans to raise plant biotechnology research budgets by 400% before 2005. If achieved, China could account for nearly one-third of the world's public plant biotechnology spending.⁵

   The injection of public fund have generated results. Unp till the end of 2004, there weare over 200 institutions (institutes or firms) focusing on agricultural biotechnology research and development established nation wide.⁶ These firms can may be divided into 4 categories. The first category is the institutes or firms affiliated to the China Academy of Agricultural Science (e.g. Biocentury Research Institute), provincial agricultural academy and big universities. This category takes a predominant majority. The second category is institutes or firms affiliated to national or provincial government. The third category is the joint venture (such as the Jidai Cotton Seed Co. and the Andai Cotton Seed Co. Both of them are joint venture with the Monsanto). The last category is other firms, such as private firms, etc.

   After 10 years of the “863 Program”, the sales of three major groups of biotechnology products reached to RMB 11.4 billion (about US$ 1.38 billion) in 1996 from only RMB 0.2 billion (US$ 0.024 billion) in 1986.⁷ The sales of the three groups of products were respectively lLight industrial products accounted for RMB 7.8 billion (US$ 0.94 billion), medicine for RMB 2.1 billion (US$ 0.254 billion) and agricultural products for RMB 1.5 billion (US$ 0.18 billion). In 2001, the total sale of biotechnological products (including both conventional and modern biotechnological products) reached to RMB 100 billion (US$ 12.1 billion).⁸ In the area of animal biotechnology, research has been done concerning the genome of several endangered species, such as the panda. This research will hopefully lead scientists to find an explanation for the reason why the number of pandas is decreasing rapidly, how to protect its habitat and ultimately how to save this endangered species from extinction. Moreover, more active research has been done with regard to GM fish, GM lamb and GM cow, for the purpose of increasing food production and food supply. For example after 15 years of research, the Chinese scientists have succeeded in producing a new type of GM carp. It can grow 42% faster than the traditional carp and offers a 125% increase in profit to fish farmers. At present, this kind of GM carp is at the stage of safety assessment for commercialization.⁹

 

   A. GM plants in general

   Due to the importance of agriculture for China and the expected role of GM plants in agriculture, they have received much attention, support and publicity. It is estimated that China is developing the largest plant biotechnology capacity outside of the North America.¹⁰ Until now, China has developed over 50 new types of plants and over 120 functional genes.¹¹ The majority of them are agricultural crops, such as rice, wheat, sorghum, maize (corn), soybean, potato, peanut, cabbage, sugar beet, oil rape seed, cane, apple, banana, peach, orange, strawberry, tomato, sweet pepper (green pepper, tian jiao), etc.¹² Other important crops include cotton and tobacco. The principal objective for developing these crops is to increase crop yield to meet the need of China’s the growing population. By 1992, the accumulated area of such crops was around 206,000 hectares nation wide. The total increase of grain yield was about 45 million kilograms.¹³ The total annual sown area of GM crops increased from less than 0.1 million hectares in 1998 to 2.1 million hectares (mainly Bt cotton) in 2002.¹⁴ In 2004, China alone grew up to 3.7 million hectares of Bt cotton (66% of total cotton area), an increase of 32% above 2003. It was about 5% of the total global area of biotech crops (while the share of the United Sates is 59%).¹⁵

   According to the FAO, the development of the above GM crops is at different stages in China: experimental phase, field trial and commercialization.¹⁶ Since March 1997, the Ministry of Agriculture has received 703 applications for GMO safety evaluation (submitted by 41 domestic applicants and 2 foreign applicants, including Monsanto of the U.S.), of which 517 applications received approval for different stages of development.¹⁷ The principal crops include (but are not limited to) the following: ¹⁸

   a. Experimental phase: barley, maize, oil rape seed, papaya, potato, rice, sorghum,

   sugar beet, wheat;

   b. Field trial:    chili, Chinese cabbage, cotton, groundnut, maize, melon,

   papaya, populus, potato, rice, soybean, tobacco,

   green pepper, tomato;

      c. Commercialization:  cotton, green pepper, petunia and tomato¹⁹.

   The traits include pest, disease and herbicide resistance, shelf-life improvement, cold and salt tolerance, etc. Of these GM crops, the 5^th generation of herbicide resistant soybean has been developed and at the stage of field trial. China is the first country to successfully develop disease resistant CMV/TMV tobacco. At present, sSeveral of the GM crops , such as rice, soybean, corn and Chinese cabbage, are that are at the stage of field trial arend expected to be approved for commercialization within next 5 years. ²⁰ The traits include pest, disease and herbicide resistance, shelf-life improvement, cold and salt tolerance, etc.  Because of the fact that for one crop, different GM traits have been added (traits such as pest, disease and herbicide resistance, shelf-life improvement, cold and salt tolerance, etc.) several GM varieties of one crop exist. By the end of 2000, 45 GM varieties were approved for field trail, 65 GM varieties were approved for environmental release and 31 GM varieties were approved for commercialization. ²¹

   Despite China’s achievements in agricultural GMOs, it only takes a small share of the world market of biotechnology, in comparison with some developed states. In 1996, the sale of biotechnology products was RMB 11.4 billion (about US$ 1.38 billion) in China, only around 14% of that of the United States (US$ 10.1 billion).²² With regard to the quantity, production scale of agricultural GMOs, the technology and equipments used, China is also still far behind on the United States even though China is developing more varieties of GM crops.  

   Because Bt cotton and Bt rice are two most important GM crops in China, more information will be on them is provided in the following two subsections.

 

   B. Bt cotton

   Cotton is an especially important agricultural crop in China both for meeting domestic needs and for export. Cotton is not a food crop, but it is an important crop for another human necessity – clothes, among other uses of cotton. In the past two decades, a big problem that affected the cotton production in China was frequent pest outbreaks , especially those of the bollworm and other cotton pests have affected cotton production in China. The common practice was to use pesticides to control it, b. But this resulted in increased pesticide resistance in bollworms and in a growing number of problem was the bollworm could easily develop resistance to the pesticide, on one hand, and there were more and more cases of pesticide poisoning of the farmers reported, on the other. Therefore Bt cotton became an important alternative to secure cotton production and improve the health of cotton farmers. Four varieties of Bt cotton, all of which target the lepidoptera – BT, CpTI and bollworms, have been approved for commercialization. In 1992, the plantation of Bt tobacco reached 8,600 hectares.²³ China is also the second country, after the United States (Monsanto), where several Bt cotton varieties ich were independently developed and planted several Bt cotton varieties. TIn 1997, the sown area of Bt cotton increased from was only 34,000 hectares (1% of total cotton sown area) in 1997 , but it increased up to over 3.7 million hectares (66% of total cotton sown area) in 2004.²⁴ In 2002, Monsanto’s Bt cotton varieties took about 2/3 of the total GM Bt cotton grown while the remaining 1/3 was taken by varieties developed by Chinese institutes or companies.²⁵ Up till 2002, altogether 19 Bt cotton varieties from Chinese institutions were approved either by national or provincial authorities.²⁶ 

      C. Bt rice

   Rice is the principle food grain crop in China and many parts of Asia. In April 2002, a draft sequence of the rice (indica) genome was completed by some Chinese scientists, financially supported by the fund from the “863 Program”, in April of 2002.²⁷ It is expected that this achievement will help to increase the output and quality of rice. Several Bt rice varieties were developed by Chinese institutions in Hubei and Fujian provinces. In December 2002, some of them were approved for field traial. A study provided that the Bt rice varieties which were planted for field trail in Hubei and Fujian provinces helped rice farmer to increase the productivity and improved farmers’ health, just like the case of Bt cotton.²⁸ In December of 2004, the Ministry of Agriculture confirmed that GM rice developed by Chinese institutes hadwas undergone a biosafety assessment. If a Biosafety Certificate is granted, it shall become the first major GM food crop for commercialization in China and the world.²⁹

 

II. Social and Economic Implications of Agricultural GMOs in China

 

   A. Biotechnology and economic growth in general

   In the State 10^th Five-Year Plan (2000-2005), genetic engineering was listed as one of the 12 major high technology research and development programs. According to the then State Planning Commission, since 2003 the ‘State Development and Planning Commission’ (SDPC)³⁰, the state would promote and support the research and development activities of genetic engineering because it would have an enormous impact on social and economic development in China. More specifically, modern biotechnologies would be applied to the development of agricultural production, medicinal development, environmental protection, food industry and other light industries. Mechanisms would be improved to provide financial resources for such development and ultimately the creation of an internationally competitive biotechnology industry. The sale of biotechnology products was expected to increase from RMB 20 billion³¹ of 2000 to RMB 200-300 billion of 2005. Such an increase would potentially form a significant part of state economic growth.³²

   Apart from the central government, provincial governments, particularly those in the more developed eastern regions like Guangdong Province and Beijing Municipality, also emphasized biotechnologies. This is because these regions have obtained the capacity and resources to conduct something seriously in this area and are more likely to benefit from the potentials of such technologies. According to the “Guangdong Provincial 10^th Five-Year High and New Technology Industry Plan,”³³ the output value of biotechnology was only 3.68% of the total output value (RMB 207.54 billion) of high technologies in 2000. This figure is expected to reach to 6% in the year of 2005. For the Beijing Municipality, biological engineering and new medicine are considered to be “long-term, sustainable sectors of economic growth”.³⁴ During the 10^th Five-Year period, the total investment in this sector will be RMB 11 billion. It is expected that the annual output value of this sector will increase up to RMB 15 billion in 2005. Therefore, the expectation of biotechnology in economic growth is high for the public authority from the center to the provinces. 

2. GMO technology and food security

   In 2004, the national population reached 1.299 billion. The annual grain production of the same year was 469.47 million tons.³⁵ After the central government started to impose compulsory family planning program (more effectively implemented in urban areas than in rural areas), the total population is expected to reach 1.6 billion by the year of 2030.³⁶ But on the other hand, the farmland shrinks every year in the process of economic development, particularly in urbanization. Due to the rapid shrinking of farmland and serious natural disasters (such as droughts and floods), the grain production of 2001 decreased by 2.1% in comparison to that of 2000.³⁷ Food security and food self-sufficiency It areis serious always a big issues and serious business for the government to make certain that there is enough food. The desire for food security and food self-sufficiency is strong. Food production is both an issue that the government is proud ofabout and also one it worries about. The reason for its being proud is that China, until now, has managed to produce more or less enough food to the feed its such a big population (, about 1/4 of the world population) with only 1/7 of world’s arable land.

   However, such a pride is not free from any worries.³⁸ In 2004, the national population reached 1.299 billion. Despite the fact that the central government imposes a compulsory family planning program (more effectively implemented in urban areas than in rural areas), the total population is expected to reach 1.6 billion by the year of 2030.³⁹ While the population is growing, the area available for farming shrinks every year.⁴⁰ The first reason, as mentioned earlier, is that the farmland, a very limited resource, is shrinking every year. Although the conversion of farmland into non-agricultural uses, according to the 1998 Land Administration Law, is in principle strictly controlled by the 1998 Land Administration Law, many the conversions still take took place anyway at a fast pace every year for many reasons. For example, it was widely reported that over 200 golf courses were constructed in several provinces in the past few years, but only one of them did received the approval from the competent land administration. Another reason for the shrinking of farmland is the government policy on forestation. In order to fight severe dust storms and the deteriorating ecological system on the whole, especially in the northwestern part of the country, the government started to implement a policy that required farmland, mostly low-yield farmland, to be converted into forestland in over 10 provinces, most of which are in the northern and western part of China in 2002. It was planned that 73.93 million mu (about 4.93 million hectares) of farmland were converted to forestland in 2002.⁴¹ AlsoTherefore, the farmland is decreasing but the population is growing each year. Moreover, the diet of many Chinese people, especially thosee people in urban areas, has also changeds in recent years. There is a growing consumption of meat and dairy products. ThisSuch a change will also put more pressure on the grain production for animal feed. Against such a background, the potential advantages of GMO technologies bring new and promising hopes to meet the challenge of food security in China. Other factors threatening Chinese food security The biggest threat to crop yields in China includes pests, diseases, viruses, increasing demand of chemical fertilizers, shortage of water resources, increased large scale of salinisation and alkalinization of the soil (especially in the southern part of China), and deteriorating agricultural environment. Against such a background, the potential advantages of GMO technologies bring new and promising hopes to meet the challenge of food security in China. The agricultural GMOs are expected to play a significant role in solving these problems, as elaborated in the following section. 

   C. GMO technology and agricultural sector

   China’s economic reform started with agriculture in the late 1970s. After the 10-year Cultural Revolution, food supply was a big problem then. However, iIn the past 20 years, the biggest achievement of China’s economic the reform is that a more or less balanced food demand and supply has been achieved. Agricultural products are generally no longer in shortage. Hunger is not an imminent threat. ChinaIt has entered into a new stage of agricultural development that focuses on adjustment of the product structure, improvement of food quality, increase of the income for the farmers, improvement of the environment, and the achievement of stable and sustainable economic development in the countryside.⁴² The current outstanding problems in the agricultural sector include the following: poor quality of agricultural products, high production cost, low income for farmers, weak competitiveness in the world market and continuous deterioration of the environment (especially caused by the overuse of agricultural chemicals), etc. In order to solve these problems, tThe government put much emphasis on application and popularization of high technologies, especially the biotechnology and information technology, to modernize the agricultural sector,.⁴³ That is to support the application and popularization of these technologies in agriculture, such as to improve and adjust the strains and quality of crops and to change traditional agriculture to an intensive agriculture equipped with these technologies.⁴⁴ The top Chinese leaders were quoted to be enthusiastic about the agricultural biotechnology in such explicit and strong terms like, “solving tomorrow’s agricultural problem in the end will come down to biotechnology, to relying on the most sophisticated technologies” (DENG Xiaoping) and “we must carry out a new agricultural science and technology revolution” (JIANG Zemin). ⁴⁵ These remarks partly explained the reason why biotechnology development enjoyed such a priority in governmental policies and received so much public funding in comparison with other technologies.  

   Therefore, GMO technologies are expected to play important roles in not only scientific and technological aspects, but more broadly in political, economic and social aspects:1a. To increase agricultural production efficiency and farmer income

   In recent years, tThe comparatively low production efficiency and low income of farmers has increasingly become a concern for the government. T in recent years, especially the current administration (in office since March 2003) seems determined to do something serious about it. At the beginning of both 2004 and 2005, the central government issued two No.1 Official Documents⁴⁶ that were all focused on three agricultural problems (“san nong wen ti”, namely the farmers (nong min), rural area (nong cun) and agriculture (nong ye)). One of the strategies to tackle the issues, which is directly and at the same time relevant to GMOs, is to re-organize the network of supply of seeds, agricultural chemicals and other necessities for agricultural the production. A popular way of so doing is to build a “big ship”. It means, for example, one big seed supplier will merge or collaborate with other smaller seed developer and suppliers to set up a bigger seed company in order to rationalize the human, financial and technical resources within the network. Again, Bt cotton is the example. The China Cotton Seed Corporation (zhong mian zhong ye ji tuan gong si), in collaboration with 5 regional companies, has formed a large nation wide network for Bt cotton production, supply, sales and promotion. NB these numbers do not seem to match the ones mentioned earlier in the subsection on cotton EMBy the end of 2001, over 18 million kg of Bt cotton seeds were produced, which enlarged the sown area of the Bt cotton from 300,000 mu (about 20,000 hectare) in 1998 to 10,000,000 mu (about 666,670 hectare) in 2001 nation wide by the company. There was an average of 7.5kg increase of the output per mu (0.0667 hectare) and the total increase of income for the cotton farmers was nearly RMB 1 billion.⁴⁷ The central government is also making efforts to enlarge the sown area of unified supply of cotton seed from currently 75% up to 90% and effectively reduce the seeds kept by the farmers for the next year.⁴⁸ For the cotton farmers, such an organization means a guaranteed supply of better quality seeds, better quality cotton, a guaranteed sales price and eventually better income.

This has partly been moved to section on cotton EMWhat should be noted is that cotton is an especially important agricultural crop in China for meeting the needs of domestic demand and export demand. Since the demand of cotton was high in the past years, the increase of productivity of cotton did not reduce the income for the farmers. Among the 9 varieties of 4 GM crops approved for commercialization, Bt cotton takes 4 varieties, all of which target the lepidoptera – BT, CpTI and bollworms. Shortage of water supply, overuse of chemical fertilizer and deteriorating environment also contributed to the low production efficiency and low income for the farmers. Agricultural GMOs are also expected to play a role in these aspects. The Chinese scientists are working to breed new types of GM crops. Some of them will be drought-enduring and use less water. Some of them will need to use fewer fertilizers. And some will still grow in the soil of salinisation and alkalinization in the southern part of China.⁴⁹

   2b. To reduce the use of pesticide and other agricultural chemicals

   China has over 1,700 producers of agricultural chemicals with the production capacity of between 0.5-0.6 million tons annually.⁵⁰ There are over 3,000 kinds of products, which can be divided into three groups: pesticide (72%), germicide (11%) and herbicide (15%). It is estimated that their use eliminated about 15% of the crop losses of the farmers. However, the extensive use of these agricultural chemicals has increasingly becomes a serious concern because of their adverse health and environmental effects. Due to farmers’ lack of knowledge on how to use them and poor quality of the products, poisoning cases happened again and again. For the chemical products from small producers, the supply is definitely bigger than the demand, especially for those obsolete and low quality products from village or other small producers. The competition is severe. For tThe government is incapable or , it is difficult or not unwilling to supervise and enforce the quality standards with so many producers spreading all over the country, especially in those places where local governmental protectionism is strong.

   Another problem for the government is that the structure of the products is not rational. Take the pesticides for example. About 60%-70% of them are still highly poisonous and leave high levels of residueal in both soil and agricultural products themselves. Even though the government has already banned the production of several products,, they are still being in producedtion illegally, such as the DDT. As early as from 1972, for example, it was prohibited by the government to use of DDT on tea was prohibited, but more than almost 20 years later, even in 1999, when the public authority conducted an inspection on the tea quality, 42.9% of the tea products sampled in a public authority inspection, showed residues of were found DDT residual. High residuesal of pesticides are is not only found in tea, but also in vegetables, fruits and other food products. In 2000, aOne survey in Beijing in 2000 indicated that 20% of the vegetables supplied from the nearby suburb exceeded state residueal standard while the percentage for those supplied from other provinces was 69%.⁵¹ As a result of Though with the strengthening of enforcement of relevant governmental regulations and increasing awareness of the public, the situation is improving slowly. Under such circumstances, a big hope was put on the agricultural GMO technologies. But such a failure of regulation with pesticide residual also calls the government’s ability now to regulate GMOs into question.Therefore it is not surprising that over 90% of the field traits of GM crops developed in China targets insect and disease resistance (compared to , in comparison with only 19% of the field traits for insect resistance in developed countries).⁵² For example, most of the field traits introduced to the most important GM agricultural crops in China are for these purposes, such as rice (Lepidoptera), maize (Lepidoptera), wheat (virus resistance), potato (disease resistance) and cotton (Lepidoptera).⁵³ The top and short-term priority for developing GM crops is to reduce the use of agricultural chemicals. Up till now, Bt cotton provides the most successful story. Bt cotton farmers reduced pesticide use by an average of 13 sprayings (49.9kg) per hectare per season, reducing . It reduced the costs from $762 to $136 per hectare per season.⁵⁴ In 2001, Bt cotton increased yield on 1.5 million hectares and reduced pesticide by 78,000 tons (formulated products) resulting in significant fewer cases of farmer pesticide poisonings.⁵⁵ Another similar successful story is the Bt rice, although rice is not yet approved for commercialization. According to the Bt rice study mentioned earlier, the two Bt rice varieties sampled in Hubei and Fujian provinces, reduced pesticide use by 80%, in comparison with conventional rice varieties, while the rice yields were 6% to 9% higher. ⁵⁶   

   3c. To improve the quality of food

      China has achieved more or less self-sufficiency in food production. With the steady improvement of the standard of living in Chinastandard,, how to improvement of the quality of food has becomes an increasingly important issue. For example, by the year of 2010, the daily intake of protein is expected to increase up to 77 g per person.⁵⁷ The GM crops can play a role. Among the GM crops that are approved for field trial listed in the Appendix 1, one type of maize is targeted to increase the protein content.  

   The following is not about food quality but about increased yields, which was the subject of one of the earlier sections. Another role for the GM technology to play is to increase the yield by improving the quality of the seeds of crops. One priority in the 10^th Five-Year (2001-2005) Plan⁵⁸ for the agricultural development is to establish a nation wide seed breed, production, sales network. Within this network, a series of examination and evaluation centers for GM seeds should be established.⁵⁹To sum up, the agricultural GMOs are expected to play an increasingly important role in the improvement and adjustment of agricultural sector. The most important one is to reduce the use of agricultural chemicals and thereby improve the environment. Although the GMOs will not change the organization of agricultural sector automatically, they will contribute to the change of the traditional pattern of the seed breeding and distribution. The unified breeding and distribution of seeds becomes more available. By changing the supply of seeds, the changes of supply of other agricultural necessities and the sale are likely to follow. Take the example of the BT cotton. The new production network will gradually emerge from supply of seeds to the sales of the product. It will produce impact on the organization of cotton production. At present, large and industrialized farms (especially in the northern-west provinces) and small family farms co-exist. There is a tendency to connect the small farms together by unified supply of seeds. If that is achieved, there would not so much room for of independent development ofis left for small family farms. But taking into consideration of the large and diversified agricultural production pattern in different provinces in China, such uniformity can hardly be achieved in the near future.

 

4. Agricultural trade and GM crops

   Agricultural trade used to play an important role in the economy, but such importance steadily decreased with the increase of while the importance of industrial products increased in the last 20 years. For example in 1980, an average of 22.9% (US$ 4.84 billion) of China’s the exports were of agricultural products took an average of 22.9% (US$ 4.84 billion) of the total annual export.⁶⁰ This But such a share decreased to 5.4817.2% (US$ 160.0968 billion) in 1990 and only 6.6% in 2000 (US$ 16.38 billion).⁶¹ In 2002 (November), the amount reached US$ 16.09 billion, which was almost 4 times of that in 1980s, but it took 5.48%..⁶² Until November 2002, the total agricultural import and export was US$ 27.23 billion.⁶³ IThe import was more than the export: i. In 2004, the import was US$ 28 billion while the export was US$ 23.3 billion.⁶⁴ The percentage of agricultural trade continued to drop to 4.5% and for it was also the first time in many years there is a of trade deficit in past several years. In spite of the decrease of percentage, agricultural trade, especially the export, is still very important for economic, social and political reasons, which are too complex to be measured only by the percentage of the contribution to trade statistics. For one, aAgricultural population still takes the majority of the population. The economic income, social and political stability of the agricultural population cannot simply be measured only by the percentage of the contribution to the trade statistics.

   With regard to the import and export of GM crops, there are no accurate statistics is not available because before the enactment of the 2001 Administrative Regulation on the Safety of Agricultural GMOs and relevant administrative measures by the Ministry of Agriculture, there was no due to the lack of a comprehensive nation-wide examination and supervision system and practice before enactment of the 2001 Administrative Regulation on the Safety of Agricultural GMOs and relevant administrative measures by the Ministry of Agriculture. However, by analyzing the following statistics of agricultural import and export, it will reflect and explain some considerations and reasons behind the regulation of agricultural GMOs in China. 

   1a. Exports

   Figures for 2002 show that On the aspect of agricultural export, tthe principal agricultural export products (about 22.3%) are aqua products such as (e.g. fish and& shrimp) that take about 22.3%, vegetables such as (e.g. garlic and chestnut,) and fruits such as (e.g. apples, oranges, mandarins). 20.1% of agricultural exports are , poultry (e.g. duck), 12.7% are and livestock products (e.g. pork) 12.7% and grain 11.1% is grain. These four groups kinds of products make up take over 66.2% of the all the agricultural exports.⁶⁵ At this stage, the GM carp, GM pig, GM rice, GM potato and GM maize are still at the experimental stage and not yet approved for commercialization and export.⁶⁶ Of all China exported many kinds of vegetables exported by China, every year but only green pepper and tomato are GM relevant because they are the only two kinds GM vegetablesand permitted for commercialization (green pepper, 1998-1999 and tomato, 1997-1999) in China.⁶⁷ There are, however, no reports The accurate statistics of the sown area of them is not available, but they are not widely planted. The GM tomato was reported to have been planted only in Beijing, Fujian (Xiamen), Liaoning and Yunnan provinces and the GM sweet pepper was planted in Beijing, Fujian (Xiamen) and Liaoning province between 1997-1999.⁶⁸ Altogether the sown area was less than 10,000 mu (about 667 hectares).⁶⁹ It is not yet reported that China has exported GM peppers and GM tomatoes abroad. Another important export crop is corn/maize of which the principal markets are South Korea and Malaysia. There is a sharp increase of export from 5,996 million kg (US$ 624 million) in 2001 to 11,673 million kg (US$ 1,166 million) in 2002. In 2003, it reached to 16, 399 million kg. But at present, GM maize is again still at stage of field trial, not for commercialization or export yet.⁷⁰

   Another aspect of agricultural export is that China’s the principal agricultural export markets for the export traditionally weare limited highly concentrated to a few states andor trade areas. For example from during the period of 1995 to -1998, Japan and Hong Kong were the destination of more than took over 70% of China’s agricultural exports. Over 60% of the vegetable export was to received by Japan. Europe took about 20% and the United States took only 5% of that export.⁷¹ In 2004, however, the markets for Chinese agricultural exports are more diversified, with but the top five export markets beingare still Japan, South Korea, Hong Kong, the United States and the European Union. These five export markets together received over 69% of Chinese agricultural exports.⁷²

   There are no reports On the basis of the above statistics, the approved plantation of GM crops is very limited. It is not yet reported that China has exported GM products or GM seeds to other countries. Due to the serious concerns on the safety and restriction of GM agricultural products in many of its export markets (Europe, Japan, South Korea and Hong Kong), it is in the interest of China not to export GM agricultural products thereto its major trading partners even if some GM products are permitted for commercialization. China has even become more cautious in allowing commercialization of GM crops, because of the suspicions of GMOs in its export markets. In order to keep and increase agricultural export, Chinese experts suggested that China should, in fact, take the advantage of the name of “GM-free product”. One example is An example of this increased caution is China’s regulatory approach of GM corn/maize. The GM technology for maize is reported to be reported already mature and GM maize could an be commercialized but the authorities have not if approved commercialization yet by the authority in China. But Chinese experts suggested that in order to keep the export advantage, the commercialization of GM corn/maize should be very cautious because the Europeans were suspicious about GM products.⁷³

   If China were to export Therefore, the attitude of major importing states and region toward GM products, e.g. Europe and Japan, made China more cautious about commercialization of GM crops. On the export of GM products, the export of GM agricultural products, these products and related examination would not be is not subject to compulsory examination and approval from the Chinese government. O but only at the request of the importing state would such examination and approval take place.⁷⁴ That is to say iIf the importing state does not require GM examination, the Chinese authoritiesy wouldill not carry out the examination and issue relevant document. No case of export of Chinese GM agricultural products has been reported yet. 

2. Imports

     On the aspect of the import of GM crops, the picture is totally different. China is becoming a major importer of such crops. The trade statistics in Appendix 2 of this paper demonstrates a sharp increase inof the imports of agricultural products as of from 1996. Due to the lack of examination and administrative measure of GM crops before 2001, there are no accurate statistics available on imports of the GM crops import are not available. Even in 2004, no separate trade statistics of GM crops were made public for some reason. The general statistics on agricultural imports include imports of soy, maize, rape seed, cotton seed and tomato (some of which are major GM crops), from the United States, Argentina and Canada (major GM crop producing countries). The GM crops covered by the 2002 Labeling Measures are soybeans (including seed, soybean, powder, oil and residue), maize/corn (seed, corn, oil, powder), oil rape seed (seed, oil, residue), cotton seed and tomato (seed, fresh tomato and sauce). Because tThese crops are the world major GM crops and came from major producing countries of GM crops, such as the United States, Argentina and Canada, so the author provided a survey of the trade (import and export) of the major GMse crops in Appendix 2 of this paper.

   Soybeans are a good example. Soybeans originated from China. Until the mid-1990s, China was a major soybean exporter. China exported 375,097 tons and imported 293, 937 tons of soybeans in 1995.⁷⁵ This was more or less balanced picture. However since 1996, China gradually became a major soybean importer. In From 1996 to 2001 China imported the following amount of soybeans: 1.107 million tons (1996), 2.847 million tons (1997), 2.343 million tons (1998), 3.781 million tons (1999), 9.756 million tons (2000) and 13.575 million tons of soybeans(2001).⁷⁶ In 2002, perhaps due to the 2001 State Council Regulation (which will be explained in more detail below), the import dropped a little to 11.3 million tons of soybeans.⁷⁷ But in 2003 and 2004, the import wasent up at to 20.7 million tons and 20.23 million tons respectively.⁷⁸ In 2004, the soybean import from the United States alone reached historically 10.2 million tons.⁷⁹In 2004, China imported 20.23 million tons of soybeans. The imported soybeans mainly come from the United States, Argentina, Canada and Brazil. It is estimated that Chinese in fact consumed nearly 20 million tons of GM food products annually in recent years.⁸⁰ A recent market inspection in Beijing showed that all the samples of cooking oil contained GMOs.

   The sharp increase of soybean import has negatively affected the domestic soybean farmers’ interests. There are many small family soybean farmers in northern-east provinces of China.⁸¹ A majority part of the imported soybeans were used to extract cooking oil. In 2004, tThhe annual demand forof soybeans for all purposes (soy food products and animal feeds) was about 28 million tons. The domestic capacity of production in (2004) was about 18 million tons. ⁸² Therefore, about 10 million tons couldan be imported in order to keep a balance between demand and supply, but in fact China imported over 20 million tons in 2004. Even taking into consideration of the increase inof demand, the import of 20 million tons was still very significant.

   The producers of cooking oil prefer imported soybeans because the cost is lowerbecause of their . Two elements contributed to the low cost. The first is better oil extraction rate (the . The domestic soybean rate is about 16.5% while the imported is about 19%) . It makes a big difference if the extraction capacity is over 1,000 tons per day. The second is the price. Theand because domestic soybeans areis about 50% more expensive than the imported oneshigher.⁸³ Domestic soybeans are more expensive because than the imported soybeans on the market even though the extraction rate is low. This is because of the production cost is high. Due to the pressure of the imported soybeans, the price of domestic soybeans dropped significantly in recent years. In order to protect the domestic soybean production and improve the competitiveness of domestic soybeans, and after public pressure, the Ministry of Agriculture issued a policy document to promote the production of high oil extraction soybeans in four provinces in the northeast part of China and hopefully to keep the imported soybeans within a reasonable limit.⁸⁴

The above statistics shows that China is a major importer of GM crops, especially GM soybeans. In fact, China has imported more soybeans than its domestic demand. The imported soybeans produced negative impact on the domestic soybeans. Such a situation raised concern from the government and the public. Public opinions called for control on imported soybeans.

5. Indigenous genetic resources and iIntellectual property

   The sharp increase of soybean import also caused concern with regard to the “leaking” or loss of indigenous genetic resources. It is estimated that over 90% of the genetic resources of the wild soybeans can may only be found in China. SHowever, some American companies privately obtained such genetic resources from China, . Later they developed new seeds, and patented them new seeds abroad and then exported them back to China.⁸⁵ This is a common practice and a frequent issue of dispute between developing and developed states with regard to GMOs and genetic resources. China has tightened the control on the “leaking” of indigenous genetic resources by legal means.

   A relatively newlatest development in the of protection ofng indigenous genetic resources areis the Administrative Measures on the Germ Plasm Resources of Agricultural Crops, issued by the Ministry of Agriculture (MOA) onof June 26, 2003. They It entered into force onfrom October 1, 2003. These measures wereIt was enacted in accordance with the Seed Law and established an administrative system for the collection, management, evaluation, registration, preservation, exchange and utilization of seed resources of agricultural crops. On the issue of “leaking” of indigenous resources, iIt provides that the country enjoys sovereignty over the germ plasm resources. If any unit or individual intends to provide such resources to a foreign unit or individual, it/he/she shall apply to the provincial agricultural development-in-charge for review and to the Ministry of Agriculture (MOA) for final approval. The MOA will establish a classified inventory of these resources which will beand reviewed periodically. It is still too early to see how theseis Measures works, but at least in principle the collection of indigenous genetic resources of agricultural crops is regulated and not free anymore.

   With regard to the issue of intellectual property of agricultural GMOs, China promulgated the Patent Law in 1984 and revised it twice in 1992 and 2000. In 2001, the Detailed Implementation Measures of the Patent Law wereas enacted. According to Article 25 (4), animal and plant varieties cannot be shall not be granted patented right. Up till now, no plant varieties themselves received patent protection, but there are over 970 GMO technological inventions which received patent protection since 1988. ⁸⁶ T, such as the core technology of Bt cotton, for example, developed by Chinese biotechnologists received patent protection⁸⁷ on December 27, 2001.⁸⁸ It also received the title of “Gold Medal of China Patent” awarded by the State Intellectual Property Office (SIPO) of China and the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO).⁸⁹ The 970 patented GMO technologies included all kinds of technological inventions in agriculture, medicine, industry and environmental protection, etc. developed by Chinese and foreign institutions and firms.

   Moreover, on March 20, 1997, the State Council issued a Regulation for the Protection of New Plant Varieties of China (hereafterhereinafter referred as the 1997 State Council Regulation). The MOA and the State Forestry Administration (SFA) subsequently took later made several relevant implementation measures and created inventories. From April 23 of 1999, the two ministries began to accept applications for the protection of new plant varieties. On April 23 of 1997, China became the 39^th party to the 1978 UPOV.⁹⁰  According to the 1997 State Council Regulation, the exclusive right of the breeder of the new plant varieties shall be protected (Article 6). Without the authorization from the breeder, it is prohibited to produce or sell for commercial purposes the breeding materials of the protected varieties unless provided by the Regulation otherwise. The Regulation stipulated the contents of the right, conditions of granting the right, application, examination and approval, etc. The Regulation also provides penalties for the infringement of the protected rights.

   The MOA and the SFA published two lists of protection. By the end of 2003, the MOA announced 5 groups of protection lists, which included that includes inter alia rice, corn/maize, Chinese cabbage, potato, wheat, soybean, peanut, tomato, etc. For the application, bBy the end of 2002, the SFA hads examined 220 applications (10 applications came from France, Germany and the Netherlands) and , among which 48 of these applications were approved.⁹¹ Until the end of 2003, the MOA has received altogether 1,311 applications for new plant varieties (among which 13 of which applications were made by foreign applicants) for new plant varieties and 422 applications were approved altogether.⁹²  One reason for China to establish this protection framework is in order to fulfill its the obligations under the WTO TRIPS Agreement, the international aspect. The other reason is the domestic: protecting aspect; including the improving agricultural scientific and technological innovation and improving the competitiveness of agricultural products because China’s steadily increased investments in agricultural research and development activities in the past two decades and improving the competitiveness of agricultural products.

 

   

3. Actors, Interests and Social Attitudes in the GMO Regulation

 

   A. Actors and& their iInterests

   Regulating agricultural GMOs in China has a direct impact on affects the interests of several groups of actors directly. They include major government ministries, the biotechnologists and their firms, seed companies, farmers, producers or processors of related agricultural products, consumers, international and domestic environmental organizations, foreign biotechnology companies and foreign governments, domestic importers and foreign exporters of GM products, etc. The interests of the regulatory agencies (the major government ministries) will be discussed separately in the Part IV of this paper. 

   1. Scientists

    For the Chinese biotechnologists and their firms, public funding and regulation is vital to their interests. As it was mentioned earlier, Chinese biotechnologists received generous financial support from the government since the mid of 1980s. It is in their interests that they will continue to get the funding for their research and development, and then commercializinge the result as soon as possible. For example, sometimes they sold the seeds to seed companies and sometimes their own firms served as seed companies. The GM seed and non-GM seed are segregated due to the 2001 State Council Regulation, but the seed companies are not. They will sell anything that makes profit. Therefore, it is understandable that Qifa Zhang, a leading biotechnologist of Bt rice, and others explicitly complained that the attitude of the governmental policy on GMOs corps and their commercialization was ambiguous in their 2004 Recommendation mentioned earlier. ⁹³ On one hand, the government invested a lot of money in on the research and development, but on the other, no new GM crops varieties were approved for commercialization since 1999. He suggested that the approval of certain GM crops (such as Bt rice) should be speed up. Another major complaint of his was that the current regulation was too strict, burdensome and costly, due to the lack of effective coordination among different regulatory ministries oandr administrations. He suggested that regulatory mechanism should be revised, better coordinated and less burdensome. He also suggested that the government should continue to increase the investment in and support of select GM crops, such as GM rice, GM corn/maize, GM rapeseed and GM tomato because major progress has been achieved on them. He indicated that the 1996 Measure, which will be discussed later, was better than the current regulation. It is interesting to note that Qifa Zhang and other biotechnologists did not discuss how to free people from the worries of food safety and biosafety in their Recommendation. If they, the leading Chinese biotechnologists disregard shy off these worries or concerns, these worries will not disappear, in the first place. Also, Secondly, people will have reasonable doubt whether they care about the biosafety at all or if they have something to hide. 

   2. Farmers

   For the farmers who planted the GM crops, especially the Bt cotton farmers, success-ful stories were made public. It is reported in sSeveral studies mentioned in this paper and else where report that the cost of pesticides and labor has been significantly reduced and athat t the same time the efficiency has been greatly improved. It is estimated that the derived benefits from Bt cotton areis about US $330 to US $400 more per hectare, than in comparison with traditional (non-GM) cotton.⁹⁴ According to the State Development and Planning Commission (SDPC), the accumulated direct and accumulated profit for Bt cotton farmers in China may reach 1 billion RMB (US$ 121 million) from 1998 to 2001.⁹⁵  Because of thesesuch clear explicit benefits, it is understandablenatural that Bt rice was planted illegally in several provinces before the approval for commercialization, as it will be discusseddemonstrated later in this paper. However, for the farmers other than those who grow GM crops, the picture is different. Those who If what they grow crops that have to compete are in competition with GM crops, , such as for example imported GM soybeans, suffer more with increasing imports the more imported, the more they suffer because their products are less competitive than the imported ones, especially if if the market, policy and regulations are is not particularly favorable to their products.  

   3. Producers and processors of agricultural products

   For the producers or processors of agricultural products,, such as the producer of cooking oil, it generally is not important whether a material is GM does not have to been GM materials or not, if the cost of production is the same. The soy based cooking oil case mentioned earlier demonstrated that the reason for Chinese producers to choose the imported GM soybeans to make oil was because of the high extraction rate and low price. If such cooking oil products were treated the same as those from non-GM soybeans by the Chinese regulators and consumers, the producers would definitely choose the imported GM soybean. However, wWhen the principal market is not China but Europe or Japan, South Korea or Hong Kong, the picture may be different because the regulators, consumers and market there are more skeptical towards GM products. 

   4. Private biotechnology firms

   For the foreign biotechnology firms (such as the Monsanto), who created in the form of joint ventures (such as Jidai seed company and Andai seed company) with Chinese partners (such as Jidai seed company and Andai seed company) have their product distributed , they obtained over half of the Bt cotton plantation in China.  They charge farmers a technical fee they charged is basfor ‘use’ of their ed on their intellectual property (IP) rights on Bt cotton, which are . Their Bt cotton has been protected by the IP in law. However, , but the enforcement of these IP rights is something different and . Therefore, the implementation and enforcement of IP law in China has becomes a big issue between the US government and Chinese government. The foreign exporter and the Chinese importer share the profit of the import of GM products to China. The rule of trade is applied.  

   5. Environmental NGOs and consumers

   For the environmental NGOs, the issue of agricultural GMOs provided a good opportunity to increase their status and influence in China. The Chinese political and social environment is not generally favorable towards NGOs, but the environmental NGOs are the exception. For the environmental NGOs, the issue of agricultural GMOs provided a good opportunity to increase their status and influence in China.  Their voices can be heard occasionally. The Greenpeace may be considered quite radical in other countriesabroad, but in China, in the case of XUE’s Bt cotton report mentioned later, it has established a good image for the protection of the environment.

   CFor the consumers, they do not always benefit from GM crops or products directly but they have to bear all the risks, which are divided into two kinds, food safety and biosafety:⁹⁶: 

1. GM crops or food may be allergenic or harmful to human health (food safety);
2. Long-term risks and consequences of cross-pollination and of the disruption to the cellular ecology of plants, i.e. the creation of super-weeds (biosafety);
3. Bt resistance may cause adverse effect on plants and animals (biosafety);
4. Adverse effect on biodiversity and environment (biosafety).⁹⁷

For the consumers, if they can get better quality but low priced products produced from GM crops, they can at least share the benefit from GMO technology. If not, they and environmental groups will only left to worry about the food safety and biosafety issues, which will be discussed in the following two sections.

 

   B. Food Safety – Social Attitudes

   Food safety has been a big issue in the past couple of years in China. On 31 October 2001, the Ministry of Agriculture (MOA) issued an official document, urging to strengthen the administration of the quality and safety of agricultural products.⁹⁸ According to this document, the quality and safety of agricultural products was such an important and urgent issue that it had to must be dealt with immediately. What is interesting and relevant in this document is that the issue of GM crops and GM food were not even mentioned as an issue of food safety. The document did not define what it meant by food safety, but the two outstanding examples of the problem of food safety were the contamination of food by the pollutants of industrial and municipal wastes and pesticide residuesal in food. The focus was to strengthen the administration of five aspects of agricultural production: the production environment, agricultural additives, the production process, labeling, and market entry.

   A question that may be raised here is why the issue of GM food was not even mentioned as an issue of food safety in this document. One possible answer is that this document only targeted the aforementioned two outstanding issues that have increasingly worried the general public, but did not serve as a comprehensive document on food safety. Another answer may be that until now there are no known food safety problems caused by either domestically produced GM crops (e.g. tomato and sweet pepper) or imported GM crops (e.g. soybeans, corn and rape seed) so the risk of GM food was not considered to be an urgent issue of food safety. GM food safety issues are It is a matter of potential adverse effects described by reports, studies and news articles published in the media, and not one , which was not raisedresulting from by people’s first-hand experience but by the reports, studies and news articles published in the media. No cases of poisoning or allergy by GM food were reported in China so far. It seems that the media in China is also working hard to connect their “tracks” to the international ones. That is to say if the media in the developed states has already covered such the debate, the Chinese media should do the same and as soon as possible. They only repeated the stories that have already been told in the developed states. If the consumers in the developed states worryied about GM food, the media tellsold the Chinese consumers that they have the right to, and should, do the same. However, it must be noted that this ere, the “consumer” means a person that people in a the biglarge cityies who areis capable of enjoying plenty of choices (even the food from abroad) but not persons the people in rural areas or the people in the places where food supply is still inadequate.

   From March 20, 2002, as it was mentioned earlier, 17 products of 5 kinds of GM crops: soybeans (including seed, soybean, powder, oil, residue), corn (including seed, corn, oil, powder), rape seed (including seed, oil, residue), cotton seed and tomato (including seed, fresh tomato, sauce) must be labeled as GM products, in accordance with the law. But for some time after the entry into force of the law, people have not found any expressly labeled GM products on the market. A market survey conducted in 2003 by the Beijing Agricultural Agency of the municipal government showed that 22 products from 14 producers of cooking oil all contained GMOs, but none of them were labeled as such. Ironically some of these products were even labeled as GM-free.⁹⁹ To a certain extent, this survey reflects the social attitudes toward GMOs. According to one public opinion pull conducted in the city of Guangzhou (the capital city of Guangdong Province) in October and November of 2002, among over 800 people being interviewed, 2/3 of them had heard about GM food and 1/3 did not know anything about it.¹⁰⁰ A majority of them could not tell clearly what GM food was. Do they like GM food? For the majority, the answer is NO. If the price was not taken into consideration, 56% of them would choose GM-free food. Only 11% of them would like to TRY it. About 30% of them could not give an answer. Among those interviewed, old people and women demonstrated a strong preference forto GM-free food. With regard to the issue of consumer information and labeling, over 80% of them wanted to be informed and supported to establish a labeling system as soon as possible. Only 2% did not really care about it. This poll partly explained why no food was expressly labeled as GM food and some GM food was even labeled as GM-free food at the Beijing market. The GM food is not welcomed by the people in big cities. Many people are suspicious about it even thoughwhen they have little knowledge about what GMO is.

   The author of this paper also conducted a survey in several big supermarkets in Beijing during the first 3 months of 2004. This time many cooking oil products were expressly labeled as GM-Products. They were labeled as such because the municipal government of Beijing threatened to fine those producers and retailers if they did not comply with the labeling requirement of the 2002 GM Labeling Measures within a given period of time. A typical conversation about GM products was like this, -

• “Will you be sick if you eat this?”
• “ I don’t know”.

What usually happened next was that the consumers chose a product n expressly labeled GM-Free product in the end. 

   To sum up, the actors and their interests are identified and voiced in a comparatively more open way than is the case with other issues (such as land use or environmental issues) in China. The social attitudes toward GMOs are closely related to the interests of the actors. On the safety issue, GM crops and GM food has not yet posed as an outstanding food safety problem but the general public is suspicious about the potential adverse impact on human health therefore they supported the labeling for information and choices. The science community split on the science and biosafety risks associated with GM crops. Scientific uncertainty existed. Openly, the GMO regulation is supported by all the actors though in private this is not necessarily the case. The Bt rice case discussed later may case some light on this point.

 

   C. Biosafety – Conflicting Experts’ Views

   Biosafety includes tThe concerns on the risks of cross-pollination and of the disruption to the cellular ecology of plants, the adverse effect of Bt resistance on plants and animals and the adverse effect on biodiversity and environment as a whole are all related to the risks of biosafety. Due to the scientific nature of thesesuch risks and effectsquestions, the general public and the public media in China do not seems not to be being much involved in the debate on these issues. It This is the battle fieled for the science community.

   The attitude of the science community seems to have experienced a change. For a long time, many biotechnologists in the science community campaigned for freedom from any regulation and voiced distrust of any potential governmental regulation on theis matter of biosafety. Some of them even claimed that a bad law was worse than no law.¹⁰¹ However, the attitude of the science community seems to have experienced a change. Aafter the promulgation of the relevant laws, the mainstream biotechnologists seemed to become to support governmental regulation. Two factors may partly explain whythe reason. Firstly, the science communityy relies heavily relied on public funding so it they trytries to keep in line with the official government position. Secondly, the science community y areis directly involved in the rule-making so it they does not have to worry too much about the rules. At present, many biotechnologists are urging the government to pay more attention to the administration of GMOs. According to a survey conducted by the Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST), many scientists, particularly those in areas of agriculture and biology, believe that, first, there should be a strict administrative system for safety issues regarding concerning the safety of GMOs, which is based on the potential risks; second, there should be a continuous and more vigorous (financial) input in GMOs research; third, there should be better research on new types of GM plants, such as disease-resistant and pest-resistant GM plants; fourthly, the commercialization of new GMOs should be conducted prudentially, carefully and slowly; fifth, the WTO membership also means that China is and will be a potentially big market for foreign GMOs exports, so an effective administrative system should be established in order to safeguard national interests.¹⁰² It seems that the science community, also like the general public, welcomes GM regulation at least from their public speech. But, at the same time, they hope to have more funds for further research and development of GMOs and also hope to safeguard national interests, which were not spelled out in great detail. Theseis issues were raised by was what the biotechnologists said openly toin the public media. The 2004 Recommendation mentioned earlier in this part presented a somewhathow different picture when the views were channeled to the government only in experts’ reports or recommendations.

   On the issue ofrisk of biosafety, the science community split into two opposing sides. One side was led by XUE Dayuan, a scientist and a former biotechnologist from the Nanjing Institute of Environmental Science and a key advisor to the State Environmental Protection Administration (SEPA) of China. He published a report “A Summary of Research on the Environmental Impact of Bt Cotton in China” with the Greenpeace in June 2002.¹⁰³ This report came to 6 conclusions:.

1. Firstly, Talthough in the Chinese studies showed there were no significant impacts on predatory natural enemies associated with Bt cotton, but there were associated adverse impacts on parasitic enemies of cotton bollworms.  The populations of parasitic natural enemies in Bt cotton fields were significantly reduced.
2. Secondly, Bt cotton was not effective in controlling many secondary pests, especially sucking pests.
3. Thirdly, the diversity indiceses of the insect community, the pest sub-community and the pest-natural enemies sub-community, as well as the evenness index of Bt cotton fields were all lower than those in conventional cotton fields.
4. LFourthly, both laboratory tests and field monitoring have shownd verified that cotton bollworm could develop resistance to Bt cotton.
5. TFifthly, the resistance of Bt cotton to bollworm decreases over time and control was not complete in the third and fourth generations. FThe farmer must use chemicals 2-3 times to control bollworm, particularly from mid-July to the end of August.
6. Sixthly, dDevelopment of resistance of bollworm to Bt cotton had been commonly recognized in China, but there were not yet effective measures to postpone resistance development or to resolve the resistance problem. 

This report was the first important statement that Bt cotton in China has adverse biosafety effectsimpact on biosafety.

   ThisSuch a statement raised strong response from the opposing side, which was led by JIA Shirong, a key biotechnologist from the Biotechnology Research Institute of Chinese Academy of Agricultural Science that is one of the National Key Laboratories and one of the biotechnologists who joined Qifa Zhang in the 2004 Recommendation.,, because hHe issued a statement saying that the report was “garbled and biased”.¹⁰⁴ Moreover, in 2004, he published two articles¹⁰⁵ in China to defend his position. His major arguments were the following:

1. firstly, cConventional agricultural technologies could also produce a certain impact on the surrounding environment and bio-system. The question was how to evaluate the advantages and disadvantages of each kind of technology but and not to come to a simple conclusion that conventional agriculture was natural and GM crops were not natural.
2. T Secondly, the principles generally applied to the environmental risks of GM crops include the principle of substantially equivalencet principle, the case-study principle, the principle of familiarity and precautionary principle. The first two are widely accepted but the later two are very controversial and ambiguous. T
3. hirdly, bBoth GM breeding and conventional breeding all could change the genome of plants. In comparison with conventional breeding, the GM process did not produce new types of risks. AFourthly, in reply to the XUE’s report, after having examined the issues of gene flow, super weed, horizontal gene transfer (HGT), indirect impact of GM crop on bio-system, super pest or super disease, GM crop and biodiversity and long term potential impact of GM crop, he came to the conclusion that the GM crops approved for commercialization, in comparison with conventional crops, did not produce new and extra types of environmental risks.
4. The Bt cotton produced significant environmental benefits. The fact was that Bt cotton reduced the use of pesticide by 70%-80% and therewith substantially reduced the poisoning case for human and cattle. The predatory natural enemies of bollworms greatly increased.

 

   The Bt cotton produced significant environmental benefits. The above conflicting experts’ views of both sides were all reported by the media in China. EM: This conclusion seems to belong to the earlier section on actors and not as much to the section on conflicting experts’ views. I moved it up. To sum up, the actors and their interests are identified and voiced in comparatively more open way than other issues (such as land use or environmental issues) in China. The social attitudes toward GMOs are closely related to the interests of the actors. On the safety issue, GM crops and GM food has not yet posed as an outstanding food safety problem but the general public is suspicious about the potential adverse impact on human health therefore they supported the labeling for information and choices. The science community split on the science and biosafety risks associated with GM crops. Scientific uncertainty existed. Openly, the GMO regulation is supported by all the actors though in private this is not necessarily the case. The Bt rice case discussed later may case some light on this point.

 

 

5. Institutional Aspect of the GMO Regulation

 

  In order to have a better understanding of how legal regulation of GMOs are regulated in China, it is necessary to have a brief overview of Chinese legal system: first. The term of legal system here refers to the organization and relationship among various laws in a given state. There are two aspects of relevance to the GMOs regulation: . The first may be referred as vertical relationship between national and local lawsthe . The second may be referred as horizontal relationship among different laws at the same level, namely at the central level and. the vertical relationship between national and local laws.

   Since China is a unitary state, vertically national laws are superior and override conflicting local laws: . For example, among the national norms, because they are issued by different authorities at the central level, they may have different legal effect. Iin the hierarchy of legal norms, from top to bottom, the supreme law is the Constitutional provision regarding environmental protection ranks highest. The sSecond are rank is the laws issued by the National People’s Congress (NPC), e.g. the 1989 “Environmental Protection Law” and the 2000 “Fishery Law”. The third are rank is the administrative laws, often in the form of a “regulation” issued by the State Council, e.g. the 2001 “Administrative Regulation on the Safety of Agricultural GMOs¹⁰⁶”. The fFourth arerank is the ministerial rules (usually in the form of “measures”) issued by ministries, commissions and administration/agencies, for example, the 2002 “Administrative Measures on the Safety of the Import of Agricultural GMOs” by the Ministry of Agriculture. Within the set of laws that is ranked second, Horizontally speaking, the second rank some laws may sometimes have more general objectives and targets, than others (e.g. such as the “Environmental Protection Law” is more general than the . They may also have more specific objectives and targets, such as “Marine Environmental Protection Law”) (1982, revised in 1999) and “Air Pollution Prevention Law” (1987 and revised in 1995 and 2000). Laws ranked The third and fourth ranks, due to the nature of administrative rules, often have very certain specific objectives and targets. With regard to the effect of each rank of legal norms, Article 52 of the “Administrative Procedural Law” (1989) provides that the People’s Court, the judiciary, in dealing administrative cases, shall apply the laws, administrative laws and local laws. Local laws are applicable to those administrative cases within the local administrative region. In comparison, with regard to the legal effect of those administrative rules issued by the ministries, commissions and agencies or by local municipalities, the court shall refer to them. In case of conflicts among these administrative rules, it is within the discretion of the State Council to make interpretation and decision (Article 53). In accordance with the 2000 “Legislation Law”, administrative laws override local laws or local regulations (Article 79).

 

1. Historical evolution of GMO regulation

   The evolution of GMO regulation in China can be divided into two distinct periods. The first period begins with the 1993 MOST GE Measures. The second period starts with the 2001 State Council Regulation and is ongoing.

   The regulation of GMOs in China started in 1993 when the then State Science & and Technology Commission (now the MOST) issued the “Administrative Measures on the Safety of Genetic Engineering” (hereafterhereinafter referred as the 1993 MOST GE Measures).¹⁰⁷ An initial legal framework on GMO regulation was then established (rules of the , which was the fourth rank norms). GMOs wereas only regarded as a purely scientific matter. Later the Ministry of Agriculture (MOA) issued the “Implementation Measures on the Safety of Agricultural Genetic Engineering” (hereafterhereinafter referred as the 1996 MOA Measures) in 1996 and the State Tobacco Monopoly Administration issued the “Administrative Measures on the Research and Application of Tobacco Genetic Engineering” (hereafterhereinafter referred as the 1998 Tobacco Measures) in 1998 to provide more detailed rules (respectively. Tall hey were also rules of the fourth rank) norms. Then GMO was no longer a purely scientific matter but had practical implication of GM crops. After these three administrative acts were issued, there were some discussions about whether there should be a more comprehensive national law should on this matter to be promulgated by the National People’s Congress within the committees of the Congress, as consistent with Chinese legislative practice. But such an approach was dropped, mainly due to the resistance from the science community. The Congress agreed that the time was not ripe.

   In May 2001, the State Council passed a new “Administrative Regulation on the Biosafety of Agricultural GMOs” (hereafterhereinafter referred as the 2001 State Council Regulation), which belongs to the third rank norm. It repealed the 1996 MOA Measures on Agricultural GMOs. What is noteworthy about this regulation is that, firstly, it is a regulation, not ministerial administrative measures any more, which means that it is more comprehensive in nature. Secondly, although the regulation it is still deals with about agricultural GMOs, but it was not issued by the Ministry of Agriculture but by the superior authority, the State Council. ThisSuch a change enhanced the legal effect of the act and had institutional implications, which will be discussed later. In fact, the initiator and drafter of this regulation was still the MOA. In order to implement this regulation, the MOAinistry of Agriculture subsequently issued the following, more detailed, ministerial acts: the “Administrative Measures on the Safety of the Import of Agricultural GMOs” (hereafterhereinafter referred as the 2002 MOA Import Measures), the “Administrative Measures on the Labeling of Agricultural GMOs” (hereafterhereinafter referred as the 2002 MOA Labeling Measures) and the “Administrative Measures on the Safety Assessment of Agricultural GMOs”  (hereafterhereinafter referred as the 2002 MOA Assessment Measures) in July 2002. These three measures provided more detailed rules on the basis of the 2001 Regulation. These measuresy were supposed intended to be applicable from March 20 2002, b. But in fact, the entry into force application date was postponed till April 20, 2004. ¹⁰⁸ On February 20, 2004, the MOA issued Ministerial Communication No. 349, which formally confirmed that the MOA should conduct “normal” (zheng chang) administration in accordance with the 2001 Regulation and three MOA Measures. It means that the “normal” rules and procedures provided by the four administrative legal documents were applied as from April 20, 2004. The actual situation before that date was not normal.

   Apart from these above specific laws on agricultural GMOs, other laws also have contain provisions relevant provisions onto GMOs, for example, the “Law of the People’s Republic of China on Seeds” (2000) and the “Law of the People’s Republic of China on Fishery” (2000). Both were promulgated by the National People’s Congress. On the basis of these two laws, the MOAinistry of Agriculture issued the following ministerial acts on seeds and fry: the “Administrative Measures on the Examination and Approval of Varieties of Major Crops” (2001), the “Administrative Measures on the License of Crop Seed Production and Management” (2001) and the “Administrative Measures on the Labeling of Crop Seeds” (2001) and the “Administrative Measures on the Aquatic Fry” in August 2001. The Ministry of Health issued the “Administrative Measures on the GM Food Hygiene” (hereafterhereinafter referred to as 2002 MOH GM Food Measures), based on the “Law of the People’s Republic of China on Food Hygiene” (1995) of the National People’s Congress. The General Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine (AQSIQ) issued the “Administrative Measures on the Inspection and Quarantine of the Import and Export of GMO Products” in 2004 (hereafterhereinafter referred as the 2004 AQSIQ Inspection Measures).

 

      B. Regulating authorities and their competences

   As described above, tThe evolution of GMO regulation in China canmay roughly be divided into two periods: 1993 – 2001 and 2001 – now. . The first is from the 1993 MOST GE Measures to the 2001 State Council Regulation. The second period starts with the 2001 State Council Regulation till present. In the first period, it was the MOST that started the regulation of GMOs in China, withwhen China was principally at the stage of research and development. Though the 1993 MOST GE Measures, which covered was intended to cover all the activities of genetic engineering: , such as the experiments, trials and industrial production, even though, at the time . China was in fact only at the stage of research and development. At that time the import or export of GMOs was not a big issue internationally or domestically. The material scope was limited. It was also a framework and administrative measures, providing general principles. Other relevant ministries or agencies were allowed to make more detailed rules. So iIn 1996 the MOA and in 1998 the Tobacco Administration issued two relevant measures concerning the GMOs within their respective competences: e. Each ministry or administration took care of its own business. This was a multi-agency regulatory system, presuming that the cooperation and co-ordination among the ministries and agencies wasere automatic, free from difficulties and without explicit and detailed procedural requirements.

   The second period, starting with the 2001 State Council Regulation, made the picture slightly different. The Regulation came from the superior authority, the State Council, but the Regulation expressly delegated the regulatory competence on agricultural GMOs to the MOA. Except for the health and safety regulation of GM food and inspection and quarantine of import and export of GMOs, tThe MOA is responsible for the regulation of research, environmental regulation of the seeds and crops, field trials, production, environmental release and commercialization, consumer information of labeling on GM food, import and export of GMO agricultural products. It is not responsible for health and safety regulation of GM food and inspection and quarantine of import and export of GMOs. The SEPA is responsible for the environmental regulation and for the implementation of the Biodiversity Convention and the Biosafety Protocol in general, but it does not have is not given a significant role in the regulation of agricultural GMOs regulation. Currently, it is still multi-agency regulatory system, but the regulatory competence has been concentrated into the MOA.  

1. Ministry of Agriculture (MOA)

   In accordance with the 1993 MOST GE Measures, the MOA iwas responsible for the safety aspects issues of agricultural GMOs. In fact, agricultural GMOs take a majority part (about 90%) of China’s GMO research and development. Medical biotechnology is not included in What explicitly left out from agricultural GEGMOs is medical biotechnology. Following the 2001 State Council Regulation, all the activities of research, field trial, production, process, sales, import and export of agricultural GMOs in China are within the competence of the MOA (Article 2). In comparison with the 1996 MOA Measures, the 2001 State Council Regulation gave a more active role and competence to the MOA. In principle, if any rules or institutional arrangements of 1993 MOST GE Measures are in conflict with the 2001 State Council Regulation, the latter will override the former because it is issued by the State Council, not by the MOA that is at the same level of the MOST.

   An Inter-Ministerial Joint Meeting System on Agricultural GMOs Safety Administration is established within the State Council. The responsible personnel from the ministries and agencies of Agriculture, Science and Technology, Environment, Health, Foreign Trade (now the Commerce), Inspection and Quarantine, etc. shall participate in the joint meeting. Their responsibility is to study, coordinate and decide on important issues concerning the safety of agricultural GMOs (Article 5, 2001 State Council Regulation). Within the MOA, an Agriculture GMO Biosafety Committee is established (Article 9). This committee consists of 56 experts in the research, production, processing, inspection and quarantine, health and environment of agricultural GMOs. The competence of MOA covers all the activities concerning agricultural GMOs, including research (Articles 9-12) intermediate trial (Articles 13-18), production and processing (Articles 19-25), marketing (26-30), imports and exports (31-38). It seems that the MOA is the single and lead agency responsible for all activities of agricultural GMOs in China. DIt is still a collaboration among different ministries or agencies still collaborate on the issue of GMOs, but the “host” or “boss” unmistakably shall not be mistaken,is the MOA.

 

2. Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST)

   Although the MOST¹⁰⁹ was the first government ministry that initiated the regulation of GMOs in China in 1993, it is playing a more indirect role now. According to the 1993 MOST GE Measures, a National Safety Commission on Genetic Engineering was established within the MOSTministry for in charge of the overall supervision and coordination of the safety of genetic engineering (Article 4). What is noteworthy is that the 2001 State Council Regulation does not make any reference to this Commission. At present, the MOA is responsible for all activities regarding of agricultural GMOs, including imports and exports. Thus, in practice, the MOA has take over eroded or nibbled much of the regulating competence of the MOST. It seemsed that the MOST has two roles in GMO regulation, namely to control the public funds for GMO research and development (because they are scientific projects), and to participate in the MOA dominated Inter-Ministerial Joint Meeting and the Agricultural GMO Biosafety Committee. 

3. Ministry of Health (MOH)

   The MOH is responsible for the hygiene of food in general. In 1995, the National People’s Congress promulgated the “Law of the People’s Republic of China on Food Hygiene” (hereinafter the 1995 “Food Hygiene Law”). This law conferred the competence of supervision and administration of food hygiene in general to the MOH. Other relevant ministries or agencies are responsible for the administration of food hygiene in as far as this is within their competence (Article 3).

   In April 2002, the MOH issued the “Administrative Measures on the GM Food Hygiene”, in accordance with the 1995 “Food Hygiene Law” and the 2001 State Council Regulation. According to theseis Measures, the GM food is a new source of food. The production or import of such source of food is subject to the examination and approval of the MOH. It is prohibited to produce or import any GM food or to use GMOs as materials to produce or to use GMOs as food additives, if without the examination and approval of the MOH (Article 3).

   An interesting point here is the relationship between agricultural GMOs and GM food. The regulation of agricultural GMOs is done by the MOA. The hygiene of GM food is regulated by the MOH. Then what is the relationship between the MOA and the MOH on this matter? It is obvious that tThere is an overlap of administrative competence with regard to those on of agricultural GMOs that are food or can be used to produce food: is a GM tomato or a GM sweet pepper. a GM agricultural product or GM food, is soymilk made of GM soybeans a GM agricultural product or GM food? The principal purpose of agricultural development is to produce food. It is clear that during the stage of research and intermediate field trial, all agricultural GM related activities are regulated by the MOA. Then dDuring the stages of production, processing, sales, import and export, it is unclear whether they are is it still agricultural GMOs or whether they are GM food under the MOH.? According to the 2001 State Council Regulation, the MOA is still responsible for all these activities (Article 2). However, according to the MOH 2002 GM Food Measures, the production and imports of GM food must be examined and approved by the MOH (Article 3). The question is whether the tomato or sweet peeper is regarded as an “agricultural GM product” or a “GM food”. They can be both, so they are subject to the overlapping regulation by both the MOA and the MOH. Another example is soy-milk product, which is popular drink in China. The main ingredients include soybeans and milk. If the soybean is GM soybean, is such product regarded as GM food or not? Such a clear overlap without a clear coordination procedure may lead to a higher cost for the business and possibly a less efficient administration. Institutional coordination simply cannot be done by one single institution alone if without express procedures for such coordination. The initial stage of the SARS incident of the spring of 2003 provided a bitter and expensive lesson for the failure of such inter-agency coordination.  The 2004 Recommendation by Qifa Zhang and others clearly proved that such lack of coordination is a real problem. 

4. State Environmental Protection Administration (SEPA)

   The most difficult role in the GMO regulation is that of the State Environmental Protection Administration (SEPA). It was designated by the Chinese government to be responsible for implementation of the 1992 Biodiversity Convention and it is the National Focal Point of the 1999 Biosafety Protocol, but the regulation of agricultural GMOs had was already been taken up away by the MOST, MOA and MOH. The main responsibility of the SEPA is environmental administration. In the area of biodiversity and biosafety, the role of the SEPA is not clearly defined by law. Traditionally, the SEPA was mainly responsible with the matter of pollution, but now with the increasing environmental awareness, the scope of competence of the SEPA has expanded. The SEPA has set up policies and guidelines and to administer the natural reserves in China. By the end of 2002, 1,757 natural reserves have been established national wide.¹¹⁰ A Coordination Commission, consisting of 20 ministries and agencies was set up and led by the SEPA. There is frequent cConsultation with the SEPA is frequently carried out in the process of regulating GMOs in China. The 2001 State Council Regulation provides that experts of SEPA participate in the Inter-Ministerial joint Meeting on agricultural GMOs led by the MOA, according to the 2001 State Council Regulation. However, But the SEPA clearly is not the leading ministryhost or boss. The lack of information provided on the website by the China’s Clearing House¹¹¹ under the Biosafety Protocol of information on the website is a proof of the SEPA’s awkward and difficult role of the State Biosafety Office of China.¹¹² At this moment, the SEPA Up till now, it cannot even provide an updated and complete list of what GM crops are at what stage of research and development in China. Understandably, tThis information should be in the hands of the MOA. An effective institutional coordination at least should result in make this information being available at the website of the State Biosafety Office. The SEPA should be responsible for regulating the environmental implication of agricultural GMOs, but . But if with all the regulation of almost all the related activities related to of the agricultural GMOs is within the hands of MOA, there is little what is left for out to the SEPA.? I think this argument does not belong here. It is a different issue. It would be equally difficult for MOA to regulate and enforce this.  The difficulty and failure in the control of the multitude of diverse non-point (agricultural) sources of water pollution indicates how difficult it would be for SEPA to regulate the environmental impacts of agricultural GMOs in a country as large as China. The regulation of agricultural GMOs again shed light on the difficulties existing in the coordination and cooperation of administrative authorities in China.

   However, tThe picture is not yet totally fixed either for the SEPA or the MOA. It is reported that the SEPA and , along with the MOST in particular, isare refining details of a new draft law draft on biosafety to be promulgated by for the National People’s Congress, which belongs to the second rank to promulgate. This law would be , which is superior to the regulations of the State Council.¹¹³ The aim and purpose of this draft law is to ensure the country’s overall biosafety in a wide range of issue areas: that covers agriculture, pharmaceuticals, trade, and the environment. It is expected that the SEPA will have a more significant role in it. 

5. General Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine (AQSIQ)

   The AQSIQ has wide competence on quality of many products. For the agricultural GMOs, it is responsible for the examination of imports and exports of GM products. In accordance with the 2001 State Council Regulation, the AQSIQ has issued the Administrative Measures on the Inspection and Quarantine of Imports and Exports of GM products, which . It entered into force onfrom May 24, 2004. The inspection and quarantine ofn GM products shall be conducted at the port.

      Unlike what is required for labeling (0.9%) at tthe European Union, Chinese law has not yet provided either technical means or standards for GMO detection or a threshold for GM labeling.¹¹⁴ There are two major technical ways available for the detecting GMOs, namely the PCR (polymerrase chain reaction) and the ELISA (enzyme-linked immunosorbarnt assay)¹¹⁵. The PCR method is used in Switzerland, Germany and Japan. When the author of this report discussedconsulted this issue with the China GMO Safety Office of the MOA, the reply was that Chinese labeling only required “yes” or “no” answer. The inspection and quarantine at the port will give the ‘yes’ or ‘no’t answer usingby technical means. It seems that this approach hais a technical basis ed but that there is no without uniform national technical standard. RFrom what was reports show that ed, the public authorities at the ports worked hard to improve their technical means of GMO inspection and quarantine. The Guangzhou municipal authority is most advanced. If there is only 0.1% of GMOs contained in athe sample, they can find it and classify it as GMO product.¹¹⁶ But the Jiangsu provincial authority can only confirm it when the content is reaches to 2% or more.¹¹⁷ The Seed Administration of the Beijing Municipality has recently announced that it started to use PCR in GMO detection.¹¹⁸ If this is true, there is certain technical disparity and confusing results at different port, at least for the time being. The It seemed to be a zero threshold for GM labeling seems to be zero. The 2002 MOA Labeling Measures provides three kinds of labels for intentional release to environment. The first is the “GM xxx” (GM soybean). The second is “Processed GM Product” or “Processed from GM Material”. The third is “Processed Product from Agricultural GMOs but the relevant GMOs may not be even detected”.

 

 

7. Substantive Aspect of the GMO Regulation

 

1. Rules, standards and procedural requirements

   The following section is a summary of the relevant substantive rules, standards and procedural requirements of agricultural GMOs in China.

 

1. Regulation of research

   The 2001 State Council Regulation provides the legal framework for regulation of GMOs in China. The 2002 MOA Assessment Measures provides detailed procedural and substantive rules for the implementation of the 2001 State Council Regulation with regard to in the aspect of research.

   The Regulation covers all the activities of research, field trial, production, processing, sales, imports and exports of agricultural GMOs within the territory of China (Article 2). With regard to research, it applies to the research activities conducted by Chinese entities, joint entities and foreign entities (Article 18). The requirements for Chinese entities include that they should set up an agricultural GMO Biosafety Group that is in charge of the biosafety in their research and field trial. The biosafety measures should be adequate to deal with the corresponding risk category (explained below) approved by the authority (Article 11). Before a joint entity and a foreign entity conduct their research and field trial activities in China, they should obtain the approval for their research from the MOA (Article 18). ForAny research activitiesy in falling into the risk Categories of III and IV, the approval from the MOA is required before the beginning of the research work. (Article 12).

   On the aspect of risk assessment, an the initial 4-category system was first provided in by the 1993 MOST GE Measures. The Measures identified four categories of Following the different degrees of risk to human health and the environment, it was divided into 4 categories: Category I - no risk, Category II - low risk, Category III - medium risk and Category IV - high risk (Article 6, 1993 MOST GE Measures). Each ministry or agency should set up its own detailed technical standards and environmental standards for these four above 4 categories and . These standards should be submit them ted to the National Safety Commission of the MOST for its records. With regard to the examination and approval, oOnly the research, intermediate trial and industrial production, environmental release and utilization of GMOs falling into Category IV (high risk) were subject to the examination and approval of the National Safety Commission (Articles 14, 15 and 16). If the research and intermediate trial created risks of Category III, and risks of industrial production, environmental release and utilization of GMOs would fall into Categories of I to III, they were subject to examination and approval by relevant ministries and agencies at the national level. If the risks of the research and intermediate trial would falls into Category I or II, the executive chief of the research entity (for example, a biotechnology institute) was responsible for the examination and approval (in practice this means that if the executive chief of the research unit is the researcher himself or herself, he or she has the authority to approve his/her own work). The 1993 MOST GE Measures itself did not provide any detailed standard on how to assess the risks. A question was what would happen if the executive chief of the research unit were the researcher himself or herself. According to this law, at least in principle, he or she had the competence to approve what he or she was doing or has done. If the research and intermediate trial fell into the Category III, and industrialization, environmental release and utilization of GMOs fall into Categories of I to III, they were subject to examination and approval by relevant ministries and agencies at the national level.  In other words, only the highest risk were subject to the National Safety Commission for approval.

   The 1993 MOST GE Measures Such an arrangement did not provide really present a picture of tight controls on GMOs at that time. This might be because iIn 1993, the GMO related activities were mainly at an early stage of research and development (in China. The public funded promotion programs, such as the “863 Program” were only, was launched only in the second half of 1980s) and . The relevant issues involving of GM products did not pose as immediate challenges to the governmental regulation. So the regulating authority was basically claimed by the then State Science & Technology Commission (now the MOST) by enacting the Measures. Another reason for such arrangement may be that the scope of the overall competence of the State Science and Technology Commission (now the MOST), responsible for these rules,Commission was limited to science and technology only. The focus of the Commission was to regulate the scientific and technological aspect of GMOs, not specific about the intended use of thise science and technology. SThe sales, imports and exports of GMOs were clearly not within outside of the competence of the Commission and were not mentioned at all in the 1993 MOST GE Measures. Therefore, the agricultural GMO was and still is regulated by the MOA. Still aAnother reason is that the imported GMOs and GM products, such as GM soybeans, did not yet cause serious concerns at that time; . The import and export of soybeans were more or less balanced before 1995. The 2001 State Council Regulation changed this. So the sales, imports and exports were not mentioned at all there in 1993 Measures. A more obvious difference between the 1993 and 2001 acts is that who shall have the power of approval with regard to Category IV GM activities. According to the 1993 MOST GE Measures, the relevant ministries or agencies (such as the MOA) shall examine the activities and report to the National Safety Commission for final approval (Articles 13-15). According to the 2001 State Council Regulation, iIt still uses the follows the four categories of risk assessment created in the 4-category of the 1993 MOST GE Measures, but act, however, all agricultural GMO related activities (including sales, imports and exports) of all risk categories are now regulated by the MOA. The 2001 State Council Regulation, however, It does not refer to or even mention the 1993 MOST GE Measures act or the National Safety Commission established with 1993 Measuresof set up the 1993 act. It seems that that 1993 act and National Commission never existed. Instead, a 56-member Biosafety Committee is established which is responsible for safety evaluation of agricultural GMOs, including Category IV risk of GMOs.

   The 2001 State Council Regulation divides up On the aspect of field trials in 3 stages: , it includes three stages, namely the intermediate trial, the environmental release and the production trial.¹¹⁹ After the research activity is completed in the laboratory and moves on needs to go to the stage of field trials, the research entity should report to the MOA (Article 14). When moving on to the next stages of trial, If there is a need to go from one stage of trial to another, the an application should be sent to the MOA that will decide whether to approve or not.¹²⁰ After the final stage of field trial (production trial) is completed, the entity may apply for a Biosafety Certificate of Agricultural GMOs from the MOA.¹²¹ According to the 2002 MOA Assessment Measures, the MOA will organize such assessment for such certification twice a year. The two deadlines for application are March 31 and September 30. Within two months after the receipt of the application, the MOA will decide whether to accept the application or not. Within next three months afterof the acceptance of the application, the MOA shall notify the applicant about the result of the assessment (Article 16). 

2. Regulation of production and processing

   The production and processing of agricultural GMOs in fact refers to cThe regulation of production and processing of agricultural GMOs is divided into two categories. The first is that of GM seeds, GM breeding stock, GM aquatic fry. The second is all other kinds of agricultural GMOs produced or processed for the purpose of sale .(Articles 19-25). Any eEntitiesy or individuals producing conducting the production of GM seeds, GM breeding stock or GM aquatic fry should apply for athe Production Permit from the MOA, and fulfillapart from meeting the conditions laid down by other relevant laws and administrative regulations (Articles 19 and& 21).¹²² They should also establish and keep production files that include the information on production location, genes and their sources, methods of genetic modification and the destination of the GM seeds, GM breeding stocks and GM aquatic fry (Article 20).

   Any entities or individuals conducting the production or processing of all other kinds of agricultural GMOs should obtain the approval from the MOA or provincial agricultural ministries (Article 21). The detailed rules for the application of such approval shall be made by the MOA in due course. After they get the approval, they should periodically report to the local agricultural agencies at the county level the information on production, processing, safety administration and the destination of the product (Article 23).  

3. Regulation of sales of GM products

   Pursuant to Following the 2001 State Council Regulation, any entitiesy or individuals selling conducting the sales of GM seeds, GM breeding stock and GM aquatic fry should apply for a Sale Permit from the MOA, and fulfill apart from the requirements laid down by other relevant laws and administrative regulations (Article 26). They should also establish and keep files that contain the information on the sources, storage, transportation and sales of the seeds, breeding stock and aquatic fry (Article 27). If the GM product is food or food additives, the 2002 MOH GM Food Measures shall applyicable. Both food and additives are included.  

   Therefore, the approval from the MOA or the provincial agricultural ministries is required before the production, processing and sale of any kind of agricultural GMOs, including GM seeds, GM crops and GM food. The case of Bt rice is in violation of these provisions.d.4.  Regulation of GMO labeling

   Any sales of agricultural GM products in China must have a labeTl, according to the 2001 State Council Regulation provides that i. It is prohibited to import or sell any agricultural GM products listed in the falling into the inventory of the 2002 Administrative Measures on the Labeling of Agricultural GMOs¹²³ of agricultural GMOs without a properthe label. According to the 2002 MOH GM Food Measures, the same goes for GM food. The GM label should be made by the entity or individual responsible for the production and packaging (Article 28). The label should contain the information on the principal material that contains GMOs. If there is any special requirement on the scope of sale, the specific scope shall be identified and the product should be sold within that identified scope (Article 29). Any advertisements of agricultural GMOs should be examined and approved by the MOA before they can be shown in public (Article 30).

   In accordance with tThe 2002 MOA Labelling Measures provide that, the agricultural agency at or above the county level is responsible for the supervision and administration of the GM labelling. The AQSIQ is responsible to check the GM labelling at the port of import (Article 4). If the labelling on the package is difficult (for example, at the fast food restaurant or retail business), the labelling may be made by special identification on price tag, separate GM tag, or special identification at the outside of the container, etc (Article 8). The GM labelling should be made in Chinese language (Article 10). The GM labelling of imported agricultural GMOs should be sent to the MOA for approval and to the AQSIQ and Ministry of Commerce for record before it can be used (Article 11). The time limit for the examination for GM labelling is 30 days (Article 12).

   In accordance with the 2001 GM food Measures mentioned earlier, GM food should also be identified with the GM label. However, unlike the practice in Europe and other states, it does not provide how much percentage of GMOs in the food is the As explained above, there is no threshold for labelling. If any GM content is found, a label needs to be usedt is only a yes or no label. Labelling is not the only way available to put the GM products under control, but it is a common way for this kind of product in many countries. It is increasingly used by the government for reasons the sake of administration and for the consumers to protect consumer their interests not only with regard tofor GM product but also tofor many other agricultural and industrial products in China. In the inventory annexed to the 2002 MOA Labelling Measures, 5 groups of GM products (altogether 17 products) must be labelled before sale. Most of them are major agricultural imports. 

   5. e. Imports and& exports

   The rules laid down in the 2001 State Council Regulation are applicable to both agricultural GMOs developed in China and abroad. The MOA is responsible for the GMO regulation while the decision on specific import and export of GMOs is made by the Ministry of Commerce (formerly the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation, MOFTEC). In comparison with the domestic GMOs developed in China, the imported GMOs are subject to a separate and more stringent regulation, mainly provided by the 2002 MOA Import Measures.

   a1. Imports and& exports of GM seeds and crops

          For the purpose of research and field trials, the importing entity should apply to the MOA for approval (Article 31, 2001 Regulation). The entity should possess the application qualification¹²⁴ provided by the MOA, the prior corresponding research and field trial already conducted overseas and relevant safety administration and prevention measures. If the overseas companies export GM seeds, breeding stock, aquatic fry, agricultural pesticides, veterinary medicine, fertilizer and additives produced by agricultural GM technology or containing agricultural GM composition to China for the purpose of field trials, they should apply to the MOA for approval. In the application, they should provide the following information that:

• the proposed use and marketing has been approved by the exporting state or territory;
• it has been demonstrated by scientific experiments in the exporting state or territory show that no harm has been caused to human, animal, micro-organism and eco-system;
• there are relevant safety administration and preventive measures.

   After a successful completion of the Having passed the production trial and safety evaluation, an agricultural GMO Biosafety Certificate will be issued (Article 32, 2001 Regulation). With the GMO Biosafety Certificate and other relevant approvals, the importing entity or the overseas entity may go on with other procedures of evaluation, registration, quarantine and customs (Articles 32, 33 and 34, 2001 Regulation). The time limit for the MOA and the AQSIQ to approve or rejectnot to approve the application for the Biosafety Certificate is 270 days¹²⁵ (Article 36, 2001 Regulation).

   According to the 2002 MOA Import Measures, the Measures apply to any one of the three uses of agricultural GMOs, namely (1) research, (2) field trails, and (3) production and processing (Article 4). For the purpose of research, the importing entity should apply to the MOA for approval with a list of documents. If the import is for the purpose of environmental release and production trial, the GMO Biosafety Certificate is required and the application should be sent to the MOA (Articles 5-8). Production mainly refers to the import of seeds, breeding stock and aquatic fry, etc. for purpose of the production of GMO crops, stocks and fish in China. Before the production starts, the GMO Biosafety Certificate is required and other relevant administrative rules are also applyicable (Article 11). For the purpose of processing, the overseas exporting company should also first apply for the GMO Biosafety Certificate from the MOA (Article 12). If the imported processing GMO materials contain living GMOs composition, they should be segregated from other materials and guaranteed that all necessary measures are taken to assure that there is no release into the environment is made by taking necessary measures (Article 16). For the purposes of production and processing, the relevant import contract should only be signed after the GMO Biosafety Certificate is issued (Article 18).

   In comparison with domestic GMOs, the imported GMOs are subject to more stringent control from the stage of research. For the domestic GMOs, the research of below Risk Category III, no report to the MOA is necessary. For research at or above Risk Category III, only report to the MOA is necessary. But for the imported GMOs of whatever risk category, the importing entity should apply to the MOA for import approval. At the stage of field trials, for the domestic GMOs, report to the MOA is necessary when turning to the intermediate trial from the research stage. When turning from intermediate trial to environmental release or production trial, an application for approval from the MOA is required. While for the imported GMOs, no matter of what risk category, an application for approval from the MOA is required. Moreover, an application for approval from the MOA is required when turning from each stage of filed trials to the next stage. At the stage of production, if the overseas companies export GM seeds, breeding stock, aquatic fry, or seeds, or breeding stock, aquatic fry, agricultural pesticides, veterinary medicine, fertilizer and additives produced by agricultural GM technology or containing agricultural GM composition to China for the purpose of production, they should also apply to the MOA for approval. Besides, going through all stages of field trials in China and the Biosafety Certificate are required. For the importing GMOs used as processing materials, the oversea companies should apply for the Biosafety Certificate from the MOA and go through the safety evaluation procedure. If the same oversea company already holding the Biosafety Certificate for the same agricultural GMO, the application for a new Certificate in the future is simplified. With  (1) importing safety management registration form, (2) copy of the first Biosafety Certificate; and (3) safety measure to be adopted by the oversea company in China, the oversea company can apply for the second Biosafety Certificate.

   Comparing with the import of agricultural GMOs, the regulation of eExport of Chinese agricultural GMOs is not as strictly regulated as importis rather loose. Only at the request of an importing State, the AQSIQ will examine the products and issue If a GMO-Free Certificate is requested by the importing foreign state, the AQSIQ shall made the necessary examination and issue the Certificate (Article 37). A Therefore, there is no compulsory requirement of GMO Biosafety Certificate is not compulsory for exporting Chinese agricultural GMOs. It is issued only upon request.

               b2. Imports and& exports of GM food

   With regard to the import and export GM food, the regulating authority is the MOH. According to the 1995 Food Hygiene Law, the MOH is responsible for the national supervision and administration of food hygiene (Article 2). Any production and sales of food within the territory of China is subject tbind byo this law (Article 4). As it was mentioned earlier, according to the 2002 MOH GM Food Measures consider , the GM food isas a new source of food (Article 3). The production or import of such food is subject to the examination and approval of the MOH. It is prohibited to produce or import any GM food or to use GMOs as materials to produce or to use GMOs as food additives if without the examination and approval of the MOH (Article 3).

   Within the MOH, an Expert Committee on GM Food is set up. It is responsible for the assessment of the safety and quality of GM food. The committee consists of experts of food safety, nutrition and genetic engineering. (Article 9) The MOH shall establish the procedural rules and standards for the assessment of safety and nutrition of GM food (Article 7). The application for approval of the production and import of GM food shall be made to the MOH (Article 11). Within 6 months, the MOH will decide whether to approve or to reject the application. These rules only are specifically appliedapply to GM food; , not to any other food. Therefore, the GM food is treated substantially differently than from other conventional non-GM foods without GMOs, even though no negative (health) effects of GM such food have been is yet reported in China. Moreover, a special requirement for GM food is that its safety and nutritional quality should not be lower than equivalent conventional food (Article 5). The Measures itself does not explain the reason for such a requirement. It seems to mean that if the safety and nutrition areis lower, the GM food should not be produced or imported. Such a requirement obviously reflects a restrictive and even negative attitude towards GM food production and import.  

6. Liability and enforcement

   

The 2001 State Council Regulation delegates the enforcement authority is delegated to the MOA and local agricultural agencies at or above the county level by the 2001State Council Regulation. In case of violation of the above procedural and substantive rules, the enforcement measures include inquiry, an order for cessation of the wrongful act, sealing up, detainment, withdrawal of Biosafety Certificate, destruction of the dangerous agricultural GMOs and fines. Most of the penalty provisions are targeting the violation of the administrative procedures, for example, failure to report to the MOA of Categories III and IV field trials. 

   

Articles 39-42 of the 2001 State Council Regulation provides supervision capacity of the MOA and Articles 43-55 provides penalties. The Regulation is usually enforced by the agricultural ministry-in-charge at or above the county level or the MOA directly. Most of the penalty provisions are targeting the violation of the administrative procedures, for example, failure to report to the MOA of Categories III and IV field trials.  Article 45 of the 2001 State Council Regulation provides that in the case of illegal production and application of agricultural GMOs without the approval after the production trial, the agricultural ministry-in-charge of the State Council (MOA) shall order an immediate stop of the production and application and impose a fine of no less than RMB 20,000 but no more than RMB 100,000. Article 50 provides that in case of import of agricultural GMOs without the approval of MOA, the MOA shall order to stop the import and confiscate the imported products and the illegal income gained with the illegal activities. If the illegal income is over RMB 100,000, the MOA shall impose a fine of 1 to 5 times of the illegal income. If the illegal income is less than RMB 100,000, the MOA shall impose a fine of no less than RMB 100,000 but no more than RMB 100,000. On the aspect of damage to the environment or to non-GM crops caused by from the release of GMOs, nothing is provided. It seems that the MOA administration, backed by penalties provisions, hais the highest top priority. B while the biosafety is not given the same amount of attention and is not or backed by any such provisions in the 2001 State Council Regulation. The logic maighty be that if all the agricultural GMO procedural requirements are met, biosafety iscan be automatically secured.  

   

On athe whole, the agricultural GMO regulatory system seems complete, containing both substantive and institutional norms, and incorporating international (e.g. the Biosafety Protocol) regulatory approaches and techniques, but the real challenge to such a regulatory system is firstly whether China, the largest developing country has already possessed the capacity to implement and enforce the rules or not. Taking into the consideration of the highly decentralized and fragmented character of public administration in China, limited administrative resources (both human and financial resources) and strong local protectionism by local governments and other elements, it is not surprising that incidents such as the illegal plantation of Bt rice incident and others took place. A good GMO regulatory system is should be the one that is suitable and practical to the specific political, economic, social and cultural environment of the regulatory state, but not a fancy one.

 

 

9. International Aspect of the GMO Regulation

   

Since the late 1970s, China started to participate in international efforts for the protection of environment. By the end of 2000, China has participated in over 50 major multilateral environmental treaties and 25 bilateral agreements.¹²⁶

 China’s domestic environmental lawmaking was actually triggered by its participation in international efforts.¹²⁷

  The following part of this paper will focus on the international aspect of the China’s regulation of agricultural GMOs.

 

1. General overview of China and international treaties

   

The domestic environmental lawmaking of China was triggered by its participation in international efforts.¹²⁸

  The relationship between international environmental treaties and domestic law is a matter of constitutional law. There are two major issues involved in this aspect. The first is the incorporation of international treaties into Chinese law. The second is the supremacy of the international treaties. The 1982 Constitution and the 2000 Legislation Law are both silent on these issues.

   

On the issue of incorporation of international norms into domestic legal system, at least three approaches may be identified. The first one is that an international treaty is directly applicable in China without any subsequent domestic legislative act by the legislature, for example the 1984 UN Convention against Torture. The second is that a subsequent domestic legislative act is made in order to transform international norms into domestic law, for example the 1970 Hague Convention on Hijacking. The third approach, which is most widely adopted recently, especially after the WTO membership, is the revision or annulment of existing domestic laws in order to be in line with China’s international legal obligation.

   

On the issue of supremacy of international law, reference can only be found in national laws but not the Constitution, which clearly recognized the supremacy of international treaties. A typical example is Article 46 of the “Environmental Protection Law” (1989), which provides that if an international treaty regarding environmental protection concluded or acceded to by the People’s Republic of China contains provisions differing from those contained in the laws of the People’s Republic of China, the provisions of the international treaty shall apply, unless the provisions are those to which the People’s Republic of China has announced reservations. Therefore, one could conclude there is a tendency that the supremacy of international treaties is recognized by Chinese law, but this . Until now such a tendency has not yet been tested in a domestic court in China.

 

2. Convention on Biological Diversity Biodiversity Convention and Biosafety Protocol

   1a. 1992 Convention on Biological DiversityBiodiversity Convention (CBD)

   

China signed the 1992 Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD)Biodiversity Convention at the Rio Conferencein 1992. In January 1993, the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress ratified the Convention. The CBD entered into force for China on December 29 of 1993. The SEPA was designated as the lead agency for the implementation of the CBDonvention in China. Other ministries and agencies participated in the implementation efforts. On June 13 1994, the China Action Plan for the Protection of Biodiversity was published. In February 1998, the China Research Report of the State of Biodiversity was made public. Later China also published the following documents on biodiversity:

   

, - the Administration of China Natural Reserve,

   

- China Protection of Biodiversity and Sustainable Use of Wetlands,

   

- State Report of Convention Implementation,

   

- China State Framework of Biosafety, etc.

 

   

On May 16, 2003, the Coordination Office (SEPA) of the CBD Implementation (SEPA) published a review of the 10 years’ progress of the CBD in China¹²⁹

. According to the Coordination Office, China made tremendous efforts for the protection of biodiversity. The progress includes the following, (a) establishment of the state coordination framework for the implementation of the CBD, led by the SEPA; (b) improvement of the regulatory and enforcement framework (over 20 laws and administrative regulations being issued); (c) strengthening of the protection of the habitats (over 1,757 nature reserves at various levels being set up, including those in Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan); (d) improvement of public education and public awareness; and (e) more active collaboration with the international community. On the aspect of challenges, the review identified the following: (a) continuing degradation of the habitats and distinction of species; (b) invasion of alien species; (c) inadequate administrative framework of biosafety (to be specified in the following section); (d) inadequate protection and management of the genetic resources; (e) urgent need for protection of the biodiversity in the western provinces in China.   

   2b. 2000 Biosafety Protocol

   

The 2000 Biosafety Protocol was adopted on January 29, 2000 in Montreal of Canada and entered into force on September 11, 2003. On August 8, 2000, China signed the Protocol and on April 27, 2005 has approved the Protocol. As of May 30, 2005, the Protocol has 119 contracting parties. The second COP-MOP was held between May 30-June 3 of 2005 in Montreal, Canada. China participated in this COP-MOP.

   

After signing the Protocol, iIt took China was about 5 years to ratifybetween China signed and approved the Protocol. This e long-time delay of approval caused concerns in the National People’s Congress (NPC) and the Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC).¹³⁰

The Protocol, in their view, played a positive role in protecting China’s biosafety and human health, stabilizing the agricultural production, promoting agricultural exports, ensuring the social stability and improving the living standard of the agricultural community in China. Moreover, the Protocol would help China to build and strengthen its administrative capacity. Therefore, it was in the interest of the country to approve the Protocol. The reason of the failure to ratify approve the Protocol the Coordination Office emphasized that was the coordination problem among the ministries or agencies. However, the Coordination Office emphasized that this should not have become an obstacle to the final approval. NThe national interests wereas much more important than the interests and turf wars of individual ministriesy or agenciesy. In theory, these comments are 100% correct but in practice the leading role is always limited in any show. Who wants to give up the leading role for a supporting role?

   

It seems that there has been institutional tension between the MOA and the SEPA. As it was reviewed earlier in this paper, the current GMO regulatory framework delegated the regulatory authority on agricultural GMOs to the MOA, and as a result, the SEPA is marginalized. But the designated agency responsible for the implementation of the CBD in China is the SEPA. Therefore the SEPA logically believed that it should be able to regulate all the matters falling withininto the scope of the CBD, including all matters involving the GMOs. As to the current regulatory framework, the SEPA considered that it lacked the supervision on relevant basic research work and environmental release of GMOs. It claimed that So the regulatory framework is not complete and has or with obvious gaps and is far from being a unified and coherent national supervision and management mechanism. According to the SEPA, sSomething had tomust be done to change thissuch a situation. Another argument was that What is more important is the MOA cannot be both the player and referee at the same time. There is a conflict of interest in the current GMO regulation.

   

This is neither the first nor the last time that institutional tension affected the effectiveness of policy and law in China. And the regulation of GMOs is not an isolated problem in China, either. It has to be admitted that the regulation of GMOs demands to bring several ministries or agencies in. The complicated issues of GMO regulation (e.g. science, technology, human health, environment, economic, social, and etc.) easily go beyond the scope of competence of a single ministry or agency. So a workable and efficient regulatory framework has to deal with coordination issues in the first place. The latest development is that the SEPA, together with the MOST in particular and other relevant ministries, are drafting a new GMO Safety Law to be promulgated by the National People’s Congress, which is superior to the State Council regulation (this has been discussed above) The primary focus of the draft is to improve the current regulatory system, such as to strengthen the supervision and management system on biosafety and public participation, etc.¹³¹

   On the more substantive part of the connection between the Protocol and the GMO regulation in China, the following aspects needs more attention and elaboration:

   a1. China’s overall view of the Protocol

   

China participated in the negotiation of the Protocol but though the position of China was not clearly recorded in the negotiation documents of the Protocol. But iIn general, China shared the position of the “like-minded group of countries” and supported a strong Pprotocol. According to the officials of the SEPA, the present provisions of the Protocol more or less reflected the position of China, and they claim that therefore an early ratification approval would benefit the protection of biodiversity, eco-system and human health; and wouldto prevent the potential risks caused by the import of GM products and environmental release and commercialization of living modified organisms or LMOs (the term used in the Protocol for this group of GMOs) LMOs in China.¹³²

 Other advantages of the Protocol are the legitimacy and justification of establishing a GMO regulatory framework in China and the support for capacity building of strengthening of the regulatory framework.

   

It should be noted that the Protocol was done on January 29 of 2000. The 2001 Regulation of the State Council was issued one year later on May 23 of 2001. The following will show that on certain substantive aspects there are clearly demonstrate the connections and links between these two legal documents. At least, two obvious advantages of the Protocol are attractive to China, namely, the legitimacy and justification of establishing the GMO regulatory framework in China and the support for capacity building of strengthening of the regulatory framework.

   b2. Precautionary approach

   

The precautionary approach is the cornerstone of the protocol and is stated clearly in . Article 1 of the protocol stated clearly that “in accordance with the precautionary approach contained in Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, the objective of this protocol is to contribute to ensuring an adequate level of protection in the field of the safe transfer, handling and use of living modified organisms resulting from modern technology that may have adverse effects on the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity, taking also into account of the risks to human health, and specifically focusing on transboundary movement”. Later iIn other substantive and procedural provisions, the precautionary approach iwas specified.

   

As it was mentioned earlier in this paper, the objective of the 2001 State Council Regulation was three-fold: to strengthen the safety management of the agricultural GMOs; to ensure the safety of human health, animal, plant and micro-organism and eco-system; and to promote the research of agricultural GMO technology. (Article 1).

   

In general, GMO related activities are not banned in China, but the GM seeds, GM crops and GM food are regulated and treated substantially different from the conventionally produced seeds, crops and food. The conventionally produced seeds, crops and food are not subject to such a separate regulatory system. Such differentiated treatment (not prohibited by the Biosafety Protocol) is not based on the evidence of actual harm but on the potential uncertainty and risks associated with GMOsthough more research results and debate on actual harm coming out gradually. There are several regulatory tools, including safety assessment, Biosafety Certificate, compulsory labeling, import and export control and relevant liability scheme provided by the law. Basically, China adopted the precautionary approach.

   c3. Advanced Informed Agreement (AIA)

   

The Protocol created an important procedural requirement for the exporters of LMOs, that is, to seek consent from the importing country (public authority) before the first shipment of LMOs which are meant to be introduced into the environment orand for direct use as food or feed for processing. This is , the so called Advance Informed Agreement (AIA) (Articles 8-10 and Article 12). The importing country (public authority) has 270 days to make a decision on the import request. The decision should be made available to both the exporter and also to the Biosafety Clearing-House established under the Protocol as well (Article 12).

   

The 2001 State Council Regulation and the 2002 MOA Import Measures incorporated the same requirements (Chapter 5), but the scope of such consent is broader than what was provided in the Protocol. TheyIt covered the import of agricultural GMOs for research and experiment, for environmental release or production (e.g. seeds, etc.) and for materials for being in processeding. The application for export to China shall be made to the MOA and the AQSIQ, which shall, within 270 days of the receipt of the application, make a decision on whether to approve or to reject the application. But before that, the exporter should apply to the MOA for the agricultural GMO Biosafety Certificate and other relevant documents issued by the MOA.

   d4. Documentation

   

The Protocol requires bulk shipments of LMO commodities, such as GM corn or GM soybeans that are intended to be used as food, feed for processing, to be accompanied by documentation stating that such shipments “may contain” living modified organisms and are “not intended for intentional introduction into the environment”.

   

As described above, Tthe 2002 MOA Labeling Measures provides three kinds of labels for intentional release to environment. The first is the “GM xxx” (GM soybean). The second is “Processed GM Product” or “Processed from GM Material”. The third is “Processed Product from Agricultural GMOs but the relevant GMOs may not be even detected”. The difference with from the Protocol is that the Measures it does not use the term “may contain”, but a clear “yes” label.

   e5. Risk assessment

   

According to the Protocol, the importer may make the risk assessment or to require the exporter to make such assessment (Article 15 and Annex III).

      

The MOA issued the Assessment Measures in 2002. The risks are divided into 4 categories, according to their threat to human, animal, plant, microorganism and the eco-system. The requirement of a risk assessment is not only applied to imported GMOs, but also to domestic GMOs. From what was provided by the Measures, the assessment is to be made on a scientific basis. However it has to be noted that neither the Protocol nor the Measures provided criteria (e.g. GMO threshold) or methods (e.g. PCR or ELISA) used for assessment.

   f6. Liability

   

The issue of dispute settlement and liability was not resolved when the protocol was signed. It was left for the later COP-MOP.  The 2001 State Council Regulation and relevant Measures all provided liability and penalty provisions in the form of fines and criminal penalties in case of forged documentation. As it was mentioned earlier, the liability provisions in the Regulation and Measures are targeted to strengthening the GMO administration, and not rather than on the biosafety.

 

3. China’s WTO membership and its impact on the GMO regulation

   

China signed the Protocol to accede to the WTO on November 11, 2001 and formally became the 143^rd party of the WTO on December 11, 2001. The WTO membership of China triggered a process of amendment of existing domestic laws that were in conflict with the WTO rules. The process was completed when the membership started in 2001. To a certain extent, at present China is still at the stage of learning and getting familiar with the WTO rules.

   

On the impact of the WTO membership brings uncertainties for on China’s agricultural regulation in , several waysaspects are relevant. THESE TWO ARGUMENTS DO NOT DEAL WITH THE INFLUENCE OF THE WTO ON CHINA’S AGRICULTURAL REGULATIONS. THE FIRST TALKS ABOUT THE EU-US DISPUTE AND THE SECOND ABOUT HOW THE BIOSAFTEY PROTOCL RELATES TO WTO RULES. Firstly, there is no certainty whether on the compatibility of thisChina’s current GMO regulatory framework is compatible with WTO rules. I, it is still too early to draw any conclusions comment on it as the US-EU GMO dispute on the EU regulation on GMOs is still pending at the WTO Dispute Settlement Body. The outcome of this dispute shall produce an important impact on China’s GMO policy and its also the regulatory framework. Whatever the outcome of the dispute will be, on one hand, the regulation of agricultural GMOs should not be used as a tool of discrimination and trade barrier; on the other hand, the increasing public concern on the potential adverse impact of the GMO on the environment and human health should not be overlooked or neglected. The consumer should be informed and should have choices. The Chinese consumers, especially those in the urban areas, are increasingly demanding for more information on the food products they consume.

   

Secondly, since China’s agricultural GMO regulation , to a certain extent, was to a certain extent pushed forward by the Biosafety Protocol, therefore the relationship between the Biosafety Protocol and the WTO rules is relevant. The 270 days’ requirement, the AIA procedure and other rules in China’s agricultural GMO regulation can clearly be traced back to the Biosafety Protocol though China approved the Protocol only recently. On the relations between the Biosafety Protocol and WTO, the Protocol did not provide supremacy over WTO rules, but rather required the parties to pay special attention to their WTO obligations. In spite of this, it is not clear whether the agricultural GMO regulation based on the Biosafety Protocol should be subject to the re-examination on the basis of the relevant WTO rules, especially the SPA and the TBT. The final question is, if in case of conflict, which one, the Biosafety Protocol or the WTO, may override the other. Hopefully the US-EU GMO dispute could give some hint on how to resolve this issue.

   

Thirdly, as it was mentioned earlier, the provisions on the protection of the new plant varieties were a result of due to China’s obligation underto the TRIPS. The law is there, but the implementation and enforcement of such protection is a real challenge, especially in the area of intellectual property is a real challenge. According the MOA, among the 306 protected varieties under a survey, over 37.6% of them experienced infringement of their intellectual property right.¹³³

Sometimes legal remedies are not sufficient, especially in those places where local governmental protectionism is strong. Even the central government could do very little about it. Suggestions were made on the increasing the public awareness of the intellectual property rights, strengthening and improving the enforcement provisions, especially interim measures should be included and granted in this kind of infringement.  

      

D. Codex and China

      

Codex is the global reference point for food standards. China became an observer in 1983 and formally joined the CAC in 1986. The MOA is the national contact point in China. In June 1999, a Coordination Office was established in order to improve the collaboration with the Codex and to implement the various food standards in China. Apart from the MOA, the office also consists representatives from the MOH, AQSIQ, Ministry of Commerce and other relevant agencies or administrations. But according to the AQSIQ, China still lacks necessary understanding and study on the Codex.¹³⁴

China was not involved in several important standards’ drafting work, which has direct relevant to China. At present there is no state CAC at the national level. The AQSIQ is determined to improve the study on the Codex and its relations with the WTO, especially SPA and TBT.  

   

To sum up, the momentous approval of the Biosafety Protocol will be used to generate a new law on GMO safety in China by the SEPA and others. Therefore, the EU-US GMO dispute at the WTO is important for what is going to happen next in the context of drafting the GMO safety law in China. The current legal and practical uncertainty caused by the different approaches of the Biosafety Protocol and WTO agreements has to be addressed in this case. A certain balance of interests, hopefully, to be achieved. Whatever the outcome is, it will definitely produce important impact on China’s next move. 

 

VII. Challenges and Further Analysis of the GMO Regulation

 

      The above four parts give a brief account of the actors, institutional, substantive and international aspects of the agricultural GMO regulation in China. After the GMO regulatory system wais established, it encountereds a series of challenges. The following part will be devoted to the analysis of some of these several select challenges.

 

   A. Evolution and change of GMO regulation

   In comparison with the previous regulatory arrangements by the MOST, Tobacco Administration and MOA before 2001, the current administrative framework for agricultural GMOs is indeed strengthened and more sophisticated. Firstly, all the relevant activities are covered by the regulation. Secondly, the MOA has a clearly delegated regulatory competence. Moreover, detailed (procedural) rules are provided (although some are somewhat ambiguous). When issuing In the 2001 State Council Regulation and subsequent Measures, no explanation or report was provided by the State Council, the MOA or the MOH when issuing the above regulation and relevant measures. The only clue available at this moment stage is the law itself. As a general practice, the first couple of articles of a law or administrative measurelaw will expressly tell the aim and purposes of the law or measure. The aims and purposes stated for the 2001 State Council Regulation such regulation provided by the above law included the following: strengthening the safety management of agricultural GMOs; protecting human health, and safety of animal, plant and microbe safety; protecting the eco-system and the environment; promoting research of the technology of agricultural GMOs; regulating sales of agricultural GMOs; protecting consumer’s right-to-know; strengthening the safety administration of imported agricultural GMOs.

      In comparison with the previous regulatory arrangements by the MOST, Tobacco Administration and MOA before 2001, the current administrative framework for agricultural GMOs is indeed strengthened and more sophisticated. Firstly, all the relevant activities are covered by the regulation. Secondly, the MOA is clearly delegated regulatory competence by the State Council. Moreover, detailed rules, particularly detailed procedural rules are provided though with some ambiguity.  To protect human health, and safety of animal, plant and microbe safety, and more generally the eco-system and the environment areis a commonly used aims and purposes of governmental regulation, particularly in the field of the environmental field. For example, the 1999 Revised Marine Environmental Protection Law stated its aim and purpose in this way: to protect and improve marine environment, to protect marine resources, to prevent pollution damage, to maintain balance of eco-system, to protect human health, and to promote economic and social sustainable development (Article 1). Marine pollution, no matter what the sources are (land-based sources or ship-based or ocean dumping), cause adverse effect and sometimes serious damage to human health, environment and eco-system. Scientific evidence has proved it without much doubt, so regulatory measures are taken to reduce or to prohibit those activities that cause pollution. However, unlike many activities that have been shown to be environmentally harmful, the case of agricultural GMOs is different. Until now, there is not much actual sufficient and convincing scientific evidenceproof to show that agricultural GMOs have caused harm to human health, the environment and the eco-system, except for some individual cases or reports mentioned earlier in this paper. In spite of this lack of strong sufficient and convincing scientific evidence, regulatory measures are established and applied to agricultural GMOs in Europe, Japan, Korea and also in China.

   The explanation offered by both the Chinese science community and the government is more or less the same. For example, Shi Yuanchun (an academician and vice-chairman of the China Association for Science and Technology) said that GMO technology is itself neutral, but since GMO means the transfer of an outside gene into a living body, it does represent a potential danger to the human being that needs to be examined and supervised.¹³⁵ The Agricultural Minister, DU Qinglin said at the 2002 annual meeting of the “China Development Forum” that “the MOA has always has taken active measures to popularize genetically modified cottons and flowers. As for modified food crops such as soybeans – although we offer great support for research, we still are strict and restrictiveained about their general use. Modified food could have an impact on consumers’ benefits and on sustainable development.”¹³⁶ Therefore the regulation of agricultural GMOs is basically based on concerns of its potential risk on human health, environment and eco-system, rather than on actual risk or demonstrated harm. In short, China adopted a precautionary approach toward GMO regulation.

   FTrue, food safety and biosafety are the two most important and legitimate objectives for GMO regulation in China and other countries. In the case of China GMO regulation, food safety is put under control, effective or not, of the MOA and MOH. The real problem is biosafety. With Taking into the mandate of the MOA, the weak regulatory capacity, vast, complex and diverse agricultural sector, etc., it is a real challenge to how to prevent possible negative impacts of GMOs, such as GM e.g. pollution of the wild and original plant resources by the GM plant, is a real challenge. The following incident of the illegal plantation of Bt rice, discussed below, is a typical example. In order to strengthen the protection of biosafety the core science-industry-policy network should be made open to environmental considerations represented possibly by the SEPA. Currently, only 1 out of the 56 members of the Biosafety Committee works in the field of from the environmental science, which is not enough by any standard is under-represented by whatever standard. A possible solution is to create a go higher ranking law for of lawmaking, GMO safety law (a law adopted by the National People’s Congress) that gives should give more active decision-making powerrole to the SEPA, a more balanced allocation of regulatory powers and a better coordination within the government.

   More profoundly, the proposed change to a more comprehensive GMO regulatory framework reflected a “change of mind” of Chinese government towards GMO technologies, if not a “GMO winter”.¹³⁷ From the middle of 1980s untill 1999, China was an enthusiastic and whole-hearted supporter of GMO technology development. After 1999, the commercialization of more GM crops was basically stopped, though research investment still has increased. Several factors contributed to this shift of policy. Firstly, trade considerations, is one of the factors though the soybean episode, discussed below, did not really serve as a successful experience of using policy and administrative measures to influence trade for the Chinese government. Secondly, growing the public awareness (especially in urban areas) with regard to of the biosafety and food safety played a role. Although the public awareness and understanding of GMO technology is still at a very low level, especially in the rural area, with more education and involvement of the media, such awareness is increasing and wide-spreading especially in urban area.¹³⁸ Thirdly, the controversy, conflicts and uncertainty of relevant international rules also cooled down made Chinesea to cool down its enthusiasm forin GMO technological development; . Tthe more restrained attitudes of other major trading partners, e.g. EU, Hong Kong and Japan, forced China to have a second thought on whether GMO technology would bring more advantages or disadvantages.  

   B. External influences and pressures – postponement of application of the law

   TIt should be noted that the initial date for entry into force implementation of the three 2002 MOA GMO Measures (import, labeling and assessment) was from March 20, 2002, b. But it was, in fact, postponed three times (March 11, 2002, October 11, 2002 and July 17, 2003) until finally,l two years later, the Measures entered into force on April 20, 2004. This was unusual in China. In the term of the MOA, this now that was “not normal” and t. The explanation reason given by the MOA was “technical difficulties”.¹³⁹

   TFrom the trade statistics given earlier and also in the appendix of this paper, show that, although imports of GM soybeans were going up, there was China imported millions tons of soybeans every year. In 1996, such import was only 1.1 million tons, but in 2004 it went up to 20.23 million tons. Noticeably, this import dropped a slightly dip to 11.3 million in 2002. from about 13.6 million of 2001. Then the import continued to go up to the record high of over 20 million tons in 2004.

   The following explains One question is what caused the dip of 2002. Many of the imported GM soybeans are In 2002, the MOA enacted three GMO Measures (import, assessment and labeling) to implement the 2001 State Council Regulation. One of them is directly relevant to the import of GM soybeans. The American soybeans. took a big part of it, which is about US$ 1 billion business nowadays. Soybeans are the number one U.S. bulk export crop of bulk agricultural commodities of which and about 81% of are Roundup Ready soybeans.¹⁴⁰, with China ias the main leading import market for US soybeans. In 2002, the new A key factor that caused problems for the export of US soybeans to China is the Biosafety Certificate required by the 2002 MOA Import Measures required that before an export contract can be signed, a Biosafety Certificate must be obtained. Articles 17 and 18 of the 2002 MOA Import Measures provide that it takes 9 months (270 days)In order to get the Certificate from the MOA, the US exporter or the Chinese importer has to wait 9 months (270 days, Articles 17 & 18, 2002 MOA Import Measures), after submitting relevant data and documents in Chinese, to get the Certificate from the MOA. Theis Measures wereas published on January 5, 2002 and entered into force on March 20, 2002. It was impossible for How could an US exporter or Chinese importer possibly to get the Certificate in time for the 2002’s export contract. within less than 3 months while the assessment takes 9 months to complete? In response, the MOA published three Communications This was undoubtedly a “technical difficulty” if not totally impossible. So (on March 11, 2002, October 11, 2002 and July 17, 2003) the MOA published three Communications (e.g. No.190 and No.222, etc.) to set up an ad hoc procedure of Interim Measuresproviding t. That is, instead of waiting for the formal Biosafety Certificate, the importer may apply for an Interim Certificate, submitting with less complete documents, even in English, submitted. If approved, tThe MOA’s Biosafety Office would then issue athen Interim Certificate for making necessary arrangements for imports within 30 days if approved (Communicate No.190). OThen on October 11, 2002 and July 17, 2003 the Interim Measure was extended untiltill April 20, 2004. On February 20, 2004, the MOA published the Communication No. 349, which expressly provided that the Interim Measures ended on April 20, 2004. From then on, the formal (or the “normal”) procedure provided by the 2001 State Council Regulation and the 2002 three MOA Measures wouldshould be applied.

   This was what happened on the table. What under the table was much more complicated and not open. Because it was a US$ 1 billion business, understandably no one took it lightly in the United States and also in China. At the beginning of February of 2002, soon after the publication of the three MOA Measures, the U.S. government sent several delegations to China to seek “clarifications” and or to exert pressures. It was reported that a series of “fierce battles” was fought between the U.S. and China.¹⁴¹ Theis matter was even brought to the attention of the two heads of the states. The two heads of states agreed that the Chinese GMO regulations should not jeopardize the trade of the U.S. Roundup Ready soybeans. After many bilateral dialogues, negotiations and consultations, in March 2003, the MOA and Department of Agriculture of the U.S. concluded a Memorandum of Understanding, by which a high level joint working group was set up to promote GMO trade that is regulated on the basis of “sound science”. On April 21, 2004, a Letter of Intent was also signed between the Department of Agriculture of the U.S. and the AQSIQ of China to establish a Consultative Mechanism on Food Safety and Animal and Plant Health Issues. ¹⁴² It sounds that a more cooperative mechanism has been set up after the soybean battles.

   Threewo points might be derived from this soybean episode. Firstly, it was strange for the MOA to make the GMO rules without even thinking about what would be how long it was a reasonable period of time for an before the application underof the GMO rules. Law, including administrative rules, is a serious business, which should not be made lightly and later changed quickly and equally lightly. Secondly, the two years’ postponement of the three administrative measures, though unusual, was obvious due to the U.S. influences and pressures. The external pressures were real and strong on domestic law making in China. After China joined the WTO, it is no longer as easy as before for Chinese government to defend its position, reject complaints and ignore external pressure by claiming that thesethose we are purely internal affairs and rejected external pressures or interference. The U.S. succeeded on Roundup Ready soybeans yesterday. The other countries or a group of country could possibly follow the suit on other matters tomorrow if the influence and pressure is strong enough. The recent EU-China textile deal of June 2005 is another similar case of such pressure. Thirdly, the U.S. GM soybean episode is an exciting fight over trade inon the GM cropsO trade, but the technical support and capacity building for establishment of a biosafety framework, provided to China by international organizations or a groups of states to China in establishment the biosafety framework is a more subtle external influence. As it mentioned earlier, there is a clear and close link between the Biosafety Protocol and the agricultural GMO regulation in China. The future GMO safety law shall be another example of how external forces influence law making s work in China law-making. 

      C. Competence, independence and transparency of GMO regulation

   The competence of agricultural GMO regulation is principally delegated to the MOA, so the scientific assessment and management of agricultural GMO risks are accordingly put in the hands of the MOA. In accordance with the 2001 State Council Regulation (Article 9), the Agricultural GMO Biosafety Committee, consisting of technical experts in the field of research, production, processing, inspection and quarantine, health and environment of agricultural GMOs is a decision-making body, which shall be responsible for the safety assessment and final approval of agricultural GMOs in China. Biotechnologists dominate the Committee; over a half of the members are biotechnologists and only one member represents the SEPA.¹⁴³ Before the formal approval, detailed and specific examination mustshall be carried out by a the certified institution s that are capable conducting such examination if requested by the MOA (Article 10). But who are the members on the Committee and what institutions are those certified ones are not open to the public. What really matters was not made public. What being open to the public for the present is, firstly, the prices for such examination. The MOA published a Communication (gong gao) that specified the prices for the two kinds examinations on 10 October 2003.¹⁴⁴ For the examination on environmental safety, the price is between RMB 83,000 to 96,000. For the examination on food safety, the price is between RMB 1,000 to 120,000. From this Communication, one can conclude that the risks assessed by the Committee include both environmental risks and human health/safety risks.

   It was reported that, in fact, the is 56-member Committee met twice a year to review applications for field trials, environmental release or commercialization. For example, in December 2004, the Committee reviewed the application of commercialization of certain Bt rice varieties, but no approval was made and the meeting ended in the unusually low key way. The biotechnologist members dominated the Committee. Over a half of the members were biotechnologists and only one member represents the SEPA. ¹⁴⁵ On February 23, 2004, the MOA published the first list of 2004 Biosafety Certificates granted to foreign companies forof imported agricultural GMOs used for materials of processing.¹⁴⁶ The MOA received altogether 18 samples of 4 GMO crops (soybean, maize/corn, oil rape seed and cotton) from 5 foreign companies:, Monsanto (USA), DuPont (USA), Dow AgroSciences (USA), Bayer (Germany) and Syngenta Participation AG (Switzerland) for examination. From the The examination of 7 samples sent in by from the Monsanto, has been completed, among which 5 received Biosafety Certificates, were granted and 2 temporarily did not get a Certificate were rejected temporally due to lack of information. The other 11 samples are still being currently in the process of examinedation due to their late submission of the documents. With the Biosafety Certificate for processing materials, the foreign company and Chinese importers can conduct imports of the certified GMO crops, such as soybeans, to China from April 21, 2004. The Interim Biosafety Certificate is expired as from April 20, 2004.

   TFrom what is open to the public, the MOA is making an effort to make the regulatory and management system more transparent than before. The above information is publicly available put on the website of the MOA, open to the public. This was a n obvious clear change of public administration for the government ministries and agencies in general (not only for the MOA) as a result of after China joiningted the WTO, no limited to the MOA only.

   However, from the procedural aspect, there is still much important information that is not publicly availableare still places that are not clear or open enough. The names of the members of the Committee and the names of certification institutions, for example, are not open to the public. , for example, who are those experts on the Biosafety Committee,There is no way of knowing what would happen if an individual expert on the Committee has a conflict of interests with regard to a in the case before the Committee, or what are the criteria are for selecting those certifiecation d examination institutions and again what would happen if such an institution in case ofhad a conflict of interests with a case it is examining, or in case of rejection whether there is a review available by certain body superior, etc. Publication of the result of the examination is certainly a first step towards the transparency, but only a first one. More detailed information should be made public in the future. Public accessibility of i And the information accessible to the public is athe pre-condition for the public participation in the decision-making. 

   In fact, during the drafting of the relevant GMO regulation and measures, only scientists, policymakers and industry shareholders were involved, which is a common practice inof lawmaking in China, especially for those rules with an obvious scientific and technical nature. It is the core science-industry-policy network that really matters in formulating the rules. There was no broader consultation and participation from the public in the GMO regulatory development.¹⁴⁷

 

      D. Capacity-building in GMO regulation

   On the aspect of cCapacity-building in, China is at a very early the beginning stage. During the period of 1997-1999, SEPA formulated the National Biosafety Framework (NBF), with . It was funding fromed by UNEP/the GEF via the UNEP. Several ministries and agencies were involved.¹⁴⁸ The Framework It summarizes regulations and policies but does not have formal legal status. At the provincial level now, 24 provincial GMO Biosafety Management Offices were established within the provincial departments of agriculture-in-charge.¹⁴⁹ But because of due to the marginal role of SEPA in GMO issues (explained above in great detail)in the whole matter, it can ould only be regarded as a beginning towards establishing the national biosafety framework. Moreover, much remains to be done with regard to capacity-building, taking into consideration of the vast smallholder agricultural sector and the diverse and large country itself.  

   E. Impact of GMO regulation on the sale of agricultural products in China

   In the current GMO regulatory framework, both domestic and imported agricultural GMOs are put under regulation. In theory, national treatment should be applied to imported GMOs in such regulation as a result of China’s WTO membership. No additional or more costly rules should be applied to imported GM products. However, the above discussion on the substantive aspect of the current GMO regulation shows that the imported GMOs are under a separate and more stringent control. Moreover, it what is interesting is to havepay a closer look at attention to the first listfirst inventory of the GM products (covering both GM seed, GM crop and related products) that, according to the 2002 MOA Labeling Measures, have to be labeled in the 2002 MOA Labeling Measures. Five groups of GM products are listed, including soybean, maize/corn, oil rape seed, cotton seed and tomato and other related products. Except for cotton, all the other four are all food crops. The question is why these five groups were listed in the first inventory. The Measures itself did not offer any explanation.

      On November 25, 2002, the MOA published the list of 10 groups of Interim Certificates for imported agricultural GM products.¹⁵⁰ All together 486 interim certificates were issued. The countries of origin include the United States, Brazil, Argentina, Germany, Canada, Australia, Thailand and Denmark. The imported products include soybean, maize/corn, oil rapeseed, cottonseed oil and their related products, such as soybean oil and rapeseed oil. Therefore all the imported GM products are included in the first list of GMOs that need to be first inventory that is subject to the regulation of labeleding. By the year of 1999, 16 domestic GM products were approved for trial. They include cotton, rice, wheat, maize/corn, soybean, potato, oil rapeseed, peanut, tobacco, cabbage, tomato, melon, sweet pepper, chili, petunia and papaya¹⁵¹. Among them, cotton, tomato, sweet pepper and petunia were approved for commercialization. In this list, only the tomatoes were on the first labeling listof the four commercialized products were included in the first inventory. This e first list inventory alone may not be a strong enough evidence to prove that there is discrimination against imported GM products. T for the government may give other reasons for its labeling requirements, such as scientific, trade or others, as justification of the inventory. However, But the fact that the list inventory covers all the meaningful imported GM products but only one of the four domestic GM products, does raise suspicions demonstrated that the principal targets of the list inventory isare imported GMOs projects. 

   Whether On the impact of the GMO regulations have an impact on sales of agricultural food products, safety concerns and the above regulation will produce impact in China. For the impact on the sales, it is still too early to sayee the impact at this stage. After the labeling measures are implemented, the consumer will decide whether to choose GM products or non-GM-Free products. Three factors will play a role in the consumer’s choice. The first is whether GM and non-GM-Free products are available to a particular consumer in the same place and at the same time or not. The second is how much the consumer knows about the GM product. If the consumer has non-GM-Free products available and knows sufficiently enough about what GMO technology is, he or she may buy non-GMchoose GM-Free product because of the uncertainty or the potential risk of GM products. This has been proved by the survey conducted in Guangzhou mentioned earlier in this paper and the following Nestl� law suit in Shanghai described below. The problem is that the non-GM-Fee product may not produce the same risk as the GM product, but this does not mean that it is necessarily safe. For example iIt might, for example, be contaminated with by agricultural chemicals or other pollutants, which is an often occurring outstanding food safety problem in China nowadays.¹⁵² The third is the price difference between the two kinds of products. Therefore, the availability, consumer information and price are all relevant and important.  

      F. Nestl� Case (Shanghai)

   The first test case on the GM labeling came in December 2003 in Shanghai.¹⁵³ A consumer, Mm. ZHU Yanling bought a Nestl� product (Nestl� Qiao ban ban, the price of which was RMB 6.80 (less than US$ 1)) for her child in March 2003. Later, she found out via the Internet that this product contained GMOs. Although there was no definite conclusion that GMOs were harmful to human health, she still felt strongly that she and her child were cheated by the Nestl� Company because thesuch a product was not expressly labeled as GM product-Based on the violation of her right-to-know as a consumer, she sued the Nestl� Company at the Shanghai No.2 Intermediate Court. But there was no progress after over 6 months since she brought the suit. One of her lawyers, Mr. WU Dong, flew to headquarter of the Nestl� headquarters Company in Switzerland to consult with the Nestl� representativespeople. The reply from the Nestl� was that before the charge being confirmed by the court, the Nestl� Company would continue to produce the relevant products without GM labeling. This is because that according to the 2001 State Council Regulation and the 2002 MOA Labeling Measures, only the raw materials of agricultural GMOs and products directly derived from agricultural GMOs should be labeled as GM product.¹⁵⁴ This Nestl� product was not such a neither the above twoproduct.

   Article 6 (3) of the 2002 MOA Labeling Measures further provides that if a final product is made from agricultural GMOs or processed from another product containing agricultural GMOs but the final product does not contain GMOs or if GMOs cannot be detected in the product, it the product should be labeled as “made from GM xxx (e.g. GM soybean) but does not contain GMOs” or “ingredient containing GM xxx (e.g. GM soybean) but does not containing GMOs”. Therefore, the deciding factor can be is the detecting technical standard and method. Two detections were done by the GM Food Laboratory of the Shanghai Agricultural Academy, but bBecause there is no unified technical standard in China, the results of two detects were different. The two detections were all done by the GM Food Laboratory of the Shanghai Agricultural Academy. At the request of the Intermediate Court, the Laboratory made the first detection in August 2003, by using an internationally recognized method and standard: . The result was that GMOs were found in the sample of the product (Nestl� Qiao ban ban). On September 2, 2003, the Nestl� Company challenged the result of the first detection at the Court and asked for a second detection. This time the same Laboratory used a different method that is one the 17 methods recommended by the MOA in December 2003: . The result was no GMOs were found in the sample product. On April 19, 2004, the Court of first instance ruled handed down the decision that Mm. ZHU lost the case and ordered her to pay RMB 3,050 fee, on the basis of the second detection.

   Mm. ZHU She made an appealed to the Shanghai High Court in July 2004. In the appeal, the main arguments¹⁵⁵ included, firstly, that the first detection which followed the international practice that was more advanced, and should be accepted by the Court. Secondly, the Nestl� Company challenged the method used for the second detection (because it is used for agricultural products), but accepted the result of it. This was a contradiction. Thirdly, the method used by the AQSIQ should be used because in fact the product Qiao Ban Ban was a kind of instant cocoa drink, produced in Brazil and packaged in China. Therefore, it was an imported food and the AQSIQ standard should be applied. Fourthly, the Nestl� Company gave made false information advertisement because the package said that it was produced by the Nestl� Company in (Shanghai), but in fact it was produced in Brazil. Fifthly, the fact that no GMOs were not found using the second method did not mean there wereas no GMOs in the product. According to the 2002 MOA Labeling Measures, even if no GMOs can be not being found, the label should also make it clear that a product is it was made from GMOs. The people of the Nestl� representatives Company admitted in an interview that some of the materials used by the Nestl� Company may contain GMOs: , as two samples of Qiao Ban Ban was tested confirmed GMO positive by the German GeneScan on two occasions: twice on November 1, 2003 and October 22, 2002. Lastly, according to the 2002 MOA Labeling Measuresthe Food Labeling Standard of China, the origin of the imported food must on the be labeled as such, but this product of the Nestl� product Company was not so labeled as suchrequired by the law. In spite of these above strong arguments, the High Court came to the conclusion that the Nestl� Company did not violate the compulsory labeling rules of the country. so the Mm. ZHU lost the case and was ordered to pay RMB 50 (about US$ 6.05) fee.

   This case, as the first test case, is meaningful in several aspects. Firstly, it demonstrated that the technical standards and methods used for the GMO regulation are asequally important as the procedural and substantive rules. Otherwise, confusions and disputes are likely to arise by the compulsory labeling rules but lack of unified compulsory detection methods. Such a failure has already posed loopholes and confusions in the agricultural GMO regulation in China. Secondly, the consumers, especially those in urban areas, are increasingly aware of the safety issues of GMOs and ready to defend their rights by the means available to them. Mm. ZHU lost the case but she received wide support and respect from the media and the public. 

      G. Effectiveness of GMO regulation – GM rice and& others

   In order to establish the rule of law in China, the first condition is there have to be laws is law to obeyand secondly, these laws have to be implemented effectively. At present, China has more or less achieved theis first condition though loopholes still existed. Many laws and administrative regulations and measures have been issued in the last twenty years. Not many obvious or big gaps exist in the current legal system. The second condition is the effective implementation of the law. This is more difficult to achieve. Sometimes the lack of effective implementation is due to the lack of clarity in the law itself, b. But the clarity of the law alone cannot guarantee effective implementation of a lawautomatically. The political, economic, social and cultural environment behind the weak implementation is more complicated.

   In China, agricultural GMOs are not banned but only regulated, by the means of control on commercialization and compulsory labeling, for example. If agricultural GMOs were banned, things would be a little easier though human and financial resources were still necessary to enforce the ban. But at present, they are put under a complicated administrative regulation with many detailed procedural and substantive rules. An effective implementation and enforcement relies on better and more efficient administrative network with richer and higher level human resources and capacity. This is exactly what is lacking now. The illegal commercialization of Bt rice is an example.

      As discussed in From the Appendix I and discussion earlier in this paper, Bt rice is still at the stage of experimental or field trial (in Hubei and Fujian provinces) depending on what trait technologies are developing since 1999. A definite conclusion is nNo variety of Bt rice has been approved for commercialization (here meaning wide scale of plantation) by the MOA. Some biotechnologists are not happy with this situation. In December 2004, the Recommendation by Qifa Zhang and others openly made the complained about thist open. In that Recommendation, theyit claimed that up totill now no harmful effectsrisk haves been found in the whole process of assessment and field trials for commercialization of the Bt rice. They claimed that conditions for commercialization were ripe and that so the commercialization should be speed up. From December of 2004, there it was speculation whether ed that the biosafety assessment of Bt rice would soon be started and whether the commercialization would soon come in early 2005.

   Soon after the media made this Recommendation and the speculation public, the debate on the food safety and biosafety of Bt rice became heated.¹⁵⁶ Those biotechnologists who supported the commercialization argued that Bt rice would bring similar benefits to China as the Bt Cotton, namely reducing the use of pesticides, reducing the crop loss therefore increasing the income, and increasing the nutrients (� - Carotene), etc. No harm or risk was found on the aspect of food safety but the potential risk for biosafety was never mentioned. Those who are skeptical about Bt rice it argued that in spite of the benefits, no one can deny the potential risk for biosafety, especially because China is the origin of several wild rice varieties. Taking into consideration of the current level and capacity of public administration, it was almost impossible to prevent illegal plantation and gene pollution. For exampleIn fact, in Anhui province, many of the Bt cotton planted hadwere never undergone biosafety assessment. No one could guarantee that Bt rice would not follow the suit of Bt cotton. With regard to On the aspect of food safety, tests showed that it was safe for a rat to eat several grams of Bt rice for a couple of months, but this does it did not mean it iwas safe for humans to eat several hundred grams as a main food for 50 years ( because rice being the number one food crop in China and many parts of Asia).

   While the debate went on and heated up, an influential newspaper, Southern Weekend (nan fang zhou mo), published an article¹⁵⁷ saying that up to 20,000 mu (about 1,333 hectares) to 25,000 mu (about 1,666 hectares) Bt rice had been were, in fact, planted illegally in Hubei Province last year. The article claimed that Bt rice (including seed, rice and milled rice) hads been sold on the market in Wuhan (the capitol of Hubei province). Such a wide spread plantations can hardly be justified as field trials. The Greenpeace played an important role again in this incident. It They collected 25 samples of rice, rice seed and milled rice from Wuhan and the nearby countryside and sent them to the German GeneScan for GMO detection. The results showed is that 19 out of the 25 samples were found GM positive. Qifa Zhang, his home university, the Huazhong (Mid-China) Agricultural University, and his collaborating local seed companies, were accused offor selling Bt rice seeds privately to the farmers nearby in the last couple of years without any governmental approval. If thise accusation turns out to be was proved true, it shall be the first serious violation of the 2001 State Council Regulation and relevant administrative measures. According to Article 45 of the 2001 Regulation, in case of production and application without a Biosafety Certificate after the production trial, the MOA shall order to stop the production and application and impose a fine between RMB 20,000 – 100,000. The MOA was informed of this incident and said to carry out investigation.

      The Wuhan Bt rice case was not an isolated onecase of such illegal planting of GM crops. The author heldalso made a survey in Nantong of Jiangsu Province in February 2005.¹⁵⁸ One farmer has been planting ed over 160 mu (11 hectares) GM rice for 5 years on over 160 mu (11 hectares). He got the seeds from the local agricultural science station of the local government, which helped the farmer to plant and provided technical assistance. He knew itthose was GM rice and said he would plant it again because it was profitable to plant it. Another farmer planted about 250 mu (17 hectares) of GM wheat (another GM crop not yet approved for commercialization) for 5 years. He got the seeds from the Jiangsu Provincial Agricultural Academy. Again, the local agricultural science station provided technical assistance. He sold the wheat to a local seed company. He also stated that he would also plant it again because it was profitable.

      These Wuhan Bt rice, the Nantong GM rice and GM wheat, together with several reported cases of illegal planting of GM crops across the country, are only a small part of the ice-burger. They call into questioned the effectiveness of the GMO regulation into question. There may be many reasons behind such illegal planting, e.g. the private interests of the biotechnologists and the strong protectionism of the local government, etc. The biotechnologists certainly have direct interests in the commercialization of the Bt rice varieties after many years of hard work. If it is approved for commercialization, the biotechnologists or their family members, as discussed in the Southern Weekend article, could benefit directly from the commercialization. One MOST official explained, “there is a policy of getting scientists to develop companies for the promotion of biotech. You can now form a company and register IP as belonging to a single person. Patents can be used as a basis to create stock companies”. ¹⁵⁹ But tThe problem is that most of the funding for the research fund or most of it came from the government not from the private companies in the first place. Moreover, apart from the biotechnologists, tThe local government can also benefit from the commercialization for the reasons of taxation and employment, etc. So tThis is usually the reason why the local authorities protectionism is very strong in the case of failure to implementation national policies and law or even act in direct violation of the law.

   It hais been four years since the enactment of the 2001 State Council Regulation. It seems that the Regulation it did not really change much what the farmers are have been planting. It did not make the things totally different. The fFarmers planted GM crops before the Regulation and continue to plant them after the Regulation. As to the question whether Will the Regulation will remain to bejust words on paper, t? The Wuhan Bt rice incident will be a nother test case, especially to test the effectiveness of the agricultural GMO regulation in China. By cCoincidentally ce or not, the MOA recently just sent a Notice to 12 provincial Agricultural Bureaus (including Hubei, Jiangsu, Hunan, etc.) to promote the plantation of 28 varieties of high yielding (non-GM) hybrid rice (Super Rice). It is interesting to see what impact of such official promotion will produce on Bt rice.

 

VIII. Conclusion

 

   This paper made a survey of the regulation of agricultural GMOs in China. As the paper shows, it has been indicated in this paper China embraced the agricultural GMO technology with enthusiasm since the middle of 1980s, mainly out of economic and political reasons. CA considerable y lot of public funds have been was invested in this area. As a result, encouraging results came out. China is the among the top five agricultural GMO producers. In the future, China will continue to pursue the development of agricultural GMOs because such technology is expected to ultimately become the solution to many existing problems of the Chinese agricultural sector, including production efficiency, food security, food safety and environmental protection.¹⁶⁰

   The regulatory framework forof the agricultural GMOs was triggered by many considerations, including domestic and international ones. Many competing interests are involved, both internationally and domestically. Internationally speaking, the EU and the US stand for two opposing sides on the regulation of the agricultural GMOs. TFrom the above survey shows that, the EU’s precautionary approach is more influential in the design of the whole regulatory framework in China. The US is more influential in forcing China to remove the regulatory obstacles to the American GM products into Chinese market. An obvious reason why China chose the EU model is that China, like the EU, is not a major exporter of GM products, but an importer. As an importer, the issues of biosafety and food safety all are real and challenging. Moreover, China has continuously invested much in this area since the mid of 1980s, so it is logical that China expected that this high-tech tree should bear fruits now and the fruits can be sold well. Because this tree is a young one, protection is natural and necessary. If the international rules (the Biosafety Protocol) and foreign rules (the EU model) provide ready and useful models for this purpose, how can China ignore them? From the first list of inventory of GM products that have to be labeled, it is clear that the target is imported GM products, but Chinese biotechnologists want more, like – treating imported and domestic GMOs differently when examining their application for a different treatment on the bBiosafety Ccertificate (a suggestion made between imported and domestic products in Qifa Zhang’s Recommendation). As far as the international rules are concerned, there is indeed scientific and legal uncertainty in this area, especially when the EU-US WTO dispute is still pending before the WTO Dispute Settlement Bodypanel. DeIn spite of the pushing effort by Chinesethe biotechnologists to get on the commercialization of GM rice commercialized, the final approval and commercialization will not come easily. China will continue to take a wait and see attitude on the commercialization of new GM crops, especially on rice, the number one food crop.

   Domestically speaking, the interests of the biotechnologists, GM crop farmers and the MOA, etc. are prevailing. The interests of other agricultural scientists, non-GM crop farmers and the SEPA are just neglected. The issue of biosafety is not given the importance put in the place where it should havebe. From the above survey, it is hard to get the conclusion that tThe beneficiariesy of the GM technologies do not seem to really care about the interests of others and do not take precautionary measures to reduce the risk of gene pollution, for example. The issue of biosafety is expected to be given proper attentiona right place in the future GMO safety law.

   As toOn the characteristics of the GMO regulation in China, the following features may be identified. Firstly, China usedtook legal binding regulations, rather than the voluntary guidelines. Instead of revising the existing regulation, a new the regulatory mechanism was createdis a newly made one, but limited to agricultural GMOs. Secondly, China took athe multi-ministry approach so several ministries and agencies are involved in the regulatory framework. Thirdly, with the accession to the WTO, the decision-making has becomeis more transparent than before; r. Relevant documents and information have been were published onat the official websites. Fourthly, the MOA plays the leading role in this regulatory framework. Though bBiosafety and environmental considerations are, in theory, taken into account, but the priority of the MOA is agricultural production rather than the biosafety or the environment. Therefore, a more active role of the SEPA is definitely necessary in the GMO regulation. The relevant issues of agricultural GMOs are not onpurely agricultural issues or economic issues. GMOs These issues should be addressed and regulated in broader context and in the more neutral way.

   It has beenis about four years since the 2001 State Council Regulation was enacted. Implementation and enforcement increasingly became a challenge, like is the cases with many other regulatory frameworks in China. There are some doubts on the effectiveness of the regulation, taking into consideration of the big size and diversified situation ofin the Chinese agricultural sector. We have to have rules for such an expensive game, but if the rules themselves are too complicated and expensive, as complained by the Chinese biotechnologists in the 2004 Recommendation, we have to think about the rationale of making the rules. If the choice is between the immediate risks of pesticide contamination and the potential risks of the GM product, we choose the latter because the former is clearly worse. Consequently,Then we should give the GM products a more favorable regulatory environment. If the choice is between the long-term biosafety risks of GM products and the short-term agricultural benefits, we have to have a second thoughts:, who shall pay for the future risks and is thate price affordable? To avoid or minimize chances of paying such a price, Then the GM products should be regulated and put under effective control. However, But what really matters is what is effective may vary from place to place and or even from country to country. After four years of implementation of the agricultural GMO regulatory frameworkion, it is a high time to conduct a systematic review of its effectiveness now. Hopefully those rules shall not become words on paper, but are being implemented and enforced in practice. With the increasing public awareness, the regulation of agricultural GMOs received public support even though many people doid not really know or care about who is responsible for what. What many people, especially those in the urban areas, really care about is the information and choices, especially those in the urban areas. The bBiosafety and food safety issues will continue to be discussed and debated.

   For many developing countries where human financial and technological resources are limited, the Chinese experience with agricultural GMO development and regulation may tell the following things: firstly, though the resources are limited, but when you pool them together something important can be done. Secondly, the choice of what needs to be done has to be made carefully, for you may not have a second chance. So far as the development of the agricultural GMOs is concerned, it is costly. It is worthy only worth it if it can solve certain outstanding problems in youa country because you may have nothing to waste. Many expectations were attached to the development of agricultural GMOs in China. Thirdly, the rule of law has to be established. One You cannot play the game without rules in the first place. The rRules haves to be the one that is suitable to the local political, economic, social and cultural environment, and they do not necessarily have to be a fancy, like the ones that is used in the developed countries where financial the relevant resources are abundant. There is no universally applicable model for this. The people should work it out with their own wisdom. Fourthly, in order to reduce potential conflicts of regulation, the clarity of relevant international rules is necessary and the domestic rules have to be compatible with the international rules. 

¹ Clive James, Preview - Global Status of Commercialized Biotech/GM Crops: 2004 (Executive Summary), No. 32 – 2004, http://www.isaaa.org (April 10, 2005); FAO, Regulating GMOs in developing and transition countries, Electronic forum on biotechnology in food and agriculture: Conference 9 (28 April - 25 May 2003), Background Document, http://www.fao.org/biotech/forum.asp (May 15, 2003); see also SEPA, China 10 Years Progress in the Implementation of the Convention of Biological Diversity (zhong guo lu xing sheng wu duo yang xing gong yue shi nian jin zhan),

http://www.sepa.gov.cn (May 16, 2003).

² The “863 Program” is a state-funded high scientific and technology development program launched in March of 1986. Biotechnology is one of the priorities of the program. The projects funded in biotechnology include two areas, the agriculture (47.28% of the biotechnology fund) and the medicine (52.72% of the biotechnology fund). Up till now, 455 projects were granted patent, including 10 international patents. See News article, Summary of the Biotechnology in the 863 Program of Our Country (wo guo 863 ji hua sheng wu ling yu kai kuang) , http://www.sina.com.cn (March 1, 2001).

³ Jikun Huang and& Qinfang Wang, Biotechnology policy and regulation in China, IDS Working Paper 195, August 2003, http://www.ids.ac.uk/bookshop/wp/wp195.pdf (November 30, 2004).

⁴ LIU Qian and& ZHU Xinquan eds., Biosafety (sheng wu an quan) – “Biotechnology Series in the 863 Program” (“863”sheng wu gao ji shu cong shu), Science Publication (ke xue chu ban she), at 9 (2002).

⁵ Jikun Huang et al., Plant Biotechnology in China, 295 Science, Number 5555, 674-676 (25 Jan 2002), http://www.sciencemag.org/content/vol295/issue5555/index.shtml (May 24, 2002).

⁶ China National Center for Biotechnology Development, Report on China Biotechnogical Development (2003) (zhong guo sheng wu ji shu fa zhan bao gao), China Agricultural Publication, 2004, at 305; Qifa Zhang et al., Recommendations on the Development Strategies for the Research and Industrialization of Agricultural GM Crops in China (guan yu wo guo zhuan ji yin zuo wu yan jiu he chan ye hua fa zhan ce lue de jian yi), September 29, 2004, http://www.cas.cn/html/Dir/2004/09/29/8456.htm (May 11, 2005).

⁷ LIU Qian and &and ZHU Xinquan (2002), supra note 4, 9-11. The exchange rate between US$ and RMB for the past few years stayed at the rate: US$ 1 = RMB 8.26.

⁸ China National Center for Biotechnology Development, Report on China Biotechnogical Development (2002) (zhong guo sheng wu ji shu fa zhan bao gao), http://www.cncbd.org.cn/nianbao/2002/ (May 10, 2005).

⁹ News article: Our Scientists Have Succeeded in GM Carps (wo guo ke xue jia yan zhi chu zhuan ji yin li yu), http://www.sina.com.cn (January 12, 2001). Apart from animal biotechnology, medicine is another area of focus. A number of new medicines that were produced with the genetic engineering technology have already entered the stage of commercialization, including the vaccine for the hepatitis (Type B).⁹ By the end of 2000, 18 kinds GM medicine and vaccine have been put on market, among which 15 received state fund from the “863 Program”. See LIN Lin et al., Outstanding Achievements in Biotechnology (sheng wu ji shu ling yu qu de ling ren zhu mu de cheng jiu), 21 Bio-Enginering Progress (sheng wu ji shu jin zhan), No. 3, 2001.

¹⁰ Jikun Huang et al (2002), supra note 5.

¹¹ See also China National Center for Biotechnology Development, 2002 Report, supra note 8.

¹² See the Appendix 1 attached at the back of this paper. The information in the first table is provided by the FAO. The second is by Jikun Huang et al (2002), supra note 5. With regard to the number and sown area of GM crops planted in China, there is no single official statistics available at present. When a certain statistics is quoted in this paper, please see the footnote for reference.

¹³ State Research Report of Biodiversity of China (zhong guo sheng wu duo yang xing guo qing yan jiu bao gao), 183-184, China Environmental Science Publication, 1998.

¹⁴ ISAAA, Global Status of GM Crops, http://www.isaaa.org/kc/Global_Status/gstat/2002/globalstat.htm (May 20, 2003).

¹⁵ Clive James (2005), supra note 1.

¹⁶ FAO, Inventory of GMOs for Selected Countries – China, http://www.fao.biotech/inventory_admin/dep/default.asp (April 15, 2005). For complete information, please see the Appendix 1 attached at the back of this paper. At present, no official statistics are available for the GM crops planted in China by the public authority in China.

¹⁷ YANG Zongliang et al., The Status and Safety Management of Agricultural GMOs (nong ye zhuan ji yin sheng wu yan jiu xian zhuang ji an quan xing guan li), Shangdong Agricultural Science, vol.5, 2002, at 51.

¹⁸ FAO, supra note 16. Several crops, such as papaya, potato and rice, all exist at different stages of development. This is because, firstly, they are developed for different traits, for example, papaya for both delayed growth and virus resistance (PRSV). Secondly, even if they are developed for the same traits, they are developed by different laboratories or institutes in different places in China.

¹⁹ Among these 4 GM crops, there are 4 varieties of cotton and 3 varieties of tomato. Altogether there are 9 varieties approved for commercialization

²⁰ LIU Qian &and ZHU Xinquan (2002), supra note 7, at 12. See also China National Center for Biotechnology Development, 2003 Report, supra note 6, 110-120.  Of these GM crops, the 5^th generation of herbicide resistant soybean has been developed and at the stage of field trial. China is the first country to successfully develop disease resistant CMV/TMV tobacco.

²¹ China National Center for Biotechnology Development, 2002 Report, supra note 8. The report did not specify what GM crops were approved.

²² LIU Qian &and ZHU Xinquan (2002), supra note 4, at 17.

²³ QIAN Yingqian, Analysis of Benefit and Risk of GMO Crops (zhuan ji yin zuo wu de li bi fen xi), 15 Biotechnology Information (1999) (sheng wu ji shu tong bao), at 5.

²⁴ Clive James (2005), supra note 1; Jikun Huang &and Qinfang Wang (2003), supra note 3, at 17.

²⁵ Dayuan Xue, A Summary of Research on the Environmental Impact of Bt Cotton in China, published by Greenpeace in June 2002, http://archive.greenpeace.org/geneng/reports/env_impact_eng.pdf (April 7, 2005).

²⁶ China National Center for Biotechnology Development, 2003 Report, supra note 6.

²⁷ YU et al., A Draft Sequence of the Rice Genome, 296 Science, Number 5565, 79-92 (April 5, 2002). http://www.sciencemag.org/content/vol296/issue5565/index.shtml (May 22, 2002).

²⁸ Jikun Huang, et al, Insect-Resistant GM Rice in Farmers’ Fields: Assessing Productivity and Health Effects in China, 29 April 2005, Vol. 308, Science, at 688-690, http://www.sciencemag.org (May 10, 2005).

²⁹ YANG Xiaohong &and SHI Rong, Launching of biosafety Assessment for the  GM Rice (zhuan ji yin shui dao an quan ping jia qi dong), http://finance.sina.com.cn (2004-12-07).

³⁰ State Planning Commission, Communication on the Project of Biotechnology Engineering and Production in the 10^th Five-Year Plan (February 11, 2002)(guan yu shi wu qi jian shi shi sheng wu ji shu chan ye gao ji shu gong cheng gong gao), http://www.sdpc.gov.cn/ (May 3, 2003) The State Planning Commission was changed as the present State Development and Planning Commission (SDPC) since May 2003.

³¹ RMB 20 billion is about US$ 2.42 billion if the exchange rate is at US$ 1 = RMB 8.26. If taking into consideration of the price pooling program multiplier (PPP: 4.29333 (1999-2000)), RMB 20 billion is about US$ 10.39 billion.

³² The 2004 national GDP is RMB 13,651.5 billion. See the State Statistic Bureau, 2004 National Economic and Social Development Statistic Communication of the People’s Republic of China (zhong hua ren min gong he guo 2001 nian guo min jing ji he she hui fa zhan tong ji gong bao) (February 28, 2005).

³³ It was issued by the Guangdong Provincial Government on October 18, 2001, http://law.chinalawinfo.com/newlaw2002/ (May 21, 2003)

³⁴ Beijing Municipal Government, Beijing 10^th Five-Year High and New Technology Industry Development Plan (bei jing shi shi wu shi qi gao xin ji shu chan ye fa zhan gui hua), issued by the Beijing Municipal Government on September 11, 2001, http://law.chinalawinfo.com/newlaw2002/ (May 22,2002)

³⁵ State Statistic Bureau (2005), supra note 33. Of the 1.299 billion, over 58% is agricultural population (757 million). http://www.cafte.gov.cn/gjhzxm/t20030611-90574.htm (July 12, 2003)

³⁶ Qifa Zhang, China:Agricultural Biotechnology Opportunities to Meet the Challenges of Food Production, at 45.

³⁷ State Statistic Bureau (2005), supra note 32.

³⁸ HOU Dongmin, A Study of the Safety of Food in China (xun qiu zhan lue tu po: po jie zhong guo liang shi an quan wen ti), China Environmental Science Publication, 2002.

³⁹ Qifa Zhang, China:Agricultural Biotechnology Opportunities to Meet the Challenges of Food Production, at 45.

⁴⁰ Due to the rapid shrinking of farmland and serious natural disasters such as droughts and floods, the grain production of 2001 decreased by 2.1% compared to the production in 2000. See State Statistic Bureau (2005), supra note 33.

⁴¹ See WEI Jianhua, Conversion of 30 million mu farmland into Forest Land this Spring, People’s Daily (Overseas Edition) (ren min ri bao, hai wai ban), at 1, (May 15, 2002).

⁴² State Council, Framework for the Agricultural Science and Technology Development (nong ye ke ji fa zhan gang yao), (April 28, 2001).

⁴³ State Development and Planning Commission, The Achievements and Experiences in the Process of Implementing Modern Agro-Industry (June 10, 2002) (guo jia ji wei zai shi shi xian dai nong ye chan ye hua guo cheng zhong qu de de cheng xiao he jing yan), http:// www.sdpc.gov.cn (May 21, 2003)

⁴⁴ State Development and Planning Commission, The Achievements and Experiences in the Process of Implementing Modern Agro-Industry (June 10, 2002) (guo jia ji wei zai shi shi xian dai nong ye chan ye hua guo cheng zhong qu de de cheng xiao he jing yan), http:// www.sdpc.gov.cn (May 21, 2003)

⁴⁵ James Keeley, The biotech developmental state? Investing the Chinese gene revolution, IDS Working Paper 207, September 2003, http://www.ids.ac.uk/ids/bookshop/wp/wp207.pdf (November 30, 2004).

⁴⁶ Its purpose is to identify the top priority of policy and administration of the government in the year.

⁴⁷ State Development and Planning Commission, 2002, supra note 27.

⁴⁸ MA Shuping, Improving the Quality of Cotton and Competitiveness (ti gao mian hua zhi liang zeng qiang jing zheng li), China Agriculture Yearbook, 2003, at 86.

⁴⁹ Qifa Zhang (2003), supra note 36, at 37.

⁵⁰ See QIAN Chuanfan, Pesticide Residual (nong yao can liu), http://www.cast.net.cn/expert/exp-text.asp (July 12, 2003); News Article, New Trends in Pesticide Market (nong yao shi chang qin qu shi); News Article, Current Status and Development Trends of Domestic Biological Pesticides (guo nei sheng wu nong yao xian zhuang ji fa zhan qu shi), http://www.cast.net.cn/yaowen/yao-text.asp (July 12, 2003)

⁵¹ WANG Shiwen, Pesticide Pollution of Agricultural Products in China (zhong guo nong chan pin de nong yao wu ran), in China Environment and Development Review, vol.1, 2001, at 347.

⁵² Jikun Huang et al., supra note 5, at 675. See also the Appendix 1 attached to the back of this paper.

⁵³ See Appendix 1 attached at the back of this paper.

⁵⁴ Jikun Huang et al., 2002, supra note 5, 675-676.

⁵⁵ ISAAA, Global Review of Commercialized Transgenic Crops: 2001. Feature: Bt Cotton, ISAAA Briefs No. 26 – 2002, Crop Biotech Update, Special Edition, December 13, 2002, http://www.isaaa.org/kc/CBTNews/ISAAA_PR/briefs26_exeng.htm (May 3, 2003)

⁵⁶ Jikun Huang, et al (2005), supra note 28.

⁵⁷ State Development and Planning Commission, The Tenth Five-Year Plan of the National Agricultural and Rural Economic Development 2001-2005 (quan guo nong ye he nong cun jing ji fa zhan di shi ge wu nian jihua), http://de.cei.gov.cn/lszl/hygh_1/ny1001.htm (May 21, 2003).

⁵⁸ At this moment, the 11^th Five-Year Plan (2006-2010) is in the last phase of drafting. It should be published in the 2^nd half of 2005.

⁵⁹ State Development and Planning Commission, supra note 57.

⁶⁰ GUO Peixing, The Major Barriers and Responses to China’s Export of Agricultural Products and Food (zhong guo nong chai pin he shi pin chu kou de zhu yao zhang ai he dui ce), http://www.cafte.gov.cn/gjhzxm/t20021120_27647.htm (April 13, 2003).

⁶¹ Ibid.

⁶² Ministry of Agriculture, Analysis of Imports and Exports of Agricultural Products in 2002 (2002 nian nong chan pin jin chu kou fen xi), http://www.agri.gov.cn/xxfb/t20030123_49954.htm (March 28, 2003).

⁶³ Ibid. The total annual agricultural export is US$ 18.02 billion. MOFTEC, Monthly Statistics of China’s Agricultural Export (zhong guo nong chan pin chu kou yue du tong ji bao gao), December 2002.

⁶⁴ MOA, 2004 China Agricultural Trade Analysis (2004 wo guo nong chan pin jin chu kou mao yi fen xi), http://www.agri.gov.cn/xxfb (April 25, 2005).

⁶⁵ GUO Peixing (2002), supra note 60.

⁶⁶ LIU Qian &and Zhu Xinquan (2002), supra note 7, at 45-74 and 198-224. See also the Appendix 1 attached.

⁶⁷ For the GM green pepper, the trait introduced is CMV (Peking University, 98A01-11; 99A-01-43; 99A-01-44; 99A-01-45). For the GM tomato, the trait introduced are fruit ripening (Huazhong University, 97A-01-15) and CMV (PekingUniversity, 98A-01-10; 99A-01-46; 99A-01-47; 99A-01-48), Liu Qian &and Zhu Xinquan (2002), supra note 3, at 47.

⁶⁸ LIU Qian &andand ZHU Xinquan (2002), supra note 7, at 229.

⁶⁹ XUE Dayuan, “GMOs and Food Safety”, TV Lecture at the Phoenix TV Hong Kong, June 21, 2003.

⁷⁰ See both Appendix 1 and Appendix 2 attached for detailed information.

⁷¹ GUO Peixing (2002), supra note 60.

⁷² Ministry of Commerce, China Commerce Yearbook (zhong guo shang wu nian jian), vol. 21, China Commerce Publication, 2005, 67-68.

⁷³ LI Ze et al, Experts: Big Potential but Very Cautious about GM Maize (zhuan jia ren wei: zhuan ji yin yu mi qian li ju da dan ying shen zhong zhong zhi), http://www.agri.gov.cn  (April 11, 2005).

⁷⁴ Article 37, 2001 “Administrative Regulation on the Safety of Agricultural GMOs”.

⁷⁵ See Appendix 2. In 1995-1996, there was not separation between seed and other use (Code: 1201000). In 1997, they are separated: seed 12010010, other use 12010090. From 1998 to 2001, other use is replaced by yellow soybeans 12010091. The statistics is the combination of both seed and other use or yellow soybeans.

⁷⁶ See Appendix 2.

⁷⁷ LI Lei, China May Announce the Postpone of the GMOs Interim Measures this Week (zhong guo ke neng zai ben zhou xuan bu zhuan ji yin lin shi cuo shi yan qi), June 25, 2003,  http://www.agri.gov.cn/gjdt/t20030625_94693.htm (June 25, 2003). See also the Appendix 2 attached.

⁷⁸ CHENG Tao, What is behind the Increasing Soybeans Import (da dou jin kou fang liang zeng zhang de bei hou), Nanfang Weekend, July 10, 2003, at B13 (Economy); see also Appendix 2 – Trade Statistics of Relevant Agricultural Products of China (1995-2003).

⁷⁹ Ministry of Commerce, supra note 72, at 68; see also the Appendix 2.

⁸⁰ MOA, The 5^th – 10^th Interim Certificate for GM Agricultural Imports (di wu zhi shi pi jin kou zhuan ji yin nong chan pin li shi zheng ming), November 25, 2002, http://www.agri.gov.cn (December 17, 2002)Apart from GM soybeans, China also imported GM corn and GM rape seed. News articles: ZHANG Dongcao, Chinese Eat 20 Million Tons of GM Food Annually (zhong guo ren mei nian chi diao 2000 wan dun zhuan ji yin shi pin), http://www.finance.sina.com.cn (April 10, 2002).

⁸¹ CHENG Tao (2003), supra note 78.

⁸² Soybean Association, Communication on the Soybean Extraction Industry of China (guan yu wo guo da dou ya zha ye you guan qing kuang de gong gao), January 2005, http://www.agri.gov.cn/zcfg/ (April 9, 2005).

⁸³ WEN Tiejun, The Challenges to the Three Agricultural Issues by China’s Accession to the WTO (zhong guo ru shi dui san nong wen ti de tiao zhan), http://www.agri.gov.cn (April 9, 2005).

⁸⁴ MOA, MOA Announced the Zoning of Superior Agricultural Products 2003-2007 (nong ye bu fa bu you shi nong chan pin qu yu bu ju gui hua 2003-2007), http://www.agri.gov.cn/xxfb/t20030212_54226.htm (March 28, 2003).

⁸⁵ News article, Heavy Losses of Domestic Biological Genetic Resources, Urgent Need for Stronger Protection (wo guo sheng wu yi zhuan zi yuan liu shi yan zhong, ji dai jia qiang bao hu gong zuo), http://www.sina.com.cn (May 21, 2002).

⁸⁶ Celilia Lo from the University of Pennsylvania received the patent for her application, Patent Application No. 89109830.

⁸⁷ Patent No. 95119563.8. See China National Center for Biotechnology Development, 2002 Report, supra note 8.

⁸⁸ Patent No. 95119563.8. See China National Center for Biotechnology Development, 2002 Report, supra note 8.

⁸⁹ SIPO, http://www.sipo.gov.cn ; WIPO, http://www.wipo.int . All the information of the 970 GMO inventions are available from the website of the SIPO in both Chinese and English though the English version is not complete and simplified.

⁹⁰ YU Fang, TRIPS Agreement and China’s Intellectual Property Undertaking of Accession to the WTO (TRIPS he wo guo ru shi zhi shi chan quan cheng nuo), China Yearbook of Intellectual Property (2001/2002), 2002, 43-51.

⁹¹ ZHOU Jianren, Improving the Intellectual Property Right Protection of New Plant Varieties and Encouraging the Development of Forestry in Big Leap (jia qiang zhi wu xin pin zhong zhi shi chan quan bao hu – cu jin lin ye kua yue shi fa zhan), China Yearbook of Intellectual Property Right (2003), at 46.

⁹² CHEN Fengxiu, The Current Status and Development Strategies for the Protection of New Agricultural Plant Variety in China (wo guo nong ye zhi wu xin pin zhong bao hu xian zhuang ji fa zhan dui ce), China Yearbook of Intellectual Property Right (2004), 42-47; CHEN Chao &and LIN Xiangming, On the Impact of the Protection of New Plant Varieties upon China’s Agricultural Development (lun zhi wu xin pin zhong bao hu zhi du dui zhong guo nong ye fa zhan de ying xiang), China Yearbook of Intellectual Property Right (2004), 72-76.

⁹³ Qifa Zhang et al, Recommendation (2004), supra note 6.

⁹⁴ Jikun Huang et al.(2002), supra note 5.

⁹⁵ State Development Planning Comission, Achievements and Experiences in Implementing Modern Agricultural Industry (guo ji ji wei zai shi shi xian dai nong ye chan ye hua guo cheng zhong qu de de cheng xiao he jing yan), http://www.adpc.gov.cn (December 21, 2002)

⁹⁶ News article, The Currently Most Contentious Issues in Bio-Safety (dang qian sheng wu an quan ling yu zui guan zhu de ji ge wen ti), http://www.jczs.sina.com.cn (March 4, 2002).

⁹⁷ News article, The Currently Most Contentious Issues in Bio-Safety (dang qian sheng wu an quan ling yu zui guan zhu de ji ge wen ti), http://www.jczs.sina.com.cn (March 4, 2002).

⁹⁸ Ministry of Agriculture, Recommendation on the Strengthening of Administration of the Quality and Safety of Agricultural Products (nong ye bu guan yu jia qiang nong chan pin an quan guan li gong zuo de yi jian), October 31, 2001. http://www.chinalawinfo.com/ (April 3,2002)

⁹⁹ News article, 14 GM Products were Found out (14 zhong zhuan ji yin chan pin bei cha – jin long yu, huo lie niao lie qi zhong), http://finance.sina.com.cn (July 4, 2003)

¹⁰⁰ XIA Chang, GM Food: Love or Refuse you? (zhuan ji yin shi pin: ai ni hai shi ju jue ni?), http://www.cast.net.cn/yaowen/yao-text.asp (July 12, 2003).

¹⁰¹ YANG Huanming (2001), The author’s personal interview in 2001.

¹⁰² News articles, Experts urge: Attention Should be Paid to the Administration of GMOs (zhuan jia hu yu: ying gai ren zhen guan zhu dui zhuan ji yin sheng wu de guan li), http://www.sina.com.cn (September 28, 2000); Commentary: GMO Technology is the Inevitable of Scientific Development (ping lun: zhuan ji yin sheng wu gong cheng shi ke xue fa zhan bi ran), http://www.sina.com.cn (June 21, 2001).

¹⁰³ XUE Dayuan, A Summary of Research on the Environmental Impact of Bt Cotton in China, June 2002, http://archive.greenpeace.org/geneng/reports/env_impact_eng.pdf (April 9, 2005)

¹⁰⁴ James Keeley, Regulating biotechnology in China: the politics of biosafety, September 2003, IDS Working Paper 208, at 20, http://www.ids.ac.uk/ids/bookshop/wp/wp208.pdf (November 30, 2004).

¹⁰⁵ JIA Shirong, Environmental Risk Assessment of GM Crops: Progress in Risk Assessment, 2004 Scientia Agricultura Sinica, 37 (2), pp. 175-187; Environmental Risk Assessment of Future GM Crops, 2004 Scientia Agricultura Sinica, 37 (4), pp. 484-489.

¹⁰⁶ A different translation in English is “Regulation on Safety Administration of Agricultural GMOs”, see Jikun Huang &and Qinfang Wang (2003), supra note 5, at 1.

¹⁰⁷ A list of relevant laws and regulations is provided in Appendix 3 of this paper.

¹⁰⁸ Web Commentary “China’s Regulation on the Trade of Agricultural Product GMOs” (zhong guo dui zhuan ji yin nong chan pin mao yi de guan zhi), http://www.agri.gov.cn (December 17, 2002). MOA, Communication No. 349 (February 20, 2004), http://www.agri.gov.cn (April 5, 2004).

¹⁰⁹ In 1993, the current MOST was the State Science &and Technology Commission.

¹¹⁰ SEPA, 2002 Report on the Environmental Status of China (2002 nian zhong guo huan jing zhuang kuang gong bao), Chinese Yearbook of Environment (2003), Chinese Yearbook of Environment Publication, 2003, at 195.

¹¹¹ Website: http://www.biosafety.gov.cn

¹¹² Website: http://www.biosafety.gov.cn

¹¹³ News article, Nation to Draft Laws on Biosafety, China Daily, April 8, 2002, http://www.china.org.cn (November 19, 2002)

¹¹⁴ The EU uses a threshold of 0.9%.

¹¹⁵ ZHAO Guozhi, The Present Situation of Detection Technique to GMO Products (zhuan ji yin nong zuo wu jian ce ji shu xian zhuang yu wen ti), 6 Grain &and Oil (liang shi yu you zhi), at 12 (2003).

¹¹⁶ XIA Chang (2003), supra note 100.

¹¹⁷ China Outward and Inward Inspection and Quarantine Yearbook (zhong guo chu ru jing jian yan jian yi nian jian), 2001, China Jiliang Publication, 2001, at 566.

¹¹⁸ Web article, Beijing has Successfully Detected GMO Products (bei jing cheng gong jian ce zhuan ji yin chan pin), http://www.agri.gov.cn (April 4, 2004).

¹¹⁹ Each of them is defined in Article 13 of the 2001 Regulation.

¹²⁰ Article 15 of the 2001 Regulation. It also provides a list of documents required in the application.

¹²¹ Article 16 of the 2001 Regulation. It also provides a list of documents required in the application.

¹²² Other relevant laws and regulations include the 2004 Amended Seed Law, 2000 Fishery Law, 2001 Administrative Measures on the Licenses of Crop Seeds Production and Management, etc.

¹²³ The inventory is provided by the 2002 MOA Measures. The following agricultural GMOs are included: (1) soybean seeds, soybeans, soybean powder, soybean oil, soybean residue; (2) corn (maize) seeds, corn (maize), corn (maize) oil, corn (maize) powder; (3) seeds of rape seeds, rape seeds, rape seeds oil, rape seeds residue; (4) cotton seeds; (5) tomato seeds, tomato, tomato source.

¹²⁴ The 2002 MOA Assessment Measures provides that the entity that conducts research and experiments of agricultural GMOs in China should possess the following 4 qualifications: having its own established professional institution in China; having its own professional personnel conducting the research and experiment in agricultural GMOs; having proper equipment and technical conditions for conducting such research and experiments; and having established a agricultural GMO safety management group  (Article 18).

¹²⁵ But in the 2002 MOA Import Measures, the time limit for the MOA alone to notify the applicant its decision of approval or refusal is already 270 days (Article 17).

¹²⁶ See the China Environmental Web: http://www.zhb.gov.cn/international/ (December 17, 2002)

¹²⁷ See SONG Ying, Marine Environment Protection in China: Challenges and Legal Responses, in Laws on Marine Environmental Protection in China, Russia and Norway, DET JURIDISKE FAKULTET SKRIFTSERIE NR.50, Troms�, Norway, 2002 (ISSN 0801-6259).

¹²⁸ See SONG Ying, Marine Environment Protection in China: Challenges &and Legal Responses, in Laws on Marine Environmental Protection in China, Russia and Norway, DET JURIDISKE FAKULTET SKRIFTSERIE NR.50, Troms�, Norway, 2002 (ISSN 0801-6259).

¹²⁹ Coordination Office (SEPA), Progress of the Implementation of the CBD in China (zhong guo lu xing sheng wu duo yang xing gong yue shi nian jin zhan) (May 16, 2003), http://www.biodiv.gov.cn (April 9, 2004).

¹³⁰ Ibid. Coordination Office (SEPA) (2003).

¹³¹ News Article, China Approved the Biosafety Protocol (zhong guo he zhun ka ta he na sheng wu an quan yi ding shu), http://news.sina.com.cn (May 20, 2005).

¹³² Coordination Office (SEPA), Brief on the Protection of Biodiversity and the Implementation of the CBD (sheng wu duo yang xing bao hu ji lu xing sheng wu duo yang xing gong yue jian bao) (November 11, 26), http://www.biodiv.gov.cn (April 9, 2004).

¹³³ CHEN Chao &and LIN Xiangming (2004), supra note 92, at 75.

¹³⁴ A special website was set up by the AQSIQ for spreading the knowledge and understanding of the Codex:

   http://www.cac.org.cn (August 15, 2005).

¹³⁵ News article, China Prudent Towards Genetically-Modified Crops, People’s Daily (03/08/2001), http://www.china.org.cn (November 2, 2002)

¹³⁶ News Article, Minister of Agriculture Urges Care in Use of Modified Foods, China News Agency (April 10, 2002), http://www.china.org.cn

¹³⁷¹³⁷ See generally Xueman Wang, Challenges and Dilemmas in Developing China’s National Biosafety Framework, (2004) 38 Journal of World Trade, pp. 89-913; see also the IDS Working Papers (No.195 by Jikun Huang &and Qinfang Wang (2003), supra note3, No.207 by James Keeley (2003a), supra note 45; No. 208 by James Keeley (2003b), supra note 104.

¹³⁸ See studies on consumer reactions to GM products in China, Wuyang Hu &and Kevin Chen, Can Chinese Consumers Be Persuaded? The Case of Genetically Modified Vegetable Oil, AgBioForum, 7(3) 2004; Funing Zhong et al., GM Foods: A Nanjing Case Study of Chinese Consumers’ Awareness and Potential Attitudes, AgBioForum, 5(4): 136-144; Quan Li et al., Consumer Attitudes Towards Genetically Modified Foods in Beijing, China, AgBioForum, 5(4): 145-152, http://www.agbioforum.org (November 1, 2004).

¹³⁹ See MOA Communication No. 190, March 11, 2002, http://www.agri.gov.cn  (November 19, 2002) and MOA Communication No.222, October 11, 2002, http://www.agri.gov.cn (April 4, 2004).

¹⁴⁰ Mary A. Marchant et al., Issues on Adoption, Import Regulation, and Policies for Biotech Commodities in China with a Focus on Soybeans, AgBioForum, 5(4): 167-174, http://www.agbioforum.org/v5n4 (November 1, 2004).

¹⁴¹ See a series of news articles by Xinhua News Agency published on the http://www.agri.gov.cn (April 17, 2005).

¹⁴² For the document, see the Letter of Intent  at http://www.fas.usda.gov/itp/china/ (April 17, 2005).

¹⁴³ James Keeley (2003b), supra note 104, at 5.

¹⁴⁴ MOA, Communication No. 303 (October 10, 2003), http://www.agri.gov.cn (April 5, 2004).

¹⁴⁵ James Keeley (2003b), supra note 104, at 5.

¹⁴⁶ MOA, The Results of the First Examination of Imported Agricultural GMO Safety of 2004 (2004 nian di yi pi jin kou nong ye zhuan ji yin sheng wu an quan shen pi qing kuang), http://www.agri.gov.cn (April 5, 2004).

¹⁴⁷ IDS, Public Participation and the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety – A review for DfiD and GEF, part II: The Case Studies – China, http://www.ids.ac.uk (November 1, 2004).

¹⁴⁸ WANG Dehui &and ZHANG Shigang, Domesticating the Biosafety Protocol – Development of National Legal, Administrative and Other Measures to Implement the Protocol at the Country Level, Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety: from Negotiation to Implementation, CBD News Special Issue, http://www.biodiv.org (April 4, 2004).

¹⁴⁹ CHENG Jingen, Improving the level of Management of Agricultural GMOs in Accordance with the Law(yi fa ti sheng nong ye zhuan ji yin sheng wu guan li shui ping, August 5, 2003), http://www.agri.gov.cn (April 5, 2004).

¹⁵⁰ List of No.1-10 groups of interim certificates for imported agricultural GM products, http://www.agri.gov.cn (December 17, 2002)

¹⁵¹ Jikun Huang et al.(2002), supra note 5.

¹⁵² YANG Xiao-e et al., Agricultural Environmental Quality and Safety of Agricultural Products (nong ye huan jing zhi liang yu nong chan pin an quan),vol. 4 (4) Review of China Agricultural Science and Technology (zhong guo nong ye ke ji dao bao), 2002, 3-9.

¹⁵³ CHAI Huiqun &and LI Daoquan, The loopholes in the First GMO Regulations and the Nestl� Circumventing Chinese Law (shou bu zhuan ji yin fa liu lou dong xue chao kou ji yan gui bi zhong guo fa lv), http://www.sina.com.cn (April 1, 2004). The author of this paper did a survey in a supermarket in Beijing in April 2005. This product is still sold without GM labeling.

¹⁵⁴ Article 3 of the 2001 Regulation and Article 6 of the 2002 Labeling Measures.

¹⁵⁵ YANG Guosheng &and WU Dong (Mm. ZHU’s lawyers), Appeal Memo, July 29, 2004, http://www.fincance.sina.com.cn (October 26, 2004).

¹⁵⁶ Many articles, including: LIU Jianqiang, Commercialization of GM Rice – Do Chinese Scientist have Private Interests or Not (zhuan ji yin shui dao shang ye hua – zhong guo ke xue jia dao di you wu si li); LIU Jianqiang, Risks of GM Rice (zhuan ji yin shui dao de an quan yin huan); LIU Jianqiang, GM Rice and Risk of the Interests of the Main Food Crop for the 1.3 Billion People (zhuan ji yin shui dao yu 13 yi ren zhu liang li yi xuan yi), Southern Weekend, December 9, 2004, http://www.finance.sina.com.cn ; LI Hongbing, Who has the Right to Say NO to GM Rice (shui you quan dui zhuan ji yin shui dao shuo bu), HUANG Dafang, GM Rice has No Safety Problems (Huang Da Fang: zhuan ji yin shui dao mei you an quan wen ti), http://www.sina.com.cn  (March 15, 2005) .

¹⁵⁷ LIU Jianqiang, GM Rice Made Shocking Appearance on the Market (zhuan ji yin dao mi jing xian shi chang), Southern Weekend, April 14, 2005, at A3.

¹⁵⁸ The following two surveys are in file with the author.

¹⁵⁹ James Keeley (2003), IDS WP 207, supra note 45, at 18.

¹⁶⁰ News article, Scientists Call for Better Use of Biotech in Farming, China Daily, July 19, 2001, http://www.china.org.cn (November 19, 2002)